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Abstract
For the past decade the Kosovo has been a subject of conflict. Since June 1999 the
Province is undergoing the reconstruction of civil society under the direction of the
United Nations in the form of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo
(UNMIK). This thesis analyzes the prospects of developing democratic government in a
post-conflict Kosovo. On a larger scale, the Kosovo study serves the basis for the analysis
of the techniques available for the international community to build democracy in
ethnically divided societies.

The argument of this thesis rests on the premise that in ethnically divided societies
traditional democratic means are not always able to provide equally meaningful
participation of minority and majority ethnic groups in government. The lack of
inclusiveness will contribute to the perpetuation of constant political struggle and general
instability in a post-conflict zone. Based on the Kosovo study, this thesis argues for the
need for a conceptual framework for peace-building in ethnically divided societies. The
framework must channel all international activities in a coherent and comprehensive
manner towards the goal of democracy-building and stabilization. The thesis suggests
that such a framework is found in a combination of the UN concept of peace-building and
a model of consociational democracy - a system of governance that provides for
mechanisms of inclusion of minorities in government. According to the model of
consociational democracy, the governmental structures function according to the
principles of proportional representation, grand coalition among the leaders of the major
segments of a society and a right of each segments to veto decisions, which are contrary
to its interests.

Given the limited experience of the UNMIK to date, there is insufficient data to
reach definite conclusions about the success or failure of the international approach to
post-conflict reconstruction. Instead, this thesis evaluates how the approximation to a
consociational model increases the chances for the development of stable democratic
government in Kosovo.

x

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

List of Abbreviations
AAK

Alliance for the Future of Kosova

AJC

Advisory Judicial Commission

BSDAK

Bosniacs Party of Democratic Action of Kosova

CEC

Central Election Commission

DRSM

Democratic Reform Party of Muslims

ECAC

Election Complaints and Appeals Sub-Commission

EJS

Emergency Judicial System

EU

European Union

GIG

Citizens’ Initiative of Gora

IAC

Interim Advisory Council

ICP

International Civilian Police

IOM

International Organization for Migration

IQPM

Citizens’ Initiative of the Independents of Mitrovica

JAC

Joint Advisory Council on Provisional Judicial Appointments

JIAS

Joint Interim Administrative Structure

KFOR

Kosovo Force

KLA

Kosovo Liberation Army

KP

Coalition for Independence

KPC

Kosovo Protection Corps

KPS

Kosovo Police Service

KTC

Kosovo Transitional Council

KTHP

Turkish People’s Party of Kosova

LDK

Democratic League of Kosovo

LNDSH

Albanian National Democratic Movement

PQLK

Liberal Centre Party of Kosovo

PLK

Liberal Party of Kosova

MEC

Municipal Election Commission

MTTT

Mitrovica Turk Community

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

OMIK

OSCE Mission in Kosovo

OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PDASHK

Ashkali Albanian Democratic Party of Kosova

PDK

Democratic Party of Kosovo

PGK

Provisional Government of Kosova

PRSH

Albanian Republican Party

PBKD

National Democratic Front of Kosova

PGJK

Green Party of Kosova

PLDK

Liberal Democratic Party of Kosova

PSDK

Social Democratic Party of Kosova

PSHDK

Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosova

PRK

Republican Party of Kosova

PNDSH

Albanian National Democratic Party

RJS

Regular Judicial System

SDA

Party of Democratic Action of Kosova

SRSG

Special Representative of the Secretary General

UNMIK

United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USD

Social Democratic Union

xii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Acknowledgements
Writing this thesis was a hard work (fortunately, sprinkled with some moments of
enjoyment from the process and from the completed product) not only for me, but also
for my professors, family and friends. I want to thank all of them for advice and support,
patience and understanding, inspiration and encouragement.
I am very grateful to my supervisor Professor Leon Trakman and my reader
Professor Kindred who enormously helped me to develop and improve my thesis. Their
insightful advice and encouragement to great extent account for the enjoyment that I felt
during the last stages of writing and satisfaction with the work done. I equally express my
appreciation to my examiner Professor Richard Devlin for his critical and helpful
comments.
Thanks go to my mom and dad who probably worried about my project much more
than I did. Thanks to all my friends for making my stay in Halifax enjoyable (even during
the last months of intensive writing). Special thanks to Ola and Yehenew who always
availed their mighty shoulders to cry on and their sharp minds to discuss the issues of my
thesis. Huge amounts of coffee (and accompanying it conversations) that they regularly
pumped into me were a necessary source of energy and inspiration without which the
work would not have been completed yet.
Thanks to the library staff who were always ready to assist with the most incredible
search demands.
Thanks go to all wonderful people that I met this year for making my life in Halifax
more colourful and exciting.

xiii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Introduction
One of the most striking contradictions of the contemporary world politics is the
great advance in the international mechanisms for the promotion and establishment of
peace and almost equally remarkable “development” of the tools and techniques of war and
repression. Due to the close interrelation of national, political and economic processes in
today’s world, internal conflicts perhaps have stronger impact on the neighbouring states
and on the global atmosphere than they did before. Intervention for the establishment of
peace may be viewed among the most important tools capable of mitigating the negative
consequences of internal conflicts. As a result, the utilization of peace operations has
increased dramatically during the last decade. The development of various forms of peace
operations, on one hand, has opened new opportunities for conflict resolution, but, on the
other, has brought new questions about the legal framework for such operations and their
relative effectiveness and cost.
One of these new and relatively unexplored peace tools is peace-building. The
idea of peace-building was first introduced in the range of the UN instruments for peace
in 1992 by An Agenda for Peace.1 However, only in June 1999 (the time of the
establishment of the United Nations International Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)
could we evidence the comprehensive practical implementation of this idea.
It would be wrong to say that the UNMIK is the first, pilot peace-building activity.
Similar tasks were carried out by the peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Cambodia.
However, the Kosovo mission represents a qualitatively new effort. Unlike the majority
of previous missions, it seeks not merely to treat the symptoms of a conflict, but to
address its sources. This objective requires greater international involvement not only in
the termination of a conflict and initial restoration of peace in Kosovo, but also in a long
term reconstruction of state institutions and the development of civil society. This

1An Agenda for Peace - Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Report o f the
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR/SCOR, 47lh Sess., Preliminary List Item 10 at 55, U.N. Docs.
A/47/277 & S/24111 (1992) [hereinafter An Agendafor Peace].

1
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is probably the first instance o f a mission with such a wide scope of activities - wholesale
reconstruction of the state2 and society.
This thesis covers only a narrow segment of the multidimensional international
efforts in the Province - the development of self-government and the reconstruction of
the judiciary. In this respect, I discuss the following issues: what measures are available
for the reconstruction of a stable democratic government in a deeply divided post-conflict
society; what measures are feasible for the Kosovo situation; and what are the potential
long-term effects of their application in Kosovo.
My framework for analysis of the Kosovo reconstruction is the synergy of two
concepts - peace-building and consociationalism. Each of the concepts highlights a
different aspect of the international activities in Kosovo. The peace-building concept
provides the framework for the assessment of the institutional arrangement o f the
UNMIK. Consociationalism evaluates how the means adopted by the UNMIK contribute
to the development of stable democratic government in an ethnically divided Kosovo.
Consociationalism suggests that stability and democratic governance in an ethnically
divided society can be achieved only through the employment of special techniques
which guarantee minority inclusiveness and cooperative decision-making on matters of
concern to the whole society.
The thesis seeks to capture both theoretical controversies located within the
discourse of peace-building and practical problems of the Kosovo mission. Chapter I
reviews the concept of peace-building and consociational democracy. It explores the
potential benefits of their cooperative utilization and establishes the criteria for the
evaluation of the UNMIK activities. Chapter II presents a theoretical debate over the legal
and moral issues of peace-building. This chapter further develops the criteria for legitimate
peace-building. Chapters IH and IV deal with the practical aspects of the development of
self-government and re-establishment of the judiciary in Kosovo. Each activity of the
international mission is viewed in two dimensions: first, whether it complies with the
requirements and limits established for peace-building; second, how these activities
contribute to the conciliatory democratic result generally sought in peace-building.
21refer to the activities in Kosovo as state building meaning solely the nature of the international
activities, but not implying that the international community attempts to build an independent
state of Kosovo.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3
I do not contend that an international administration was expressly guided by the
principles of consociationalism. Neither do I suggest that consociationalism can be applied
in Kosovo without any reservations. The success of consociationalism in each individual
case depends on the individual circumstances and means used for the implementation of its
principles.
Two years of an international administration is not a long term enough to allow
finite conclusions on the success or failure of the UNMIK. The currently available
information gives one an opportunity to judge on the achievement of short-term goals, such
as humanitarian relief and the re-establishment of state institutional structures. In this
respect, the UNMIK can only be judged on its ability to live up to certain expectations of
the international community in bringing stability to the Province. However, there is still
little basis for the evaluation of the long-term effect of the consociational-type techniques
adopted in Kosovo. At the same time, considering consociationalism critically, I will
analyze whether it can offer effective solution for situations like Kosovo and if not, what
needs to be changed in this theoretical concept to improve it.
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Chapter I
A Theoretical Framework for Effective Peace-building
Any theoretical model or concept is usually construed as a set of general trends
observed in a particular situation and a range of remedies that can be applied for the
resolution of tensions in that particular situation. The general character of concepts and
models is both an advantage and a limitation. On the one hand, the general character of a
model allows the remedies to be applied to a wider range of situations. On the other hand,
the success of the implementation of a model may often be limited because general
guidelines fail to adequately address the deviations from the usual circumstances. The
peace-building concept suffers from such limitations. Although it was developed
specifically for the establishment of peace, it does not embrace the peculiarities of
reconstruction in ethnically divided societies. Because of that, I will tailor my theoretical
approach to the analysis of the events in Kosovo as a combination of two concepts which
together can provide crucial and sensitive guidelines for the practical reconstruction of
the ethnically divided Province. They are peace-building and consociational democracy.
Both concepts seek the same objective - ensuring stability and democratic governance in
a society. However, they seek this objective from different perspectives. Peace-building
focuses more on what should be done, while consociationalism tells how it is to be done
in an ethnically divided society and what effect particular means are likely to have.
Because the two concentrate on different aspects of governance, their combined
utilization in peace operations can provide a well-rounded approach to post-conflict
reconstruction. Each concept will be discussed in this Chapter. The application of each
element of the two concepts in Kosovo will be analyzed in Chapters m and IV.

A. Peace-building
/.

Definitions and characteristics

There is no clear agreement among scholars or practitioners as to the concept of peace
building. In the most general understanding, peace-building refers to the “creation

4
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of a specific infrastructure within and among nations, which removes causes of war and
offers alternatives to war in situations where it might occur.”3
The modern UN concept of peace-building stems from three major documents:
An Agenda for Peace,4 the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace,5 and the Brahimi
Report.6
The 1992 Agenda for Peace introduced the initial, basic ideas about peace
building. It identified the main direction of peace-building -to prevent reoccurrence of
conflict - and exemplified possible peace-building activities. An Agenda for Peace
defined peace-building as “an action to identify and support structures which will tend to
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”7 Peace-building is
viewed in two dimensions: as “concrete cooperative projects which link two or more
countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking"8 and as UN assistance in the
transformation of deficient national structures and strengthening of democratic rule.9
Moreover, the document stipulated the UN obligation to “develop and provide when
requested” 10 support for development of new democratic institutions in post-conflict
states.
A Supplement to An Agenda for Peace has further developed the guidelines for
the “structures for the institutionalization of peace.”11 Given that after an intra-state
conflict state institutions have often collapsed, the Secretary-General emphasized that the
international peace-building intervention must extend beyond military and humanitarian

3 Dyan Mazurana & Susan McKay, Women and Peace-Building (Montreal, PQ: International
Centre Human Rights & Democratic Development, 1999) at 7.
4An Agenda fo r Peace, supra note 1.
s Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper o f the Secretary-General on the Occasion
o f the Fiftieth Anniversary o f the United Nations, U.N. GAOR/SCOR, SO18 Sess., U.N. Docs.
A/50/60 & S/195/1 (1995) [hereinafter Supplement to An Agenda for Peace ].
6 Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations, Report o f the Panel on the United Nations Peace
Operations, UN GAOR, 55th Sess., UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (2000) at 2, online: United
Nations Homepage, http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace operations/ > (date accessed: 24
September 2000) [hereinafter Brahimi Report].
7An Agenda for Peace, supra note I.
8 An Agenda for Peace, supra note 1, para. 56.
9 Ibid., para. 59.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., para. 49.
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tasks and include reconstruction and reconciliation activities.12 The Supplement
distinguished two situations when peace-building can take place. First, peace-building in
the zone where no peacekeeping operation has been deployed before. Then, the
Secretary-General should act on the basis of his general mandate for preventive
diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace-building and take an initiative of sending a mission
(given that a host state gives its consent) to the country in question.13
The second case for peace-building is when a comprehensive political settlement
has been negotiated and verification of its implementation is entrusted with a
multifunctional peace-keeping force.14 In such a situation the UN already has a presence
in the state, and its role has already been accepted by the parties; the peace-keeping
operation is already mandated with peace-building activities.15 Here, peace-keeping is
seen as a prerequisite for peace-building. It is proposed that when a multifunctional
peace-keeping operation succeeds in restoring normal conditions, the UN programmes,
funds, offices and agencies take over the responsibility for further economic, social and
humanitarian reconstruction.16 The Supplement suggested that the decision-making
responsibility in a peace-building operation should be transferred from the Security
Council to the General Assembly or other inter-govemmental bodies.17 At the same time,
the peace-building strategy should be worked out in joint consultations between the UN
and the parties to the conflict.18
The recent Brahimi Report represents one of the first attempts to summarize the
UN experience in peace maintenance and to derive practical recommendations from this
practice. It reaffirms many of the previously stated features of peace-building. The Report
defined peace-building as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble
the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations
something that is more than just the absence of war.’' 19 It recognized the importance of

12 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, supra note 5, para. 13.
13 Ibid., para. 56.
14 Ibid., para. 49.
15 Ibid., para. 50.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., para. 54.
18 Ibid., para. 48.
19 Brahimi Report, supra note 6, para. 13.
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the multidimensional engagement of local parties in peace-building,20 In particular, it is
necessary that the population consciously accepts elections and the formation of local
government as “an appropriate and credible mechanism through which their views on
government are represented.”21 This means that peace-builders should be concerned not
only with the implementation of solutions that they deem appropriate, but also with the
population’s acceptance and understanding o f such solutions.
The Report recognized the great transformative character of peace-building:
“United Nations thus do not deploy into post-conflict situations so much as they deploy
to create such situations.”22 Through the work in personal, political and other areas,
peace-builders drive an unfinished conflict from the military to the political arena and
this way make the diversion of a conflict permanent.23
The Report also takes the connection between peacekeeping and peace-building
seriously: “History has taught that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable
partners in complex operations: while the peacebuilders may not be able to function
without peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders’
work.”24
According to the mentioned UN documents, peace-building encompasses a
variety of activities in different areas of public life: disarmament, restoration of order,
destruction of weapons, repatriation of refugees, training of security personnel, electoral
monitoring, strengthening the rule of law, reforming governmental institutions,
promoting reconciliation, etc.23 These measures have different degrees of priority,
depending on the stage of post-conflict rehabilitation. At the time of deployment, peace
building activities are targeted at rapid humanitarian relief, reconstruction of
humanitarian objects, disarmament and restoration of order. At a further stage,
international organizations will usually proceed towards institution-building - the
establishment of the judiciary (through the appointment of judges and prosecutors, their
legal training, technical support of the courts, etc.), the formation of representative bodies
20Brahimi Report, supra note 6, para 37.
21 Ibid., para. 38.
22 Brahimi Report, supra note 6, para. 20.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., para. 28.
25 Ibid. See also An Agendafor Peace, supra note 1, para. 55.
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(through the promotion of political participation, preparation and monitoring of
elections), and the creation and training of the local police.
As evidenced in the UN documents, peace-building is exercised by an outside
authority (usually in the form of an international administration) which seeks to fulfill
two objectives - to transform a post-conflict society and to provide for its sustainability.
Transformation is aimed at changing the conflict at the political, structural and social
levels, which precludes reoccurrence of tension.26 Sustainability means: 1) local
governmental structures are put in operation and are able to independently manage the
affairs in a post-conflict zone after the withdrawal of an international mission; and 2)
those local structures continue to function in accordance with democratic principles
introduced by peace-builders.
The achievement of the two main goals of peace-building requires adoption of a
certain strategy. Boutros-Ghali noted in An Agenda for Peace that “there is an obvious
connection between democratic practices - such as the rule of law and transparency in
decision-making - and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable
political order.”27 Consequently, democratization becomes one of the central strategies
for achieving transformation and sustainability. First, democratic institution-building
catalyses the transformation of society and its political system. In turn, the existence and
the work of the newly established institutions lays the foundations for the self
sustainability o f a post-conflict society.28
The transformation sought by peace-builders implies the alteration of the nature
of a post-conflict society. Such a task involves a number of challenges from both a
practical and a scholarly point of view. From a scholarly perspective, the difficulties with
exercising transformative peace-building are twofold: first, no comprehensive peace
building theory has been elaborated yet29 - for example, there are no clear principles
26 John Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington:
US Institute of Peace Press, 1997) at 75.
27 An Agenda fo r Peace, supra note 1.
28 The causal relation between democracy and resolution of the problems of a post-conflict
society can also be viewed from another perspective: the establishment of democratic government
may be a result, rather than the cause of the transformation. See, Samuel Barnes, ‘The
Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies” (2001) 95 AJIL 86 at 86-87.
29 Here, I mean lack of developments other than guidelines stipulated in An Agenda for Peace,
Supplement to an Agenda for Peace and the Brahimi Report.
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governing the status of peace-builders in a post-conflict zone (e.g., to what extent they
should be impartial, when could they use weapons, etc.); second, how legitimate are
lengthy large-scale international interventions in post-conflict reconstruction.30 These
theoretical problems have a strong impact on the practical exercise of peace-building. As
I will show in the next Chapter, the legitimacy of a peace-building mission, and the
organs re-established by it, influences the amount of support that an international
administration will receive from the local population.
As pointed out above, to date the peace-building concept remains vague. Neither
the UN documents nor scholarly discussion provide sufficient precision about the
characteristics which allow one to distinguish peace-building from other peace operations
and to define the limits on the conduct of peace-builders. For the purposes of this thesis,
one can identify the following characteristics of peace-building (as derived from the
previously discussed Agenda for Peace, the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace and the
Brahimi Report);31 I) comprehensive nature - it embraces political, economic, military,
humanitarian and other tasks; 2) it includes institution-building as one of its essential
activities; 3) it seeks to transform a society in a way that precludes the reoccurrence of
tension and provides the sustainability of such transformation; 4) it is exercised in close
connection with peacekeeping (the latter is seen as a prerequisite for peace-building in
terms of both the legal basis and the foundation for practical activities of a peace-building
mission); S) it requires close cooperation between peace-builders and local parties; and 6)
it takes place after the cessation of hostilities.
These characteristics create a certain idea about peace-building, but leave
unresolved several essential issues, including: whether a host state’s consent is required
for peace-building; whether peace-builders have to be neutral and impartial; how broad
their military and police power of a peace-building mission should be. The answers to
these questions will be provided through the analysis of the theory and practice o f peace
building in Chapter II. From the perspective of the UN documents, we can observe the

30 The second problem may be classified as a “moral” problem of peace-building. It will be
examined in Chapter n.
31 Peace-building can be exercised at pre-conflict stage as a counterpart of preventive diplomacy
and at post-conflict stage. The discussion of this thesis concerns post-conflict peace-building
only.
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following trend. First, the host state’s consent is likely to be needed. An Agenda for
Peace and the Supplement expressed a concern that peace-building may be treated by
local parties as an invasion on the sovereignty of their state. Since such a situation is of
concern, it would be logical for the international community to seek the host state’s
consent to the deployment of a mission. Second, because the documents recognize deep
involvement of the UN and other agencies in reconstruction and the transformative nature
of such reconstruction, I can suggest that peace-builders are viewed as parties to the
reconstruction process, but not as neutral and impartial observers of the transformation.

2. Peace-building in a divided society
At the point when the international community has not acquired enough feedback
about peace-building through “in Held’’ missions, the theoretical concept of peacebuilding

is likely to be the main guideline for the planning of international actions. As a

concept, peace-building stipulates commonly shared values - peace, democracy, human
rights - but does not prescribe particular means for their achievement. What is crucial in
relation to Kosovo, is that the peace-building concept to date has inadequately addressed
the issue of institution-building under the circumstances of divided societies.
According to political science studies, “...a peculiar set of problems surrounds the
maintenance of democracy”33 in divided societies.34 The peculiarities of political
organization and electoral behaviour in these societies create a situation that even under
the existence of democratic institutions and procedures the domination by a majority is

32 Here, I mean the concept derived from An Agenda fo r Peace, the Supplement to an Agenda for
Peace and the Brahimi Report
" Donald L. Horowitz, “Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?” in Designing Democratic
Institutions, Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo (eds.) (New York: New York University Press, 2000)
253 at 253.
34 Societies may be divided by different criteria - ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious, social, etc.
The following discussion places a lot of emphasis on the distinct nature of divided societies,
especially ethnically divided societies, like Kosovo (the evidence for that will be provided in
Chapter m). It should be borne in mind that the effect of democratic practices is contingent not
merely on the fact of ethnic division, but rather on the nature of such division, historical
peculiarities of the zone, political culture, etc.
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possible, along with the exclusion of minorities from government.35 Let us briefly review
why democratic practices produce such an effect in a divided society.36
The two inalienable characteristics of democracy are contestation and
inclusiveness: contestation of political power within a framework of rights and
institutions and inclusiveness regarding the adult population’s right to participate in such
contestation.37
In an ethnically divided society, ethnic identity would often define if a person or a
group is included or excluded in the contestation of power.

Moreover, the very

contestation of power is exercised along ethnic lines. The sense of ethnic group creates a
strong impetus towards party organization along ethnic lines.38 After a deadly ethnic
conflict, ethnic affiliation becomes even stronger source of the sense of “trust...and
protection against neglect of one’s interests by strangers.”39 Thus, not only parties are
formed along ethnic lines, but also people usually vote for parties, which represent their
ethnic group. Then, democratic elections regress into a zero-sum game: one ethnic group
wins by its democratic weight and others see themselves as losing all and being excluded
not only from the government, but also from the larger political community.40 Being
underrepresented in the organs of government, minority groups have limited access to
power and little opportunity to ensure that their interests are taken into account. The
majority rule in a divided society may produce decisions that serve the benefit of the

33 Donald Horowitz, “Democracy in Divided Societies” in Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and
Democracy, Larry Diamond & Marc Platter (eds.) (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University
Press, 1994) 35 at 37.
36The following discussion involves a great deal of generalization about patterns of democracy in
divided societies. I highlight only the most important and common trends that can be expected in
such a society. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the peculiarities of ethnopolitical balance and the effect of consociational techniques may significantly differ from case to
case.
37 Bames, supra note 28 at 88.
38 Ibid.
39 Horowitz, supra note 35 at 49.
40 Donald Horowitz, “Ethnic Conflict Management for Policy Makers” in Joseph V. Montville
(ed.) Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Lexington. Mass.: Lexington Books,
1990), 115-16.
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majority, but ignore the needs of minorities. This way majority rule becomes not only
ineffective in mitigating ethnic tensions, but also incompatible with democracy.41
The peace-building concept refers to democracy-building in general terms and,
thus, it most likely suggests only traditional democratic means for democratization in an
ethnically divided society. Yet, in an ethnically divided society the usual democratic rules
do nothing about ethnic exclusion and even more, they foster it.42 The unresolved tension
between minority and majority will be like a powder keg ready to explode any time.
Then, the peace-building concept, which relies on traditional means and does not include
special mechanisms against exclusion of minorities from the government, will fail to
achieve its main goal - transformation of society in a way that prevents the reoccurrence
of a conflict and sustainability of that transformation. Consequently, to accomplish its
objective, peace-building has to address ethnic division through the mechanisms that
reconcile ethnic divergences within the democratic process. In my opinion, such
mechanisms can be found in political science theory. In particular, the model of
consociational democracy suggests some avenues for more effective peace-building.

B. Consociational Democracy
/.

General characteristic

The model of consociational democracy was initially developed by Arend
Lijphart in his work “Democracy in Plural Societies.” This model suggests that in plural
societies43 the establishment and maintenance of stable democratic government becomes
possible due to special built-in techniques, which ensure participation of all major
segments of the society in state decision-making. These special techniques (or elements
of consociational democracy) are: 1) grand coalition; 2) mutual veto; 3) proportionality in
political representation, civil service appointments and allocation of public finds; and 4) a
high degree of autonomy for each segment of the society.44

41 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (London: Yale
University Press, 1977) at 113.
42 Horowitz, supra, note 35 at 45.
43 Plural society is a society divided into segments based on linguistic, cultural religious, racial,
ethnic or other characteristics. See, Lijphart, supra note 41 at 3-4. Note that the term “plural
society” is broader than “ethnically divided society.”
44 lbid.,at 25.
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The grand coalition presupposes the participation of the leaders of all significant
segments in governing a society.43 Grand coalition is a central element of
consociationalism. It is the factor that guarantees conciliation in a society. The
participation of the major segments of the society may be achieved, inter alia, through
the establishment of reserved seats in the legislature, special requirements to the
composition of the organs of government, etc. Importantly, it is not the mere fact of
participation that produces the conciliatory result of a grand coalition. It is the willingness
and ability of the leaders of the segments to cooperate and compromise. If the leaders of
segments are formally included in government, but refuse to cooperate with each other,
no mutually acceptable solution can be elaborated and the decision-making is most likely
to be ruled by the segment that has majority in government.
Grand coalition is complemented by three other instruments: mutual veto,
proportionality and segmental autonomy. These three elements may be regarded as
procedural rules, which support collective decision-making and adoption of mutually
acceptable decisions.
Grand coalition allows minority participation in decision-making, but if in such a
coalition decisions are made by majority vote, there is no guarantee that minority
interests will not be outvoted by the majority. This is why an effective grand coalition
requires such a tool of political protection as mutual veto.46 Each segment of a society has
power to veto a decision if it considers it to be contrary to that segment’s interests.
Mutual veto may be incorporated in legal rules as a requirement of making decisions by
consensus.
Proportionality is the third element, which represents a deviation from majority
rule. Proportionality is utilized in at least two forms. First, as a guideline for allocating
seats in state organs and financial resources among different segments47 and in the design
of an electoral system. Second, as a principle of decision-making that allows groups to
influence decisions in proportion to their numeric weight.48

45Lijphart, supra note 41, at 32.
46 Ibid., at 37.
47 Ibid., at 38.
48 Ibid., at 39.
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Segmental autonomy is a corollary of the grand coalition principle. The decisions
on matters of common concern are made by all segments of the society together. The
matters of exclusive concern for a particular segment are resolved by that segment
alone.49 Segmental autonomy enables minorities to rule over the areas of their exclusive
concern.50 It includes delegation of rule-making and rule-application powers to the
segments of a plural society. One of the forms of segmental autonomy is federalism.51
These are briefly the main characteristics of the elements of consociationalism.
Because I propose consociationalism as a remedy for Kosovo, we need to be aware not
only of the benefits, but also of the limitations of this model.
The criticisms of consociationalism can be summarized in four points. First, it is
noted that grand coalition provides for relatively small and weak opposition.52 Inclusion
of all segments in decision-making undermines the incentives for democratic
competition, which is an essential prerequisite for healthy democracy. If everybody is
included and minorities have their fixed seats in representative bodies, what is the sense
of trying to win voters’ support?53 Minority parties that automatically get seats in the
legislature may feel reluctant to actively participate in the contest for power during
elections. At the same time, majority parties are likely to oppose automatic inclusion of
minority members in the legislature on the grounds that such inclusion unduly favours
minority parties. Thus, grand coalition may not only weaken the opposition, but also
strengthen the aggressiveness of majority parties. It may also produce an opposition,
which is based not on difference in political positions, but rather on ethnic affiliation.
Second, as a corollary of grand coalition, proportional system creates little
incentives to generate pooling of votes across ethnic lines either at electoral or at postelectoral stage. Because the consociational system relies on quotas and restraints rather
than positive incentives, the interethnic dialogue will have a competitive rather than
cooperative character.54 Paradoxically, proportionality may be viewed as preventing

49 Lijphart, supra note 41, at 41.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., at 42.
52 Ibid., at 47.
53 Horowitz, supra note 35 at 49.
54 Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific, Michael E. Brown & Sumit
Ganguly (eds.) (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997) at 553.
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conciliatory results, which is sought through introducing consociational techniques.
Another objection to proportionality may be raised from the position of meritocracy.
Appointments based on person’s ethnic identity rather than individual qualities,
emphasize ethnic affiliation as a passport for obtaining certain public positions. Then,
ethnic boundaries are likely to be maintained rather than smoothed over.
Third, the consociational model, concerned with equal treatment of groups rather
than individual equality,ss creates “communal society” as opposed to democracy in a
homogenous society, where the emphasis is made on individual rights and freedoms.56
The emphasis on ethnic community threatens to undermine the goals of maximizing
individual freedom and equality in society.57
Fourth, the remedies of the consociational model are mainly targeted at the
representative or executive branch of government. The other systems of state organs, Uke
the judiciary and the police, are usually overlooked as if they were not influenced by
ethnic division. This omission is erroneous. Not only the judiciary and the police reflect
ethnic division, but they may also contribute to mitigation or, to the contrary,
strengthening of ethnic exclusion.58 Consequently, consociationalism needs to develop
mechanisms of minority inclusion, which will be suitable for application to the judiciary
and the police.
The presented critiques are strong enough to question the workability and
usefulness of adapting consociationalism in plural societies. Do these limitations imply
that consociationalism is inherently flawed? I do not support either an extreme position
that consociationalism is an inherently flawed model or an opposite view on it as a
panacea for divided societies. The degree of the deficiency of consociationalism depends
on two factors: the individual set of circumstances in the country in question and the
means chosen for the implementation of the elements of consociationalism. The
limitations of consociationalism reveal themselves in different forms and to different
degrees, depending on the characteristics of a particular society. For example, in such

55 Horowitz, supra note 35 at 49.
56Ibid., at 48.
57 David Wippman, “Introduction” in International Law and Ethnic Conflict David Wippman
(ed.) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) at 240.
58This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter ID.
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plural societies as Belgium and Switzerland consociationalism does not prevent either
pooling of votes across ethnic lines or the existence of effective opposition.59 There the
power sharing among ethnic groups is traditionally exercised through inter-ethnic
coalitions: poly-ethnic parties (Switzerland) or through poly-ethnic unions of mono
ethnic parties (Belgium).60 It should be noted that consociationalism was developed on
the basis of studies of stable democracies in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland. Consequently, the proposed remedies largely rely on the processes inherent
to stable democracies. Because the circumstances of a post-conflict society are different,
the peculiarities of the country in question may place a restraint on the success of
consociational techniques. Thus, depending on the characteristics of a society,
consociationalism may or may not suffer from the mentioned limitations.
Another factor that influences the effectiveness of consociationalism in mitigating
ethnic tension is the means chosen to implement the elements of consociationalism. For
example, consociationalism is criticized for creating little incentive for politicians to
moderate their statements and for voters to vote across ethnic lines. The incentives for
such pooling of votes and moderation of positions depend, inter alia, on the design of an
electoral system. One of the successful examples of creating such incentives through
electoral system is found in Nigeria. There the electoral system was designed in a way to
guarantee that a candidate for President of the Republic would be moderate on matters of
interethnic relations.61 To win a candidate had to receive the largest number of votes plus
at least 25% of the votes in at least two-thirds of the 19 states.62 This formula precluded
two of the three main ethnic groups from combining to win elections without minority
support63 The first elections provided for the sought result - the first president, Shehu
Shagari

proved

to be

a

“panethnic

figure.”64 This

example

confirms

that

consociationalism developed on the basis of stable democracies can still be effective in
59 Philippe Van Parijs “Power-sharing versus Border-crossing in Ethnically Divided Societies” in
Designing Democratic Institutions, Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo (eds.) (New York: New York
University Press, 2000) 296 at 307.
60 Ibid. Actually, the model of consociationalism elaborated by Lijphart was to great extent
inspired by the democratic practice of these two countries.
61 Horowitz, supra note 33 at 263.
62 Ibid. The territories of states were a proxy for ethnicity.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
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developing states if implemented with careful consideration of local peculiarities. As we
can see, it is not consociationalism as such that works or does not work, but the
mechanisms for its implementation that are inadequate or not. In Chapter in we will see
what system was adopted for the implementation of the elements of consociationalism in
Kosovo.

2. Implication o f consociationalism fo r Kosovo
The particular set of circumstances in Kosovo will to a great extent define what
elements of consociationalism can be adopted and what adverse effect on reconciliation
the limitations of consociationalism may have. The characteristics of the situation in
Kosovo may be divided into two categories: those that are likely to increase the adverse
effect of consociationalism and those that are likely to mitigate it. The nature and degree
of ethnic division, the previous existence of an open conflict between ethnic groups, poor
economic conditions, uncertainty about the future status of the Province, differences in
political positions of the majority and minority parties - these factors are likely to
increase the adverse effect of consociationalism. These factors themselves are limitations
on the implementation of consociationalism and its success in Kosovo. At the same time,
there is a factor that is likely to mitigate the limitations of consociationalism. It is the
existence of an international administration in Kosovo, which has power to set up the
rules of behaviour of the main participants of the political process and to control the
enforcement of these rules. Usually the division of society prevents it from taking an
action to overcome such division.63 However, in case of Kosovo, there is an outside
power (an international administration) that exercises pressure for the implementation of
a coherent package of techniques, which facilitate minority inclusion.
It has been determined in the preceding discussion that the success of
consociationalism depends on the circumstances of a particular country and measures
adopted for the implementation of consociationalism. Then, in relation to Kosovo it is
necessary to look at: 1) what elements of consociationalism are suitable for Kosovo? 2)
can these elements be actually implemented? If yes, through what techniques? 3) what is
the likely effect of their implementation? These questions will be briefly addressed
“ Horowitz, supra note 33 at 261.
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below, but their more detailed analysis is to follow in Chapters m and IV where the
concrete techniques used by the UNMIK will be discussed.
Grand coalition. For a post-conflict society, the importance of a grand coalition
lies in its potential to promote post-conflict reconciliation, cooperation and fairness of
decision-making. Given the peculiarities of Kosovo (that Kosovo is a part of a state; that
it is currently administered by an international administration; etc.), the formation of a
grand coalition will differ from the process described by Lijphart. He applied the model
for independent states, but Kosovo is an internationally administered province. The
essence of the principle remains the same - to ensure that matters of common concern are
decided with consideration of the interests of all segments. However, there may be
several deviations from the pattern proposed by Lijphart.
In Kosovo grand coalitions are created under the pressure of the international
administration, but not through the internal incentives of the political process. Grand
coalition at the provincial level was created through the nomination of the representatives
of all major segments of the Kosovo society in the UNMIK-created organs.66 These
organs included the leaders of religious, political, ethnic and other segments. The
pressure of the international authority was crucial for overcoming the post-conflict
reluctance of political leaders to enter multiethnic bodies and conduct dialogue with each
other.
The mere fact of the inclusion of ethnic community leaders is a precondition, but
not yet a guarantee for the emergence of a grand coalition. For example, Kosovar leaders
often resorted to boycotting decision-making or refusing to participate in multiethnic
organs in order to advocate their political demands.67 If leaders are formally included, but
decline the mutual decision-making, a grand coalition does not accomplish its aim of
producing mutually acceptable solutions. It confirms our previous assumption that an
international administration can only create strong preconditions for overcoming
unwillingness of local parties to enter into inter-ethnic dialogue, but it is for the locals to
make the most of such preconditions.
66 For more detailed discussion of these organs, their composition and powers see. Chapter III.
67 One of the vivid examples is the position of Kosovo Serbs. Their representatives were
appointed to the UNMIK-created organs, but they refused to take seats. Only after negotiations
with the SRSG did hey agree to participate in the meetings as observers only.
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Mutual veto. Mutual veto is an important guarantee that minorities have their
interests taken into account during decision-making in grand coalitions. However, there is
a danger that the frequent use of veto will lead to paralysis and deadlock in decision
making. Lijphart believed that this danger is not likely to be serious because, first, the
fact that the veto is available creates the feeling of security for a respective minority and,
thus, makes the use of the veto improbable;68 second, each segment is aware of the threat
of deadlock and will try to reach mutually acceptable solutions.69 These reasons seem to
be convincing, but they are likely to be true for societies with more or less established
structures and power sharing where rationality becomes a main guideline for decisions. In
contrast, the behaviour in post-conflict societies continues to be significantly influenced
by ethnic sentiment. Minority and majority groups are so hostile towards each other that
decisions are likely to be dictated by populist motives and emotions rather than
rationality. When rationality, as the main safeguard against unrestricted use of veto, is
absent, the risk of deadlock becomes very high. There is a danger that in a post-conflict
society mutual veto will have destructive, rather than conciliatory effect. Again, a lot will
depend on the instruments chosen to design the veto power. In this respect, the approach
adopted by the UNMIK is very interesting. Through a number of tools the administration
tailored a model of a moderate mutual veto which, on the one hand, allows ethnic
communities to protect their interests, but, on the other, reduces the danger of deadlock.70
Another tool available for preventing deadlock, which results from the use of the veto, is
the power of the international administration to interfere in case of an organ’s inability to
reach a decision. This method, however, should be viewed as acceptable only for the
initial stages of reconstruction.
Proportionality.

Proportionality

is another important mechanism,

which

strengthens the inclusiveness of minorities in government through seat allocation and
decision-making procedures. In Chapters m and IV we will examine in more detail how
the UNMIK employed proportionality in the appointment of the local bodies and judicial
personnel and in tailoring the electoral system.

68 Lijphart, supra note 41 at 37.
69 Ibid.
70This mechanism will be discussed in Chapter III.
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Segmental autonomy. Segmental autonomy provides major segments of the
society with the authority to manage their affairs independently. Lijphart discussed
segmental autonomy as a solution for a state. In relation to the province of Kosovo, it
may have somewhat different effect. On the one hand, segmental autonomy would mean
delegation of certain powers to the Province’s minorities in the areas of their (minority)
concentration.71 This ability of minorities to manage own affairs facilitates their fuller
inclusion in the government. It would also be consistent with the general trend of
decentralization of power through the municipal self-government. On the other hand, in
regard to the Serb municipalities segmental autonomy can produce a destabilizing effect.
In my opinion, further delegation of power to the Serb communities may lead to their
claims for secession. For this reason, the issue of implementing segmental autonomy and
its scope should be dealt with special care. It may be expedient to implement only three
(grand coalition, mutual veto and proportionality), but not four elements72 in Kosovo.
Then, there is a legitimate question whether these elements can be implemented
separately. On the one hand, according to Lijphart’s concept, the four elements of
consociationalism -

grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental

autonomy - are complementary to each other. Only together can they be effective in
mitigating ethnic tension. Horowitz suggests that the four elements of the consociational
model are complementary to each other and are intended to work as a coherent project.
He warns that the adoption of certain parts of the model without the others may not only
fail to reduce a conflict, but also lead to worse results than doing nothing at all.73 For
example, grand coalition without mutual veto will not guarantee that the interests of
minorities will not be overridden by the ethnic majority. On the other hand, not all
elements are suitable or can be quickly implemented in Kosovo. In his work on
democratization in South Africa, Horowitz noted that “the trick [about successful

71 All Kosovo municipalities are granted equal degree of self-government, but this is not
segmental autonomy. Segmental autonomy means delegation of powers to segments, but not
merely territorial units. In Kosovo municipal boundaries do not coincide with the ethnic
distribution of the population (except for the three Serb municipalities).
72 As pointed at the beginning of the section, the fourth element is segmental autonomy.
73 Horowitz, supra note 33 at 261.
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democracy-building] is to borrow right institutions,”74 i.e., those that are appropriate and
suitable in given circumstances. I suggest that grand coalition, mutual veto and
proportionality can be and should be implemented in Kosovo. The implementation of
segmental autonomy may be subject to the reservations that I have expressed above. I
concur with Lijphart who said that “[t]he essential characteristic of consociational
democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint
effort by the elites to stabilize the system.”75 My point here is not that institutional
arrangement has to be defined by elites (this pattern an be considered undemocratic), but
that there is no one strictly determined structure for consociationalism, which has to be
equally followed in all situations. In each case the design of the elements and institutions
will be contingent on the circumstances of the country in question. At the same time, the
elements of consociationalism have to be implemented in a way that allows preserving
the internal checks and balances among the elements of consociationalism.'6

C. Peace-building and consociationaism: a mutually beneficial
union?
Both the peace-building concept and the consociational model have their
limitations in relation to reconstruction of divided societies. The peace-building concept
does not incorporate techniques to accommodate tensions in ethnically divided societies
and because of that an international administration may fail to eliminate the sources of a
conflict - dictatorship by the majority and exclusion of minorities. Consociationalism
provides for techniques of ethnic inclusion, but these techniques may not be implemented
by the parties to a conflict without international pressure. Thus, peace-building
complements consociationalism in terms of providing a framework for an international
administration in a post-conflict zone and consociationalism adds important conciliatory
techniques to the range of peace-building tools.
74 Donald Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1991) at 101.
75 Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy” (1969) 21 World politics, reprinted in Van Parijs
supra note 59 at 307.
76 For example, proportionality has to be adopted not only in relation to one state institution or
branch of government, but all of them when applicable, that is, not only the legislature should be
based on proportionality, but also the composition of the cabinet and the election of a president as
well as formation of the judiciary and the police.
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The strength of the interrelation of peace-building and consociationalism is in the
exchange between theory and practice. The consociational model is suggested as a
possible way for the resolution of the potential democratic deficit in Kosovo associated
with majority government. The activities of peace-building missions give feedback about
the practical value of consociational mechanisms. Moreover, the empirical evidence from
such missions contributes new aspects to the theoretical model of consociationalism (for
example, the necessity to apply proportionality not only in representative organs, but also
for the creation of the judiciary and the police77).
Even the combination of peace-building and consociationalism does not
automatically mean success for a peace-building mission. Consociationalism, proposed as
a solution for the “ethnic neutrality” of peace-building, has its limitations, which may
even be intensified by the circumstances of post-conflict Kosovo. Although I have
already expressed a critical stance on the proposed theoretical model, the conclusion
about its workability and its limitations in Kosovo and similar situations will ultimately
be reached through the further analysis of this thesis.

77 For the discussion of these issues see, Chapter IV.
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Chapter II
General Issues of Peace-building
A painter usually starts a picture with the choice of several basic colours and their
correlation. The three or four main spots of colour are the basis for the further work on
details and overtones and a guideline for the harmonic combination of images and
perspectives in the picture.
I want to start my picture of peace-building in Kosovo with the presentation of the
basic “colours” of this peace operation: the circumstances, which led to the establishment
of the mission, the legal basis of the mission, and the major problems that have been and
may be encountered during the exercise of peace-building activities there.
This Chapter combines a theoretical discussion of peace-building with the
analysis of practical aspects of the UNMIK activities. Section A provides an overview of
the major events in Kosovo that happened since 1989. Based on the facts of Section A,
Section B reveals major legal and moral controversies of peace-building which should be
borne in mind during a further discussion of self-government and judicial reform in
Kosovo. It also further defines the characteristics required of a peace-building mission
and analyzes how well the UNMIK meets these requirements.

A. The Establishment and Powers of the UNMIK
What follows is not a comprehensive analysis of the development of the Kosovo
conflict.78 Rather, these are the basic facts that create a necessary context for the
understanding of peace-building activities in Kosovo.79

78 For detailed analysis of the events in Kosovo, see: Tim Judah, Kosovo War and Revenge (New
Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000); Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond
(Toronto: Viking, 2000); Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History o f Kosovo
(London: Hurst & Company, 1998); Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York : New
York University Press, 1998).
79The debate about the lawfulness of the actions of the Serbian authorities in Kosovo, the scale of
ethnic violence (e.g., whether it amounted to ethnic cleansing or genocide), the nature of the
Kosovo struggle (whether it can be viewed as self-determination movement), the lawfulness of
the NATO intervention and related issues are beyond the scope of this paper. For the discussion
of these problems, see: Michael Smith “NATO, the Kosovo Liberation Army, and the War for an
Independent Kosovo: Unlawful Aggression or Legitimate Exercise of Self-Determination?'
23
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1.

Statement o f facts80

Historically, the Province of Kosovo is of great importance for both Serbs and
Albanians. For Serbs, Kosovo is the birthplace of the Serb nation.81 The Albanians’ claim
to Kosovo is based on historical connection: the Albanian national movement started in
Kosovo in 1878 and since that time Kosovo is considered one of the centers of Albanian
nationalism.83 Another factor is demographics. For centuries Kosovo has been populated
predominantly by Albanians. During 1953-1991 the Albanian population in Kosovo
increased from 64.9% to 82.2%.83 The growth of the Albanian part of the population was
accompanied by a significant decrease in numbers of Serb, Montenegrin, Croat and Turk
minorities. By 1998 Albanians made up more than 90% of Kosovo’s population.84
In 1974, under President Tito’s rule, Kosovo obtained the status of an autonomous
region within Serbia. The next several years were characterized by growing
“Albanization” of the political, economic and cultural life of Kosovo. The positive
discrimination pursued by formerly disadvantaged Albanians83 was experienced by other
ethnic groups as injustice and contributed to their sense of insecurity.86

(2001) 27 Army Law. 1; Richard B. Bilder, "Kosovo and the “New Interventionism”: Promise or
Peril? “ (1999) 9 J. Transnat’l L & Pol’y 153; Julie Mertus, “Reconsidering the Legality of
Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Kosovo” (2000) 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1743; Walter
Gary Sharp, “Operation Allied Force: Reviewing the Lawfulness of NATO’s Use of Military
Force to Protect Kosovo” (1999) 23 Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade 295; “Editorial Comments: NATO’s
Kosovo Intervention” (1999) 93 AJIL 824. In the description of the events in Kosovo I do not
take either pro-Albanian or pro-Serb side. My goal here is briefly summarize the facts of the
conflict as they were presented by different authors.
80 For a flow chart of the major events, see Appendix 1.
81 The significance of Kosovo for the Serb history is seen first of all in the battle between the Serb
knights and the Ottoman Turks that took place in Kosovo Polje on 28 June 1389. The loss of the
battle led to the establishment of the Ottoman Turk rule over the Balkans. Serbs viewed the
collapse of the Serb medieval state as one of the central events in their history and found its
explanation in the Battle of Kosovo. “The epic cycle of Kosovo became the longest, most
beautiful and most important of all the Serbian epics. These epic myths ... become
institutionalized as a part of the ...Serbian national programme.” See, Vickers, supra note 78 at
12-15.
82 M. Smith, Kosovo: Background and Chronology, online: Federation of American Scientists
Homepage http://www.fas.org/man/dod-10 l/ops/docs99/g72-mas-compl.htm (date accessed: 20
January 2001).
83Judah, supra note 78 at 313.
84 Smith, supra note 82.
85 After World War Q the Yugoslav government suppressed Kosovo Albanians in many ways.
The land of Albanian farmers was given to numerous Serbian and Montenegrin families, which
were encouraged to settle in Kosovo. Albanians were discriminated in employment. Very few
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In 1981-82 a series of riots calling for “unified Albania” and “Kosovo Republic”
shook the Province.87 The riots were often accompanied by abusive actions against Serbs
and Montenegrins, including beatings and the destruction of property. At that point,
Milosevic exploited the general instability in the Province and the growing concerns of
Serbs about their position in Kosovo to increase his popularity among the Serb
population. He expressed strong support for the Serbs of Kosovo and willingness to help
in fighting “Albanization,”88 what gained him wide support among Serbs.
After becoming a Serb president in 1989, Milosevic supported a series of
measures to limit Kosovo autonomy. The abolition of the Kosovo autonomy started with
the amendments to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia in March 1989.89
The same month, the work of the Kosovo Executive Council and the Kosovo Assembly
was suspended. In July 1990 the Serb National Assembly took administrative and
executive control over the Province.90 In September 1990 the process of abolishing the de
jure and de facto Kosovo autonomy was completed with the adoption of a new Serb
Constitution, which defined Kosovo as a region within Serbia.
Seeking to reinforce control over Kosovo, the Serb government used various
means of oppression against the Albanian population, ranging from firing Albanians from
public sector positions and reducing funding for Kosovo public institutions to arrests,
beatings and other forms of intimidation. In turn, the Kosovars refused to recognize the
legitimacy of the Serb direct rule over Kosovo. They formed parallel political, economic
and social institutions, including a shadow government, political parties, schools, trade
unions and hospitals.91 The Kosovars managed to create a highly coordinated system of

schools and educational and cultural institutions provided instruction in Albanian. See,
Expulsions
of
Albanians
and
Colonization
of
Kosova,
online:
<
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.Uk/Kosovo/chap3.htm#n4> (date accessed: I August 2001)
86 Vickers, supra note 78 at 223.
87 Ibid., at 198.
88 Vickers, supra note 78 at 229.
89 Ibid., at 234.
90 Ibid., at 245.
91 Ibid.
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institutions, which provided for nearly all services “except for their own army and
garbage collection.”92
In 1991 the Kosovo shadow parliament proclaimed Kosovo independence, which
was further supported on a secret referendum by 99.87% of the eligible voters.93 In the
1992 parliamentary and presidential elections to the Kosovo parallel structures, the
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) - one of the central actors of the Albanian
opposition - won the majority of votes. The movement’s leader Rugova was elected the
president of Kosovo.
During 1992-1994, the Serb oppression over Kosovo grew. Rugova’s policy of
peaceful resistance and reliance on the international support failed to change the situation.
His tactics were challenged by more radical members of the Kosovo community, who
advocated armed resistance to the Serb administration. Among them was the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA), which adopted an aggressive policy of attacking the Serb police
and security forces and assassinating Serb officials. Quickly gaining support among the
population, the KLA soon became a force equally important to the LDK. By 1998 it
controlled about 25-30 percent of the Province’s territory.94 After the Serb withdrawal from
Kosovo in 1999 the KLA assumed de facto authority in many Kosovo municipalities93 and
continued to play an active role in Kosovo political life after the deployment of the UNMIK.
Due to popular support, well-developed structures and substantial financial
resources, the KLA-tied organizations and the LDK remain the most influential political
entities in Kosovo. They played a central role in the self-government structures created by
the UNMIK and led over other political parties during the 2000 municipal elections. A
detailed discussion of these issues is to follow in Chapter III.
The year 1998 was marked by intensified violence from both the Serb and Kosovar
sides. The strengthened KLA undertook several massive operations against the Serb police.
92 Julie Mertus, “Nationalism and Nation-Building: Milosevic Turns to Montenegro and Kosovo”
(1994) 26 NYU J. Int’l L. & P. 511 at 519.
93 Vickers, supra note 78 at 251.
94 Assessment o f the Situation o f Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, OSCE Report, September 2000, at
3, online: OSCE Homepage http://www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/pdf/mibrep.pdf (date
accessed: 12 February 2001).
95 October 28, 2000 -- Municipal Elections in Kosovo: A Human Rights Watch Backgrounder,
Human Rights Watch Report, November 2000, online: Human Rights Watch Homepage
www.hrw.org/press/2000/10/kosovo1020-bck.htm (date accessed: 10 February 2001).
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In response, the Serb security forces conducted a series of raids against Albanians in the
Drenica region. Later on, numerous battles for effective control over the parts of Kosovo
arose between the Serb and Yugoslav troops and the KLA. The conflict was turning into a
guerrilla war.96 The victims of clashes between the KLA and the security forces have
commonly been the civilian population.97 Thousands of Kosovars, frightened by the
escalating hostilities, poured into neighbouring Albania and Montenegro. According to the
UNHCR report, in the beginning of 1998 about 350,000 people were displaced or fled
abroad.98
Increased violence and intensive flows of refugees from Kosovo raised concerns
within the international community about stability in the Balkan region. In 1998 the Security
Council adopted three resolutions on the situation in Kosovo. The first one, Resolution
116099 of March 1998, condemned the excessive use of force by the Serb police against
civilians in Kosovo and the terrorist acts of the KLA. It called for an immediate dialogue
between the Belgrade authorities and the Kosovo Albanian community and imposed an arms
embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), including Kosovo.100 The situation,
however, continued to worsen. In September 1998 the Security Council, concerned with the
increased fighting and mass flow of refugees from Kosovo, adopted Resolution 1199.101 It
demanded withdrawal of the FRY security forces from the Province. NATO was ready for
air strikes if the FRY failed to comply with the demands of the Security Council. On 4
October 1998 Milosevic claimed that he was withdrawing his forces from Kosovo. Several
days later, after negotiations with the US envoy Richard Holbrooke, Milosevic made further

96 Focus on Kosovo: A Timeline o f Tension, online: CNN Homepage <
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/1O/kosovo/timeline/#1998 > (date accessed: 3 March
2001).
97 German Foreign Office Report on Kosovo (November 1998), online: Balkania Homepage <
wysiwyg://5/http://raembers.tripod.com/Balkania/resources/history/gfo_report.html
>
(date
accessed: 4 July 2001).
98 Refugees Magazine, issue 116, 1999, UNHCR publications, online: UN High Commissioner
for Refugees Homepage < http://www.unhcr.ch/pubs/rml 16/rml 1603.htm > (date accessed: 4
July 2001).
99 Security Council Resolution 1160, S/RES/1160 (1998), online: United Nations Homepage
http://www.un.orp/Docs/scres/1998/sres 1160.htm (date accessed: 12 March 2001).
100 Security Council Resolution 1160, supra note 99, para. 4 & 8.
101 Security Council Resolution 1199, S/RES/1199 (1998), online: United Nations Homepage
http://www.un.orp/Docs/scres/1998/sres 1199.htm (date accessed: 12 March 2001).
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concessions. He gave his consent to the deployment of the OSCE Kosovo Verification
Mission (KVM) and of a NATO-led aerial observer mission.102
Soon it appeared that, in breach of the requirements of SCR 1199, not all Serb forces
left Kosovo and even some new troops were deployed there. On 24 October 1998, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1203 where it determined that the situation in Kosovo
constituted a threat to international peace and security and demanded the FRY to comply
with the previous resolutions.103 The same day the Supreme Allied Commander Wesley
Clark and the NATO Military Committee Chairman Klaus Naumann warned Milosevic that
NATO would launch air strikes unless Serb troops were withdrawn from Kosovo by October
27. The threat was suspended after Milosevic started withdrawal of the Yugoslav troops.
A series of international diplomatic efforts that followed in November-December
1998 failed to promote the FRY - Kosovo Albanian dialogue. The situation deteriorated after
the massacre of 40 unarmed Kosovo Albanian civilians in the village of Racak on IS
January 1999.104 Seeing that fighting in Kosovo continued, the six-nation Contact Group105
started peace talks with the Serb and Albanian leaders in Rambouillet (France) in February
1999. The talks lasted for 17 days with a follow-on session in Paris in mid-March. The
negotiations broke down on March 19 after the refusal of the Serb delegation to sign an
agreement.
On 24 March 1999, following the Serb rejection of a diplomatic solution, NATO
launched a 78-day air strike campaign against the FRY. Throughout the period of the NATO
air strikes the international community continued its diplomatic efforts to resolve the
Kosovo crisis. In May 1999 the Group of Eight worked out principles for the settlement of
the conflict, which the FRY accepted on June 3. On June 9 the Military Technical
Agreement, concerning the deployment of the international security presence and the FRY
102Smith, supra note 82.
103 Security Council Resolution 1203, S/RES/1203 (1998), online: United Nations Homepage
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres 1203 htm (date accessed: 12 March 2001).
104 More than 40 ethnic Albanians were executed by the Serb police in Racak. For more details,
see Massacre in Kosovo, 19 January 1999, online: BBC Homepage <
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid 256000/256364.stm > (date accessed: 8
August 2001).
105 The Contact Group included France, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation, United Kingdom,
and the United States. See, Stefan Toebst, Conflict in Kosovo: Failure o f Prevention? An
Analytical Documentation, 1992-1998, online: European Centre for Minority Issues Homepage,
< http://www.ecmi.de/doc/download/working paper 1-pdf > (date accessed: 3 August 2001).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29
withdrawal from Kosovo was signed by both the FRY and NATO. The next day the NATO
air strikes were suspended. On June 10 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244106
based on the G-8 principles for the settlement of the conflict and drafted by the G-8 foreign
ministers.
The deployment of the international security presence started on June 13. On June
20 the Special Representative ad interim - a temporary head of the international civil
presence - Sergio Vieira de Mello, arrived in Kosovo.
The deployment of the international presence took place under difficult
circumstances. Public service structures, including schools, telephone communication,
public transport were largely inoperable.107 Many Kosovo municipalities suffered from
the shortage of water and electricity. Kosovo’s industry and agriculture were seriously
debilitated during the conflict. The payments system and financial sector did not function.
Commercial activity was not likely to be revived in a short term because of instability,
lack of financial resources and other impediments.108
In sum, the political, economic and humanitarian situation in Kosovo after the
bombing was disastrous. The economy and infrastructure were seriously damaged. The
state institutions, including courts, law enforcement and security forces, were inoperable.
In the circumstances of a security vacuum, local military and political forces were
competing to expand their de facto control over the Kosovo territory. An additional
challenge for the international community was the absence of sufficient previous
experience in post-conflict rehabilitation109 and the lack of a clear peace-building strategy
that could be readily applied in Kosovo.
These circumstances should be kept in mind during the analysis of the overall
effectiveness of the UNMIK activities. The difficulty of the situation is not a justification
for mistakes of the UNMIK mission; but it is a vital factor in determining whether an

106 Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244 (1999), online: United Nations Homepage
<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/l999/sresl244.html> (date accessed: 16 September 2000).
107 Report o f the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999, para. 44, online: United Nations Homepage at 7 (date
accessed: 12 November 2000) [hereinafter Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999].
108Ibid., para. 16 at 4.
109 The missions in, for example, Somalia and Bosnia involved many of the issues dealt with in
Kosovo, but the tasks of those missions were not that comprehensive.
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intervention was worthwhile, and whether the mission provided significant improvement
in public and private life of the local population.110
2. Security Council Resolution 1244
Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1244 is the main source of authority for the
international civil and security presence in Kosovo. Adopted on 10 June 1999, after the
cessation of the NATO bombing, the Resolution outlines immediate measures for the
improvement of the situation in Kosovo, as well as long-term measures for the future
development of Kosovo. The Security Council determined the situation in Kosovo as
continuing to constitute a threat to international peace and security and authorized the
employment of measures under Chapter VII.111 Those measures included the deployment
of the international security and international civil presence. The Resolution recognized
the necessity for “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-determination for
Kosovo.” 112 At the same time, it reaffirmed the commitment of the UN Member states to
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY.113
The Resolution is based on a statement of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign
Ministers on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis and the principles for resolution of
the Kosovo crisis accepted by Belgrade on June 3, 1999. (These documents are included
in the Resolution, as Annexes 1 and 2 respectively.) The Resolution reaffirmed the
consent of the FRY to the principles for the resolution of the Kosovo crisis, namely, the
withdrawal of the FRY from Kosovo, the deployment of the international security and
civil presence and the transfer of the authority over the Province to the international
transitional administration. It appears that the primary authority for the establishment of
an international administration and the obligation of the FRY for withdrawal steins not
from SCR 1244, but from the principles for resolution of the Kosovo crisis, which the
FRY accepted on June 3, 1999.114 At the same time, in relation to other UN Member

110 A detailed assessment of these issues is to follow in Chapters III and IV.
111 Security Council Resolution 1244, supra note 106, preamble.
112Ibid
113Ibid.
114 According to Article 25 of the UN Charter, the UN Members are obliged to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council. At the time of the issuance of SCR 1244, the FRY was
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States and international organizations, SCR 1244 is a source of an obligation to assist in
post-conflict reconstruction. The resolution is also the primary source for the mandate of
a peace-building mission.
This example points out the distinction between the sources of obligations of a
host state, obligations of the UN Member States and the source of the peace-building
mission’s mandate. Each of the sources will be further discussed during the analysis of
the general legal basis for peace-building in Section B.
SCR 1244 clearly separated the civil and security components of the international
mission.115 The international security presence known as the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is
led by NATO. It was entrusted with monitoring the cease-fire, ensuring withdrawal of the
Serb forces from Kosovo, demilitarization of the KLA, ensuring public safety until the
international civil presence could take responsibility for this task, etc.116
The international civil presence is structured in a form of an interim
administration “under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy”117
within the FRY. The Secretary-General and relevant international organizations118 were
put in charge of establishing the international civil presence. The civil presence has broad
responsibilities in political, economic and humanitarian spheres. In particular, they
include promotion of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, general
administration of the Province, economic reconstruction, maintaining law and order,
promoting human rights, assuring safe return of refugees, etc.119 The administration is
headed by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG).
To sum up, SCR 1244 played the following important functions in relation to the
exercise of peace-building in Kosovo: 1) it reaffirmed the FRY’s obligation to withdraw
from Kosovo and its consent to the international deployment. These two created
not a member of the United Nations and, thus was not clearly bound by the requirements of SCR
1244.
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was admitted as a member of the United Nations by General
Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/12 of 1 November 2000, online: United Nations Homepage
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (date accessed: 28 January 2001).
115 No such distinction was drawn in either An Agenda for Peace, the Supplement to An Agenda
for Peace or the Brahimi Report.
116 Security Council Resolution 1244, supra note 106, para. 9.
117Security Council Resolution 1244, supra note 106, para 10.
118The Resolution does not specify which organizations participate in this process.
119 Security Council Resolution 1244, supra note 106, para 11.
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necessary preconditions for the establishment of the UNMIK. 2) It created the obligations
of the UN Member States in relation to the Kosovo reconstruction, thus, providing the
basis for the comprehensive international involvement in the Province. 3) It outlined the
mandate of the international civil and security presence, which served as a starting point
for the international reconstruction of Kosovo.
3. Competence o f the UNMIK
SCR 1244 has set basic tasks and guidelines for the international action in
Kosovo. The practical method of implementing SCR 1244 was outlined by the UN
Secretary-General in the Report to the Security Council on July 12, 1999. The Report
provided a working plan for the international administration in Kosovo. In particular, it
set out the UNMIK structure; outlined the competencies of the administration as a whole
as well as of its pillars; and defined the stages for the implementation of the UNMIK
mandate.
The definition of all these elements required interpretation of SCR 1244 by the
UN Secretary-General. In certain respects, he interpreted the Resolution’s provisions very
broadly. For example, the Report expressly stated that all the legislative and executive
power, as well as the authority to administer the judiciary, is vested with the UNMIK. In
contrast, SCR 1244 refers to the competence of the international civil administration in
more vague terms: “providing] transitional administration,” “establishing and overseeing
the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions.” The Resolution
did not specifically mention what powers an international administration would have and
how it would provide transitional administration. Thus, it is questionable whether the
Security Council meant to confer the full legislative and executive authority on the
UNMIK.
Another example of the broad interpretation of SCR 1244 is the definition of the
authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). According to
the Report, all the authority vested with die UNMIK is exercised by the SRSG.120 All
120 SCR 1244 does not contain any reference to the SRSG as the main official in Kosovo. In this
respect, the Secretary-General followed the framework for peace-building missions suggested in
the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: “In a country ruined by w ar,... the [UN] programmes,
funds, offices and agencies... gradually take over responsibility from the peace-keepers, with the
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major legislative and executive powers - to issue legislative acts, change, repeal or
suspend existing laws and to appoint and remove any official of the international
administration - are concentrated in the hands of the SRSG. In addition to that, the SRSG
is the final authority to interpret SCR 1244.121 This gives him almost unlimited power
over the Province.
The broad interpretation of SCR 1244 by the Secretary-General is somewhat
problematic. The question is two-fold: the authority of the Secretary-General to provide
the interpretation of Security Council Resolutions; and the limits of such interpretation
(how broad it can be). A certain prototype for the role of the Secretary-General in
interpreting SCR 1244 may be derived from the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace,
which proposes the transfer of decision-making power from the Security Council to the
General Assembly or other inter-governmental organization.122 Still, even this provision
cannot be considered a sufficient basis for the concentration of authority for the
interpretation within a unilateral body like the Secretary-General.
The limits of the interpretation can be defined by balancing the considerations of
practicality and legitimacy. On the one hand, SCR 1244 does not provide sufficient
details about the institutional organization of the mission and the division of power
between its elements. Then, from practical point of view, a detailed interpretation of the
Resolution’s provisions is necessary for the effective implementation of the UNMIK
mandate. On the other hand, extensive interpretation by the Secretary-General can be
viewed as substituting the legislative authority of the Security Council and developing the
Resolution’s provisions beyond their original meaning and, thus, lacking legitimacy. The
question of legitimacy becomes important in two respects: 1) the interpretation of the
Secretary-General provided the basis for the UNMIK structure, division of powers among
resident coordinator in due course assuming the coordination functions temporarily entrusted to
the special representative of the Secretary-General.” See, ibid.
According to the Report of 12 July 1999, "the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as
the head of UNMIK, is the highest international civilian official in Kosovo. He will enjoy the
maximum civilian executive powers envisaged and vested in him by the Security Council in its
resolution 1244 (1999), and will also be the final authority on their interpretation.. .., the Special
Representative will facilitate a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status,
taking into account the Rambouillet accords." See, Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July
1999, supra note 107.
121 Ibid., para 44 at 8.
122Supplement to An Agenda fo r Peace, supra, note 5, para. 54.
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the pillars, timeline for the reconstruction, etc. and, thus the legitimacy of that
interpretation affects the legitimacy of the very UNMIK; 2) whether such a pattern of the
Secretary-General’s interpretation should be followed in regard to the future peace
building missions.

4. The UNMIK structure
Peace-building is a multidimensional activity which includes humanitarian
assistance, democratization, economic reconstruction, etc. Even such a well-developed
organization as the UN cannot manage all the tasks of peace-building alone. Bearing in
mind that “regional entities can enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN
efforts for peace,” 123 several organizations were united under the UNMIK framework to
carry out their activities in Kosovo in “...an integrated manner with a clear chain of
command.” 124
The structure of the UNMIK was defined by the Report of the UN SecretaryGeneral of 12 July 1999. According to it, the UNMIK comprises four major components
(or pillars). Each is responsible for a particular area of reconstruction: the UN - for civil
administration; the UNHCR - for humanitarian assistance; the OSCE - for institutionbuilding; the EU - for economic reconstruction. Each pillar is divided into a number of
functional elements.
The civil administration led by the UN has three divisions:
1)

public administration - responsible for the establishment of multi-ethnic

governmental structures;
2)

police (Kosovo Police Service) - responsible for law and order,

3)

judicial affairs division - entrusted with the re-establishment of the

Kosovo judiciary.125
The responsibilities of the institution-building pillar (the OSCE) are divided into
three major categories - democratization and institution building, elections, and human

123 Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107.
124Ibid., para. 43.
Ibid., para. 55-78. The responsibilities of the judicial affairs division and of the UNMIK Police
will be discussed in Chapter IV.
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rights.126 The tasks of the pillar are distributed among five divisions: Police Training and
Education, Democratization, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Media Affairs and
Elections.

17 7

The Democratization and Elections divisions are responsible for the

promotion of citizens’ involvement in social and political life in Kosovo and the
development of self-government. The Human Rights division monitors the human rights
situation in Kosovo. The Rule of Law segment provides logistical and material support to
courts. The Media Affairs department assists in the development of professional and
independent media.
The humanitarian component of the UNMIK, led by the UNHCR, includes
divisions responsible for the provision of humanitarian assistance and mine action. It is
primarily responsible for providing shelter, food and medical assistance to returnees and
coordination of mine support action in Kosovo.128
The European Union is the key player in the UNMIK economic reconstruction.
The EU is responsible for planning the reconstruction of Kosovo, preparing economic
policies and coordinating the activities of various donors and international financial
institutions working in Kosovo.129
The interrelation between the UNMIK components is characterized by both
cooperation and independence of the pillars. Structurally and in terms of resources and
responsibilities, the pillars maintain substantial independence. This tendency may be
observed, for example, the representation of the pillars in Kosovo municipalities. In the
municipalities, the UNMIK is represented not as a single entity, but as a network of the
offices of its pillars (See, Table 1).
At the same time, the idea behind the establishment of the UNMIK was to
increase the effectiveness of peace-building through uniting the resources and expertise
of various organizations. These organizations reinforce their activities through
cooperation. For example, the OSCE Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law is a
key player in the Task Force on Minorities established by the UNHCR and the Task
126Ibid., para. 79.
127
Annual Report on OSCE Activities (2000), online: OSCE Homepage
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/misc/anrepOOe activ.htm#Anchor-1.-41834 (date accessed: 8
April 2001).
1 Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para. 92-100.
129 Ibid., para. 107.
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Force on Juvenile Justice established by the UNICEF.130 The Rule of Law division
maintains intensive contacts with the Administrative Department of Justice of the UN-led
Civil Administration, which is responsible for the overall management of the judicial
system and correctional service. The OSCE Human Rights division has a unique position
in relation to Pillar II - the Civil Administration. Being structurally a part of the UNMIK,
the mandate of Human Rights division includes a quasi-independent authority to monitor
the observation of human rights in Kosovo, including the judicial system administered by
Pillar II.131 In particular, the OSCE legal system monitoring mandate includes a
responsibility to report on:
-

the current statistics relating to the criminal justice system;

-

systematic violations of international law;

-

gross violations of fair trial standards in individual cases that must be
immediately remedied.132

The extensiveness of the activities of the pillars in the municipalities differs.
Table 1 demonstrates that the UN Civil Administration and the OSCE Pillar, which have
offices in every municipality, are likely to be more involved in managing the municipal
affairs comparing to the UNHCR or the EU. This may be seen as a sign of the currently
leading role of the UN-led and the OSCE-led pillars in the UNMIK framework.

Table 1. UNMIK Pillars
Municipality

UN

Civil

OSCE

UNHCR

EU

Administratio
n

130Kosovo: A Review o f the Criminal Justice System, OSCE Report, February - July 2000, at 6,
online: OSCE Homepage <
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/iustice/criminal iustice.pdf > (date accessed: 3
February 2001) [hereinafter A Review o f the Criminal Justice System].
131 Ibid.
132Ibid.
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De<;an/De£ani

staff Covered from Covered from Covered

6
members

Pec

from

Pec

Pec

and Pristina
Ferizaj/UroSevac

Fushe

11

6

internationals,

internationals,

9 locals

23 locals

6

8

Kosove/Kosovo

internationals,

internationals,

Polje

11 locals

23 locals

8

6

Gjakove/Dakovica

Gjilan/Gnjilane

Gllogovc/GIogovac

1

6

internationals,

international,

international,

6 locals

18 local

IS local

82

8

17

internationals,

internationals,

internationals,

187 locals

81 locals

12 locals

2

1

5
internationals

internationals,

I

international

11 locals
Istog/Istok

KJine/Klina

Kafanik/KaCanik

Leposavic/Leposavi

q
Lipjan/Lipljan

7

5

internationals,

internationals,

6 locals

20 locals

5

4

internationals,

internationals,

3 locals

18 locals

9

5

internationals,

internationals,

10 locals

23 locals

2

4

Covered from
Pec

2
internationals

Covered from
Gnjilane

1

internationals,

internationals,

EU/UNMIK

1 locals

14 locals

expert

4

6

1
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MalishevS/MaliSevo

internationals,

internationals,

international,

13 locals

23 locals

1 local

6
internationals,

Covered from

I

Rahovac

100 locals
Novobdrde/Novo
Brdo

2

1

1

internationals,
3 locals

Obiliq/Obilic

5
internationals,

Covered from

1

1

Kosovo Polje

3 locals
Pej e/Pec

18

86

Podujevg/Podujevo

8

5

Prizren/Prizren

Rahovec/Orahovac

internationals,

internationals,

6 locals

30 locals

7

&trpce/Shtgrpcg

Suhareke/Suva Reka

3

internationals,

internationals,

international

5 locals

61 locals

13 locals

s

5

4

5
internationals
2

internationals,

internationals,

7 locals

2 locals

4

5

internationals,

internationals,

1 locals

20 locals

5
internationals

Viti/Vitina

5

internationals,

internationals
Shtime/Stimlje

18

13

6

Covered from
Djakovica
Covered from
Pristina

Covered from
Urosevac

9

5

internationals,

international

4 locals

s

5

1
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Vushtrri/Vu£itm

Zubin

Potok/Zubin

Potok

Zveian/Zve^an

internationals,

internationals,

4 locals

20 locals

9

5

3

internationals,

internationals,

international

9 locals

19 locals

s, 2 locals

2

2

internationals,

internationals,

4 locals

4 locals

2

3

internationals,

internationals,

4 locals

21 locals

Source: Profiles of Kosovo Municipalities (2000), online: OSCE Homepage
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/municipal profiles/ (date accessed: 12
May 2001).

A certain amount of criticism has been expressed in relation to the involvement of
many international organizations in the exercise of administration in Kosovo. For
example, Ruth Wedgwood and Harold Jacobson view a “hodgepodge of international
agencies”133 involved in reconstruction as one of the factors adding to the UNMIK
disability in post-conflict reconciliation. “The overlay of redundant officials, the ratelimiting pace of the most laggard political process, the ability to play one agency against
the other, and the absence of singular responsibility for the mission, all conspire to hobble
the project of reconstruction.”134 At this point we do not have enough information to
assess whether the involvement of many agencies is actually effective or not. The
expressed criticism apparently is rational and will be relevant to later discussion about the
motives for the involvement of international organizations and states in peace-building.

133 Ruth Wedgwood & Harold K. Jacobson, “Symposium: State Reconstruction After Civil
Conflict” (2001) 95 AJIL I at 2.
134Wedgwood & Jacobson, supra note 133 at 3.
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Interim conclusion
The information presented in the preceding sections is sufficient to permit
preliminary conclusions about the conformity of the UNMIK’s structure with the
characteristics of peace-building identified in Chapter I. This analysis will be further
expanded in the next section.
First, comprehensive character. The UNMIK was entrusted with wide range of
varying tasks in all spheres of public life what confirms the comprehensive character of
this undertaking.
Second, institution-building as one of the essential tasks. SCR 1244 expressly
included the development of self-government (which implies creation of a particular
institutional structure) as the purpose of the UNMIK. Moreover, the OSCE (also called
the Institution-building pillar) was entrusted with institution-building in Kosovo. The
large scale of UNMIK activities necessarily presupposes the transformation of the
Kosovo government and society.
T hird, close cooperation between peace-builders and local parties. Such
cooperation is not only intended, but required by SCR 1244.135 Numerous UNMIK
arrangements, including creation of the mixed Kosovar-intemational organs, serve as
evidence of the actual realization of this principle by the UNMIK.
Fourth, close connection with peacekeeping. There was no UN peacekeeping
force in Kosovo before the deployment of the UNMIK, thus, no interrelation between
peacekeepers and peace-builders could take place. I will return to the discussion about the
rationality of the interrelation between peacekeeping and peace-building in the next
section.
The Supplement to An Agenda for Peace provided that if no peacekeeping
mission was previously established, a peace-building mission should be initiated by the
Secretary-General. In contrast, in Kosovo the Secretary-General did not take the initiative
for the establishment of the mission, but later he assumed a leading role in the
135 For example, SCR 1244 reads that the UNMIK “will provide transitional administration while
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing
institutions.” Such a formulation presupposes participation of the local parties in democracybuilding. Further, the UNMIK Regulation on the Establishment of the Joint Interim
Administrative Structure expressly reaffirms the participation of local parties in the provincial
administration.
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development of the UNMIK structure and allocation of the competencies between the
UNMIK pillars. As mentioned before, the central controversy surrounding the role of the
Secretary-General in the interpretation of SCR 1244 lies between practicality and
legitimacy. From a practical perspective, it is convenient to spell out only the core
functions of the international presence in the Security Council Resolution and to leave the
job of adjusting the powers for their practical implementation to the Secretary-General.
Such an approach permits the successful achievement of short-term goals -to define the
responsible organizations quickly and to establish their tasks and framework under which
they work. This, in turn, leads to a more rapid deployment and allows an immediate start
of relief activities. However, the reverse side of such an interpretation is the problem of
its legitimacy and its long-term impact on peace-building. An Agenda for Peace, the
Supplement and the Brahimi Report are silent about the role of the Secretary-General in
interpreting the Security Council resolutions. The only relevant provision is contained in
the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, which proposes the transfer of decision-making
authority to the General Assembly or other intergovernmental organ. This provision
shows intent to transfer the authority to a collective organ only. Then, the SecretaryGeneral as a unilateral organ does not have enough legitimacy to assume any decision
making powers, including the interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, which
serves the basis for the activities of a peace-building mission.
For me, legitimacy is a practical problem because it affects the long-term results
of peace-building. The opinion of the local population about the international activities
and re-established institutions as legitimate increases the chances that people will, first,
support international activities during the first years of reconstruction and, second, that
the population and its leaders will maintain the established structures after the withdrawal
of the international presence. In a global perspective, the legitimacy of the international
mission in Kosovo influences the future willingness of states to intervene in post-conflict
zones and of host states to allow peace-building interventions. For this reason, I consider
it necessary to examine the moral issues of peace-building (including legitimacy) in more
detail in the next section.
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B. Issues off Peace-building
Due to its comprehensive nature, peace-building penetrates into the very
foundations of a post-conflict society, attempting to transform its inside characteristics.
The dramatic character of such transformation and its interventionist nature raises a
number of legal, moral and practical concerns about peace-building.
The legal issues include the legal basis for the establishment of international
administrations; the correlation of their establishment with the principle of state
sovereignty; and the scope of authority that such administrations may assume. The moral
aspect of peace-building touches upon the legitimacy of implementing “Western” ideas
of democracy in post-conflict societies. The practical issues include assessing the
correlation of the goals set for peace-building missions, the means chosen for their
achievement and the results reached.
The section below briefly addresses the legal and moral issues. The practical
problems of peace-building are considered in detail in Chapters 01 and IV, which
describe the role of the UNMIK in the organization of elections and judicial reform.
1. Legal Issues
The discussion of the legal basis for peace-building includes four core issues.
First, what is the general legal basis for peace-building?136 Second, does the UN have
adequate authority to establish international administrations, like the one in Kosovo?
Third, what is the place of peace-building on the scale of peace operations? Fourth, are
there any limitations on the participation of regional organizations in peace-building?
Ideally, these issues should be addressed in the peace-building concept. However,
as mentioned, the concept remains quite vague. Some of the mentioned issues were
addressed in passing in An Agenda for Peace and the Supplement to An Agenda for
Peace, but many issues of the legal basis of peace-building in particular those concerning
the host state’s consent, the neutrality of peace-builders, and the scope of military
powers, remain unresolved. The discussion below suggests some answers to these
questions.

136 Please, differentiate the legal basis for peace-building from the peace-building concept
discussed in Chapter I.
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a.

General legal basis

The UN Charter does not contain any express reference to peace-building. Similar
to peacekeeping,137 the concept of peace-building was developed through the initiatives
of the UN Secretary-General138 and subsequent UN practice. The definition of peace
building and its elements can be found in An Agenda for Peace, the Supplement to An
Agenda for Peace, and the Brahimi Report.139 These documents, however, do not provide
any guidance about the procedural side of authorizing peace-building or the permissible
scope o f peace-building missions.140 The Supplement to An Agenda for Peace only
mentions that the Secretary-General should seek the government’s consent to the
deployment of a peace-building mission if no peacekeeping mission has been deployed in
that zone before. An Agenda for Peace indicates the necessity for close cooperation
between peace-builders and local parties.
The few examples of peace-building (e.g., Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor) and
quasi-peace-building missions (e.g., Cambodia141 and Somalia142) point out several
137One of the first resolutions authorizing peacekeeping in the Congo in 1960 did not identify any
particular Article of the UN Charter as the basis for the peacekeeping deployment. SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskjold considered Article 40 to be the basis for such operations. See, Letter
o f from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President o f the Security Council, U.N. SCOR,
15th Sess., 1920lh mtg at 1, U.N. Doc. S/4381 (1960).
138 Here, I mean through his initiative to develop a concept of peace-building in An Agenda for
Peace and the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace.
139 See, Chapter I.
140 Even if they did, neither An Agenda for Peace, nor the Supplement nor the Brahimi Report
have sufficient authority to be a source of power for the UN organs.
141 The establishment of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was based on
both state’s consent and Security Council authorization. According to the Agreement on a
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, the Cambodian parties agreed on
the principles for the settlement of the Cambodia conflict. In particular, the Agreement provided
for the delegation of powers to the UNTAC, which could exercise civil and military functions in
the country. These provisions of the Agreement were subsequently endorsed by Security Council
Resolution 668 (1990). See, Peace Agreements Digital Collection: Cambodia, online: US Institute
for Peace Homepage http://www.usip.org/librarv/pa/index/pa cambodia.html (date accessed: 31
July, 2001).
142 In contrast to Cambodia, the deployment of the United Nations Operations in Somalia II
(UNOSOM II) was primarily based on Security Council authority under Chapter VII. Based on
the presumption that there was no sovereign authority in Somalia, SCR 814 (1993) specified the
extent of the UNOSOM nation-building mandate. For more information on the Somalia
operations, see Michael J. Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operation:
The Search for a Legal Framework (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999); Sean D.
Murphy, “The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective Security After the
Cold War” (1994) 32 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 201 at 231.
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possible sources of authority for the establishment o f international administrations: the
authorization of the Security Council under Chapter VII or state’s consent to intervention,
or the combination of the two.143
State’s consent and Security Council authorization are mutually complementary.
A Security Council resolution creates a legal basis for a peace-building mission. A host
state’s consent to the establishment of a peace-building mission provides preconditions
for potentially more legitimate and successful (due to the cooperation of the local
authorities) peace-building.

As evidenced from the practice of the above mentioned

missions, a state's consent may be expressed through signing peace accords between the
parties to an internal conflict,144 or through acceptance of the principles for the settlement
of a conflict proposed by an international community.145

b.

The UN authority to establish an international administration

The power of the Security Council to authorize actions to restore and maintain
international peace and security is derived from Article 39 of the UN Charter. According
to it, the Security Council has the authority to “...determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’’146 and decide on measures to be
taken to restore and maintain peace and security. In the Lockerbie decision (provisional
measures order of April 14, 1992) Judge Weeramantry stated that it is only for the
Security Council to judge on the existence of the circumstances, which “bring Chapter
VII into operation.”147 Moreover, there is nothing in the UN Charter that suggests that the

143 From the point of view of state sovereignty, both state’s consent and enforcement action, are
legitimate bases for the exception to the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference.
According to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, the UN is prohibited from intervening in essentially
domestic affairs of states, except in application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
144 Sonia Han, "Building a Peace that Lasts: The United Nations and Post-civil War PeaceBuilding" (1994) 26 NYU J. Int'l L. & P. 837 at 884.
145 One can argue about the voluntary character of such consent Often the host state has to agree
to the proposed solution under the pressure from the international community. For example, the
FRY was under political, economic and military pressure to give consent to the principles for the
resolution of the Kosovo crisis. Moreover, the principles for the resolution of the Kosovo crisis
were drafted by the by the G-8 foreign ministers without the participation of the FRY.
146 Charter o f the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No.7, art.39.
147 Questions o f Interpretation and Application o f the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from an
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Order of 14 April 1992,
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decision of the Security Council can be reviewed by any other body, including the
International Court of Justice.148
Being initially intended for international conflicts, the notion of threat to peace
has been gradually extended to capture internal conflicts that are deemed to constitute
threats to the peace. As the ICTY stated in the Tadic decision, "it can thus be said that
there is a common understanding, manifested by the "subsequent practice" of the
membership of the United Nations at large, that the "threat to the peace" of Article 39
may include, as one o f its species, internal armed conflicts.”149
In the last decades the Security Council has used its power under Chapter VII in
relation to many essentially internal conflicts. The circumstances leading to the
determination of the threat to peace have varied from an aggravating humanitarian
catastrophe130 to the continuing escalation of human rights violations and mass flow of
refugees from a conflict zone.151
Having determined the existence of the threat to peace and security, the Security
Council can authorize measures to restore and maintain peace in accordance with Articles
41 and 42. Article 41 defines measures “not involving the use of armed force."152 Article
42 prescribes other actions involving the use of air, sea or land forces. Neither Article 41
nor Article 42 includes the establishment of an international administration as one of the
suggested measures.
In the Tadic decision on the appeals of jurisdiction, the ICTY addressed the issue
whether the Security Council is bound to employ only measures expressly provided in
Articles 41 and 42. The Tribunal admitted that the Security Council has very broad
powers under Chapter VII (Articles 41 and 42). “These two Articles leave to the Security
Council such a wide choice as not to warrant searching, on functional or other grounds,
online:
ICJ
Homepage
<http://www.icjcii.org/iciwww/idecisions/isummaries/ilussummarv920414.htm> (date accessed: 15 July 2001).
1 As Judge Weeramantry put it: “it is not for the court to sit in review on a given resolution of the
Security Council.” See, ibid.
149 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic. Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 29, online: ICTY Homepage
http://www.un.org/ictv/ind-e.htm [hereinafter Tadic].
150 Security Council Resolution 794, S/RES/794 (1992), online: United Nations Homepage
http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/s92r794e.pdf (date accessed: 5 June 2001).
131 Security Council Resolution 940, S/RES/940 (1994) online: United Nations Homepage
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/9431222e.htm (date accessed: 5 June 2001).
152 Charter o f the United Nations, supra note 146, art. 41.
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for even wider and more general powers than those already expressly provided for in the
Charter.”153 The ICTY stated that the measures listed in Article 41 are only illustrative
examples "which obviously do not exclude other measures.” 154 Under this interpretation,
the establishment of an interim administration will also be within the powers o f the
Security Council under Chapter VU. In fact, the establishment of an international
administration is not the sole example of the Security Council utilizing the measures not
expressly provided in Article 41 or 42. Earlier, the Security Council authorized the
creation of international judicial bodies155 (the ICTY and the ICTR) and the creation of a
special fund to compensate the victims of the Gulf War.156
c.

Peace-building and enforcement action

Let us now look at how peace-building may be classified on the scale of the
contemporary peace operations. The distinction between the operations can be drawn
according to two criteria: legal basis for an operation and actual characteristics of an
operation. If Security Council authorization were the sole basis for the establishment of a
peace-building mission, peace-building would, actually, constitute peace enforcement.
However, we have already seen that at least formally peace-building is partially based on
state's consent. It is interesting why the international community would seek such
consent if the Security Council can authorize the establishment of an international
administration under Chapter VII. I think that the reasons for seeking host state’s consent
are twofold: first, because peace-building interventions are problematic from the point of
view of legitimacy (the international community seeks to mitigate this problem by
obtaining formal state consent); second, because through state consent the international
community can ensure the cooperation of the local authorities with peace-builders.
Another question is whether the host state’s consent can actually be regarded as consent.
In many respects it will be imposed under economic, political or even military pressure.
153 Tadic, supra note 149, para. 31
154Ibid., para. 32.
135 Security Council Resolution 827, S/RES/827(1993), online: United Nations Homepage
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993Z827e.pdf (date accessed: 4 June 2001). The Resolution
authorized the creation of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
136 Security Council Resolution 687, S/RES/687 (1991), online: United Nations Homepage
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/199 lZ687e.pdf (date accessed: 4 June 2001).
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For example the FRY was exposed to all these kinds of pressure when it agreed to the
withdrawal and to the international deployment in Kosovo. Moreover, the host state may
have little say in elaborating the solution to which it consents. Again, in case o f the FRY,
the principles of the political settlement for Kosovo were prepared by the G-8.137 Thus,
from a formal point of view peace-building is not an enforcement operation because it is
partially based on state consent, but because of doubtful nature of such “consent” peace
building, actually, may be equated to peace enforcement.
Let us look at other characteristics of peace-building and its place among peace
operations. The four types of peace operations (peace-making, peacekeeping, peace
enforcement and peace-building138) can be differentiated by two characteristics: when
they take place in time and how intrusive they are on the state sovereignty. Viewed over
the duration of a conflict, peacemaking and peace-building are located at far ends of a
conflict. Peacemaking usually takes place before the development of open tension. Post
conflict peace-building is exercised after the establishment of the initial peace between
the warring parties. In contrast, peacekeeping and peace enforcement take place during or
shortly after the end of open hostilities.
Measured by their degree of intrusiveness over state sovereignty, peacemaking
and peacekeeping are less coercive. Peacemaking “is action to bring hostile parties to
agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of
the Charter of the United Nations.” 139 Peacekeeping involves the deployment of the UN
force in a conflict zone. It is based on three core principles: consent of parties,
impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense.160

In contrast, peace

enforcement, intended to redress threat to international peace and security or acts of
aggression, involves coercive military action, to which state consent is not necessary.
Because peace-building missions were often established partially on the basis of
state consent, peace-building seems to be close to peacekeeping. The UN documents also
emphasize the close connection between peacekeeping and peace-building. At the same
time, the other two essential features of peacekeeping - use of force only in self-defense
137See, Section A of this Chapter.
158An Agenda for Peace, supra note I.
139Ibid., para. 20.
160Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, supra note S, para. 33.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

48
and impartiality - are not characteristic of peace-building. First, peace-building mandates
comprise broad military and police powers, which allow the use of force beyond selfdefense. For example, the international security presence in Kosovo includes a military
contingent with broad powers “to take such actions as are required, including the use of
necessary force, to ensure compliance with this Agreement and protection of the
international security force ("KFOR'*).”161
Second, peace-builders are not neutral or impartial. They become parties to the
reconstruction process and pursue post-conflict rehabilitation from the perspective of
their own values and outlook.162 Peace-building is more coercive than peacekeeping also
because it includes the temporary transfer of authority from a state to an international
administration, that is, a significant infringement upon state sovereignty. Thus, judged by
its legal basis and other characteristics, peace-building comprises elements of both
peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
Graphically, the place of peace-building among other peace operations can be
presented in the following way. (See, illustration below)

Time
End of open conflict

peace-building

Open tension

peace enforcement
peacekeeping

Beginning of a conflict

peacemaking

Intrusiveness over state sovereignty

Picture 1. Peace-building on the scale of peace operations.

161 Military Technical Agreement, the International Security Presence (“KFOR”) and the
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999,
online: KFOR Homepage http://www.kforonline.com/resources/documents/mta.htm (date
accessed: 29 April, 2001).
162 This issues falls within the range of moral controversies of peace-building which will be
discussed in Section B.
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d.

Participation o f international organizations in UN authorized

peace-building
As seen from the description of the UNMIK, the UN does not exercise peace
building alone, but engages other international organizations in reconstruction. We have
now defined the sources of the UN authority to establish international administrations.
What is the basis for the participation of other international organizations in peace
building?
The basis for the participation of international organizations in peace-building
should be sought in the UN Charter and the constitutive documents of respective
organizations. The Security Council is likely to use regional arrangements for peace
building under Article 52 of the UN Charter. In other situations the ability of
international organizations to participate in peace-building will be primarily defined
according to whether their constitutive documents provide for such participation. Let us
briefly review the participation of the OSCE, the EU and NATO163 in peace-building in
Kosovo.

i. The OSCE
The 1992 Helsinki Summit Document declared the OSCE (the CSCE at that time)
a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII.164 It also defined the main principles of the
OSCE participation in peacekeeping.163 In particular, the Helsinki Document expressly
restricted the OSCE participation in enforcement actions.166
Peace-building occupies an intermediate position between peace enforcement and
peacekeeping. Because peace-building is more coercive than peacekeeping, it is
necessary to consider whether there are any limitations on the OSCE participation in such
operations. As applied to the Kosovo situation, the concrete responsibilities of the OSCE
as a part of the UNMIK include: organization of elections, promotion of human rights,
163 According to SCR 1244, NATO leads the international security presence in Kosovo (KFOR),
which is not a part of UNMIK.
164 CSCE Helsinki Document “The Challenges of Change”(1992), para. 25, online: OSCE
Homepage http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/hels92e.htm (date accessed: 5
May 2001).
163 Note that none of die OSCE Summit documents expressly refers to peace-building.
166CSCE Helsinki Document “The Challenges of Change”, supra note 164, ch. IH.
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development of independent media, democratization, etc.167 They do not go beyond the
main goals of the organization and permissible activities spelled out in the OSCE basic
documents, that is, conflict management and prevention, human rights, economic
cooperation and social justice.168 Consequently, the coercive nature of peace-building
itself does not prevent the OSCE participation in the UNMIK so far as the concrete
activities of the OSCE are consistent with the organization's goals and principles.

«. The EU and NATO
Unlike the OSCE, neither NATO nor the EU views conflict prevention and postconflict rehabilitation as its primary objective.169 Neither they are regional arrangements
within the meaning of Chapter Vm .
167 See, section A of this Chapter.
168 The 1992 Helsinki Summit Declaration reads: ‘\..[W]e emphasize the central role of the CSCE
in fostering and managing change in our region. In this era of transition, the CSCE is crucial to
our efforts to forestall aggression and violence by addressing the root causes of problems and to
prevent, manage and settle conflicts.” 1992 Helsinki Summit Declaration Document, para. 19,
online: OSCE Homepage < http://www.osce.org/docs/enplish/1990-1999/summits/hels92e.htm
(date accessed: 5 May 2001). Further the 1994 CSCE Budapest Document affirms that “[t]he
CSCE will be a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management
in the region. We have agreed that the participating States may in exceptional circumstances
jointly decide that a dispute will be referred to the United Nations Security Council on behalf of
the CSCE.” 1996 Lisbon Summit: “Our approach is one of co-operative security based on
democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, market economy
and social justice.”
169The preamble the NATO Treaty reads: “The Parties to this Treaty ... seek to promote stability
and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective
defence and for the preservation of peace and security.” North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949,
online: NATO Homepage < http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treatv.htm > (date accessed: 22
May 2001)
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union defines the following objectives:
-to promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment and to achieve
balanced and sustainable development, in particular through the creation of an area without
internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the
establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;
-to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a
common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence
policy, which might lead to a common defence, in accordance with the provisions of Article 17;
-to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States
through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union;
-to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free
movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external
border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime;
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For example, NATO has been established as an alliance oriented towards defense
from an external threat.170 Originally, it was not considered a regional arrangement under
Chapter VIE. However, during the last decade NATO was frequently utilized in the UNled restoration and maintenance of international peace and security.
In Resolution 1244, the Security Council welcomed the participation of both the EU
and NATO in peace-building in Kosovo. It is, however, unclear whether this reference
confers on them the status of regional arrangements and provides sufficient authority on the
participation of those organizations in peace-building.
Some guidelines about the participation of international and regional organizations in
peace operations, including peace-building, can be found in An Agenda for Peace and the
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace. An Agenda for Peace suggests that regional
arrangements should be utilized in peace-building. It also mentions that the Charter of the
United Nations deliberately does not give a precise definition of regional arrangements, thus
allowing more flexibility for the utilization of such arrangements. Regional arrangements
can include a variety of organizations, even those that were initially formed for mutual
security and defence, as well as organizations for general regional development or for
cooperation in particular economic, political or social area.171 Under this definition, the EU
and NATO apparently are not precluded from participation in peace-building.

2. Moral problems of peace-building
Since peace-building is based on Security Council authorization under Chapter VII
or a state’s consent or both, the establishment of an international administration is a
legitimate exception to the sovereignty principle. However, the formal legality of
international interference does not resolve some “moral” concerns about peace-building
-to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it with a view to considering to what
extent the policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be revised
with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the
Community.
Treaty on
European
Union,
7 February
1992,
online: <
http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html > (date accessed: 22 May 2001).
170 Article 5 of the NATO Treaty reads: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or
more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and
consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right
of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations...” North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 169.
171Agenda fo r Peace, supra note 1, para. 61.
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activities. Among the “moral” concerns are the fear of the neo-colonialist nature of peace
building, monopolization of the local administration by “outsiders,” imposition of a
“Western” style democracy and economy over post-conflict societies. Thus, the question
arises not that much about the legitimacy of a peace-building intervention itself, but about its
scope and the means by which such intervention is exercised. Let us look at these “moral”
problems in more detail.

a. Peace-building: echoes o f neo-colonialism?
As one can observe from the instances of Kosovo, Somalia or Bosnia, peace
building takes place in zones where state institutions have totally or partially collapsed
and, thus, no effective authority exists to maintain order, stop human rights abuses,
provide basic public services, etc.(e.g., Somalia, Kosovo) The extreme circumstances of
such a zone give rise to negative perceptions about post-conflict societies: 1) Such post
conflict states (also called “failed” states, i.e., states which are not able to govern
themselves because their institutions have collapsed) are often viewed as requiring
serious guidance from the international community. This approach implies some
inequality of treatment, a perception that “failed” states are inferior, incapable,
uncivilized. These are attitudes characteristic of the colonial era. 2) The perception about
post-conflict societies as “uncivilized” may lead to the application of lower standards of
protection to such societies compared to those normally applied in “developed” countries.
For example, peace-builders may feel that an “uncivilized” environment justifies
application of “uncivilized” means, like use of force in violation of human rights
standards, discrimination, etc.172 One of the vivid examples of such ‘"uncivilized”
behaviour are the actions of peacekeepers in Somalia. According to the reports by human
172 For the example of such “uncivilized” ways of behaviour of peacekeepers, see the following
materials on the actions of peacekeepers in Somalia: Peacekeepers Tortured Somali Suspects,
Electronic Mail & Guardian http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/97iune 1/11 iune-somali.html: Global
Rules Now Apply to Peacekeepers, U.N. Chief Declares, August 12, 1999, NY Times
http://www.nvtimes.com/leaming/students/ask reporters/articles/crossette-article2.html: Women
Tell UN Security Council of Abuses During War, October 23, 2000, online: United Nations
Development
Fund
for
Women
(UNIFEM)
Homepage
<
http://www.unifem.undp.org/pr unseccoun.html > (date accessed: 15 August 2001). These
materials primarily refer to the cases of human rights abuses committed by peacekeepers in
Somalia. These are the most “famous” cases, but such happenings give rise to suspicion that
similar violations might have occurred in other missions, including Kosovo.
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rights organizations, their actions included rape and torture of the members of local
communities. I am inclined to think that every mission potentially can suffer from such
problems and that every mission may have instances of such behaviour.
Another moral problem is the scope of the authority of international missions.
For example, the Report by the UN Secretary General concerning the implementation of
SCR 1244 reads: “The Security Council ... has vested in the interim civil administration
authority over the territory and people of Kosovo.” 173 Concentrating all the authority in
its hand, an international administration is in position to dictate the approach to
democratization in a war-torn society. If local parties are perceived as lacking knowledge
and development and, thus, not being worth consulting, an international administration
can effectively preclude local communities from choosing the way of reconstruction of
their own country. If the UN imposes the solutions to a post-conflict society (even, if it is
considered to be for the good of that society) it is likely to violate its own democratic
principles. The spirit of the UN Charter (“We the People of the United Nations...”174)
implies that the population should be included in the government, that their voice should
be heard.
These are the general thoughts about the moral side of peace-building. To assess
whether peace-building brings a real threat of neo-colonialism, we have to look at the
aims and means of peace-building - the motives for international involvement in post
conflict reconstruction and the kind of values that are “imposed” in post-conflict
societies.

i. Motives fo r peace-building
Notwithstanding the extremely high costs of peacekeeping and peace-building,
international organizations continue to engage in these operations and even expand their
scope. Because states are rational actors,175 there must be compelling reasons for their
involvement. Although humanitarian concerns for the population of a conflict zone are a
noble goal, they usually would not be the primary motive for the international
173 Report o f the Secretary-Genera o f 12 July 1999, supra note para 107. Emphasis added. SCR
1244 itself does to refer to the authority of the UNMIK over the people of Kosovo.
174 Charter o f the United Nations, supra note 146, preamble.
175Anthony Clark Arend, “Do Legal Rules Matter?” (1998) 38 Va. J. Int’l L.107 at 119.
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involvement (although from a formal point of view, an international intervention should
be and formally is primarily motivated exclusively by humanitarian concerns176).
International aid is selective. The willingness of states to interfere and the scope
of the international engagement depend on the vital interests of intervening states. Where
such interests are at stake, states will intervene more actively. For example, the situations
in Chechnya and Eritrea were no less serious than in Kosovo or Iraq, but the international
community was much more attentive to the latter than the former two.177
States seek to maximize their interests.178 Peace-building is not merely assistance in
post-conflict reconstruction carried by the international community for humanitarian
considerations. It is a way to pursue states’ political objectives. In post-conflict peace
building states pursue at least two objectives. First, they mitigate the threat that the conflict
poses to stability and well-being in the region. Second, they expand the areas of their
influence over a reviving state. In the short term, peace-building activities allow for the
return of refugees and reduce trans-border crime, thus lightening the economic and security
burden on regional states. In a long run, states-peace-builders participate in shaping a new
order in the region.179
It follows from the above that the intervening states have not only a common interest
of protecting peace and human rights, but also a self-interest, which significantly influences
their willingness to move forward with an intervention. On the one hand, self-interest is
essential for peace-building because it stimulates states’ political support without which the
UN is not be able to carry out complex peace operations. On the other hand, the desire of
stronger states to fulfill their own foreign policy objectives through peace-building gives rise
to doubts about the “good will” of these interveners. Thus, the motives for peace-building
are likely to support the proposition that peace-building is an enterprise for pursuing states’
foreign policy objective, rather than solely the well-being of post-conflict states.

176The problem lies in contradiction between the requirements of Realpolitik and the necessity to
comply with the principles of international law. Their correlation will to great extent define the
moral environment of peace-building.
177 In my opinion, the selective nature of the international attention may be explained exactly by
the degree of interests in a particular conflict by the international community.
178 Arend, supra note 175 at 119.
179 Wedgwood & Jacobson, supra note 133 at 3.
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ii. Imposing democracy is undemocratic?
Peace-building is in many respects about building democracy. The elements of
democracy - government by the people, equality, human rights - have gained acceptance as
universal values.180 Some scholars even talk about an emerging international norm for
“democratic entitlement,"181 which allows an international intervention to prevent human
rights abuses and protect democracy. It may be said that because everybody is entitled to
democracy, the implementation of democracy by international administrations in post
conflict societies is merely a realization of that universal right. Even so, there are several
problematic issues about the implementation of democracy in post-conflict societies: how
the peace-builder himself defines “democracy”; how democracy is implemented (imposed or
built through the consultation with the local population); and what are the motives behind
the imposition of democracy, (the latter issue was discussed above)
The current peace-building strategies, including democratization, are mainly
developed if not dictated by Western countries. Scholarly analysis of peace operations is
carried out mainly by Western scholars. The donor organizations taking part in physical
reconstruction of post-conflict states are usually Western. Consequently, the methods of
peace-building reflect a Western outlook. The domination of “Western” outlook in peace
building strategies entails both practical and theoretical complications for peace-building.
Theoretically, peace-building may be criticized as imposing Western values. Understanding
this potential concern, Boutros-Ghali emphasized that the UN cannot impose a new political
structure or new institutions on post-conflict states. The organization “can only help the
hostile factions to help themselves and begin to live together again.”182 However, the
practice of Kosovo shows that the activities of international administration go far beyond
mere helping the warring parties to live together again. The imposition of solutions is to
certain extent unavoidable because all the power of decision-making and enforcement is
concentrated in the hands of an international administration. In this respect, the practice of
the UNMIK is very interesting. It managed to reconcile the two challenges of having power

180See, e.g., Bames, supra note 28.
181 John C. Pierce, “The Haitian Crisis and the Future of Collective Enforcement of Democratic
Governance” (1996) 27 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 477 at 483.
182Supplement to Agenda for Peace, supra note 5, para. 13-14.
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and not imposing solutions unilaterally. This mechanism established by the UNMIK will be
discussed in Chapter m .
The practical aspect of “Western type” democracy-building relates to the question
to what extent particular “Western” democratic principles are suitable and workable in
post-conflict societies. In post-conflict societies there is little ground for quick
construction of “Western type” democracy either in terms of institutional structure and
economic foundation or legal and political culture. The development of a political system
and civil society requires not only the existence of formal democratic institutions like
universal suffrage, political parties, elected representative bodies, but also a certain
political culture, which is consistent with that political system.183 The “Western” model
of democracy is based on a participant political culture. As Almond and Verba point out,
in participant political culture members of the society tend to be oriented towards the
political system as a whole, to both its political and administrative structures. The
members of the society are oriented to play an “activist” role in the self of the polity.184 In
a post-conflict, post-Soviet society like Kosovo people are unlikely to be very actively
oriented towards the political system and participation in it. The lack of such culture
makes democratization more difficult. If peace-builders concentrate on “Western”
structure as an exclusive pattern for institutional reconstruction, this may limit their
creativeness and flexibility in seeking solutions for post-conflict societies and ultimately
reduce the success of peace-building.

Interim conclusion
The moral factor influences the exercise of peace-building in several aspects.
First, it facilitates the possibility of institutional and other changes in a post-conflict
society - if the involvement of peace-builders in reconstruction and the methods that they
are using are viewed by the local population as legitimate, the locals are more likely to
assist the international forces in reconstruction. Second, legitimacy influences the
sustainability of the changes introduced by peace-builders - if the new institutions and

183 Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba, Civic Culture (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and
Company, 1965) at 3.
184 Almond & Verba, supra note 183 at 3.
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procedures developed by peace-builders are not viewed by locals as legitimate, they are
not likely to be sustained after the withdrawal of the international forces.
In cases of international administrations in post-conflict zones, democracy is built
not from within, but from the outside, through formative coercive intervention of the
international community. The unifying force of the international administration is an
important positive incentive, which promotes cooperation among local elites. However,
because democracy-building starts from the outside and it is not a result of an internal
impulse, this process may be more difficult to sustain after the withdrawal of the
international mission. Political and constitutional evolution in a collapsed state is
impossible unless it is accepted by the local public as reflecting their history and
aspirations, rather than treated as an alien solution imposed by the international
community.

Because

legitimacy

of international

activities

becomes

important,

international administrations have to identify ways of involving the local population in
cooperative decision-making.

C. Conclusion to the Chapter
This Chapter completed the analysis of the characteristics of peace-building. In
addition to the previously defined criteria,185 it has clarified some legal issues of peace
building. First, peace-building should be based on host state’s consent, which is further
reaffirmed by the Security Council. In regard to the exercise of a peace-building mission,
the Security Council Resolution serves the source of the mission’s mandate and of the
obligations for other member states and international organizations to participate in
reconstruction. Second, there is no restriction on the participation of international
organizations in peace-building. According to An Agenda for Peace, international
organizations can participate in peace-building regardless of the initial purpose of their
foundation and basic objectives.
Thus, we can summarize the following criteria for peace-building: 1) it is
comprehensive in nature; 2) it includes institution-building as one of the major
objectives; 3) it seeks transformation of a society and promotion of its sustainability; 4) it
is partially based on host state’s consent; 5) it is closely connected with peacekeeping; 6)
185 See, Chapter I, section A(l).
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it involves close cooperation between peace-builders and local parties; and 7)
participation of international organizations in peace-building is not restricted to regional
arrangements within the meaning of Chapter VTII. In addition to these features, peace
building activities have to be generally consistent with UN principles and international
human rights standards.
I would like to revisit the issue of the close connection between peace-building
and peacekeeping. The idea of their required connection does not seem very urgent to me.
First, peacekeepers who can use force only in self-defense and who are, by definition,
neutral and impartial probably would not be very successful in the intended role of
preparing ground for peace-builders. It would be very strange to have lightly armed
peacekeepers deployed first (shortly after the cessation of hostilities, when the situation
might still require more radical means) and then transfer the authority to peace-builders
who have greater military and police powers. The idea of requiring a connection between
peacekeeping and peace-building seems to be an atavism of the previous international
infatuation with peacekeeping. In my opinion, a close connection between peacekeeping
and peace-building should not be seen as a mandatory characteristic of peace-building.
In the case of Kosovo, the idea of a connection between peacekeeping preparing
the ground for peace-building acquired a new form. In a certain sense the KFOR played
the role of “ground preparator.” This was exercised in several ways: the KFOR played
the primary role in the initial restoration of order in the Province; the KFOR provided
security for the international personnel in Kosovo; the KFOR exercised policing until the
UNMIK Police could assume responsibility for this task.
The discussion of this Chapter started with an implicit assumption that the
UNMIK is a peace-building mission. Interestingly, a more detailed analysis of the
theoretical characteristics of peace-building and the actual situation in Kosovo
demonstrates that generally the establishment of the UNMIK was consistent with these
requirements, but some of them were not strictly followed. (For example, the role given
to the Secretary-General in the interpretation of SCR 1244.) These inconsistencies do not
make the UNMIK any less peace-building in its nature and intent, but highlight the areas
o f peace-building to which more attention should be paid. Some of the legal
inconsistencies in the establishment of the UNMIK may impact on the moral side of
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peace-building. The more legal inconsistencies there are, the more intensive will be the
concerns about the neo-colonialist nature of peace-building. The next chapter
demonstrates how the UNMIK tried to mitigate the legitimacy problem through
establishing consultative

Kosovar organs and implementing

the

consociationalism.
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Chapter III
Development of Self-government in Kosovo
The organization of elections and electoral monitoring are no longer a completely
new task for international missions. The activities of several peacekeeping missions,
which exercised electoral monitoring in post-conflict Angola,186 Cambodia,187 Bosnia and
Herzegovina,188 allowed the UN to generate a certain expertise in this area. However, the
needs of the Kosovo reconstruction are of a qualitatively new level - development of
self-government.
In this Chapter I argue that for the completion of this task to be successful, the
UNMIK has to closely follow the recommendations of consociationalism about
meaningful participation of minorities in provincial and municipal organs and observe the
restraints put on its authority through the peace-building concept.

A. Kosovo ethno-political landscape
Before describing the UNMIK approach to the development of self-government,
it is necessary to characterize the situation in the Province, which served as a context for
the adoption of the UNMIK strategy.
Two characteristics of the Kosovo society that have a direct impact on electoral process
and functioning of representative bodies are the ethnic breakdown o f the population and
the division of political organizations along ethnic lines.

186 According to Security Council Resolution 747, the United Nations Angola Verification
Mission II (UNAVEM H) was given a mandate to observe and verify of the presidential and
legislative elections. See, Security Council Resolution 747, online: United nations Homepage <
http://www.un.orp/documents/sc/res/1992/s92r747e.pdf > (date accessed: September 20, 2001).
187 According to the Agreement on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia
Conflict, the mandate of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) included the
organization and conduct of elections. See, to the Agreement on the Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, supra note 141.
188 Among the tasks of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) was organization
and monitoring of elections.
60
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1.

Ethnic breakdown o f the Kosovo population

For many years Kosovo has been a home for a variety of ethnic communities.189
The Province was traditionally inhabited by Albanians, who constitute the majority, as
well as Serbs, Turks, Bosniacs, Egyptians, Ashkali and other ethnicities.190
During the years of the conflict the structure of the Kosovo population had
undergone significant changes largely due to an intensive flow of refugees from the
conflict zone.191 Although after the conflict the minority population decreased comparing
to the 1991 census,192 Kosovo still remains a multiethnic Province. (See, Table 2)
According to the results of the 2000 civil registration,193 the Kosovo population is
estimated at 1 886 589 people.194 The Joint Registration Taskforce did not collect
information on ethnic affiliation of the applicants, but the OSCE and the KFOR produced
independent estimates of the numbers of ethnic communities in Kosovo.195 While these
are only estimates, the figures offer a fairly precise picture about the population
distribution by ethnicity and the weight of each ethnic group in the total Kosovo
population. The following table demonstrates the quantitative correlation of ethnic
communities in each of the 30 Kosovo municipalities.
189 Vickers, supra note 78 at 103, 116-120, 170-171.
190Ibid., at 116. See, also the discussion in Chapter I, section A.
191 See, Chapter I, Section A.
192 In 1991 82.2% of the Kosovo population was Albanian, 9.9% - Serb, 2.9% - Bosniacs, 2.2% Roma, 0.5% - Turks and 0.4% - Croat. See, Judah, supra note ?? at 313.
193 There was no reliable data about the Kosovo population after the conflict. Thus, civil
registration was one of the first tasks of the international administration. The registration was
carried out under the authority of the OSCE and the United Nations Civil Administration. The
pillars agreed to unite their resources for the civil registration project. The registration was carried
out by a special organ - the Joint Registration Taskforce (JRT). The registration ran from March
through August 2000 and embraced applicants both inside and outside Kosovo. The aim of the
registration was to create a civil registry, which will allow people to be recognized as residents of
Kosovo and to benefit from the services provided by the Administration. The registry has also
served a basis of the voter lists for the municipal elections. See, Civil and voter registration starts
throughout Kosovo, OSCE Press Release, 28 April 2000, online: OSCE Homepage <
http://www.osce.org/press re172000/04/116-mik.html >; Process begins for Kosovo civil and
voter
registration,
OSCE
Press
Release,
14
April
2000
<
http://www.osce.org/press_rel/2000/04/l38-mik.html >; Press briefing on civil and voter
registration in Kosovo, OSCE Press Release, 10 April 2000,
< http://www.osce.org/press rel/2000/04/ 149-mik.html > (date accessed: 7 July 2001).
194 KFOR estimates, March 2001.
195 The current situation does not allow for precise figures because of the constant move of the
population: large numbers of refugees continue returning from abroad, internally displaced
persons migrate within the Province.
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Table 2. Minority Population per Municipality
Albanians

Serbs

%

%

Gllogovc/Glogovac 48,671

100 0

0

0

0

Malisheve/MaliSevo 51,372

100 0

0

6

0

Skenderaj/Srbica

55,887

99

302

0.5 0

0

Kaqanik/Kacanik

43,215

99

0

0

Podujeve/Podujevo 90,246

98

471

0.5 0

0

Suhareke/Suva Reka 69,662

98

799

1

799

1

Shtime/Stimlje

25,709

97

31

0

618

2

Ferizaj/UroSevac

120,947 96

24

0

1,005 1

Defan/Decani

30,287

96

30

0

640

2

Rahovec/Orahovac 51,084

96

1,733

3

608

1
0.3

Roma

Ashkali Bosniacs Turks

Municipality
%

231

%

%

%

120 0.2

0.5
1000 1

400 1
4200 3.4

Prishtine/PriStina

270,175 95

11,966 4

988

Kline/Klina

25,244

94

12

0

1,237 5

Vushtrri/Vucitm

75,043

92

3,571

5

290

0.4 130 0.9

Viti/Vitina

54,616

93

3,943

7

43

0

Peje/Pec

109,743 92

1,263

1

2,154 2

Mitrovice/Mitrovica 100,121 90

9,057

7

150

Gjilan/Gnjilane

89,369

85

13,479 12 400

Istog/Istok

21,148

83

207

Lipjan/Lipljan

58,204

82

10,967 15 1,501 2

Prizren/Prizren

168,047 82

1000 0.3 100

300

2.5

0.1 170 0.1 3000 2.6 600

0.4

6000 5

0.4

2000 2

0.8 2,125 8

198

0.1 5,424 3

1000 4
15002

20000 9.3 12000 5

Fushe
Kosove/Kosovo
Polje

20,922

77

4,819

2

1,500 6

Gjakove/Dakovica

18,137

70

18

0

7,695 30

2500 5
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Kamenice/Kamenica 51,440

69

22,286 30 925

Obiliq/Obilic

11,172

67

2,928

17 2,240 14 800 3

Brdo

2,395

54

2,070

46 0

0

Strpce/Shterpce

3,535

29

8,523

70 0

0

Potok

2,924

16

15,795 84 0

0

Dragash/DragaS

1,289

10

0

0

0

0

Zvecan/Zveqan

516

5

9,444

95 0

0

0

16,302 98 200

1

Novoberde/Novo

Zubin

Potok/Zubin

Leposavic/Leposaviq 80

1

190 1
1181

TOTAL

1,671,200 87.5 140,238 7

30,779 1.6 0

0.6 40000 2

15000 0.8

Source: KFOR estimates and the UNHCR-OSCE Assessment of the Situation of
Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo.

As seen from Table 2, people of the same ethnicity tend to settle compactly.19616
out of 30 municipalities have populations which are more that 90% Albanian. The three
northern municipalities - Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic - are predominantly Serb
(more than 84% of the population). Significant numbers of Serbs also live in the central
and eastern Kosovo (Strpce, Novo Brdo, Kamenica) (See map of Kosovo below). Other
minorities constitute a significant part of the population only in one or two municipalities.
For instance, in Prizren almost 10% of the population are Bosniac. In Dakovica 30% of
the population are Roma. Some municipalities hardly have any minority families (e.g.,
Malishevo, Glogovac, Kacanik).
The trend of territorial concentration of ethnic communities is observed even in
relatively multiethnic municipalities (Prizren, Gnjilane, Mitrovica, Pristina, Vicitm). For
example, in Pristina small Roma communities live mainly alongside Kosovo Serbs in
196 This is not to say that there are no minority members dispersed in areas inhabited by other
ethnicities. For example, considerable part of Roma and Egyptians are dispersed in a number of
rural areas in Klina and Istok. See, Assessment o f the Situation o f Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo,
supra note 17 at SO.
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enclaves

in

Gracanica/Ulpiana,

Caglavica/Cagllavice,

Preoce/Peroc

and

Laplje

Sello/Fshati Llap.197 The Askaelia community in Mitrovica is concentrated mainly south
of the river Ibar.198
I draw special attention to the ethnic composition of the population and its
distribution among the municipalities because, in my opinion, these two are the key to
better understanding the electoral results and electoral regulation.199 Because the
behaviour of the electorate in a divided society is ethnically motivated, the data about
ethnic distribution allows us to roughly predict what parties will dominate the
representative organs of a particular municipality. For example, judging only from the
picture of the territorial distribution of the Kosovo population, we can expect the victory
of Albanian parties in the majority of Kosovo municipalities and a good chance for
minority parties to succeed in elections in the districts where a particular minority is
territorially concentrated.

197Ibid., at 42.
198Ibid., at 45.
199The discussion of these issue is to follow in Sections C and D.
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HCIC

21-Mar-00

Kosovo: Minorities
Minority communities in and around Kosovo
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Picture 2. Roma and Serb Communities in Kosovo.
Source: Humanitarian Community Information Center Homepage, online
http://www.reliefweb.int/hcic/maps/population/minoritv2k.ipg

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66
2. Political landscape
The division of the population along ethnic lines is observed not only territorially,
but also in the political life of the Province. Each ethnic community (especially,
minorities) is concerned with protecting their rights and security. One of the ways to have
a community’s concerns heard and taken into account is to be represented in the organs
of government. In turn, to participate in the organs of government, each ethnic
community must have a political entity which represents that community.
The Kosovo political landscape is diverse in many aspects: ethnic affiliation of
parties (Albanian, Serb, Turk, Bosniac, Gora, Ashkali),200 different forms of political
organization (political party, coalition, citizens’ initiative), and different histories of
particular parties (for example, some parties were founded 9-10 years ago and established
themselves during the years of the struggle against the Serb oppression. Other parties
were officially formed only several months before the elections), etc.
The most reliable and comprehensive data on Kosovo political organizations was
generated before the 2000 municipal elections.201 By August 2000 the Central Elections
Commission (CEC) certified 19 political parties, 2 coalitions, 3 citizens’ initiatives and
15 independent candidates to participate in the municipal elections.202 All major ethnic
communities had their political parties or independent candidates to contest the elections.
14 out of 19 parties and one coalition were Albanian, three parties were Bosniac, one
Ashkali, one Turk and one Gora initiative. Egyptian communities had several
independent candidates registered. No Serb parties registered to contest the elections.203

200 See Appendix 2.
201 It should be noted that the political landscape in the first 6-10 month after the UNMIK
deployment was not that diverse. The explosion in the formation and legalization of political
forces started in spring 2000 in anticipation of the October municipal elections.
202
OSCE
Annual
Report
2000
on
OSCE
Activities
http://www.osce.Org/docs/english/misc/anrep00e_activ.htm#Anchor-1.-41834
203 This does not mean that no Serb parties exist in the Province. A number of Serb parties have
their branches in three northern municipalities. These parties had their representatives in the
UNMIK-appointed municipal councils. However, in relation to the municipal elections the Serb
communities adopted a strategy of non-participation: few Serbs registered to vote and no Serb
parties stood for elections.
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Parties in Kosovo by Their Ethnic
Affiliation, fall 2000
!■ Albanian
■Ashkali
□Bosniac
□Turkish
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Chart 2. Parties in Kosovo by their Ethnic Affiliation
Chart 2 demonstrates that the political life of Kosovo (at least in terms of activism
in contestation of elections) is dominated by Albanian parties. Although the objectives
and programmes of Albanian parties significantly vary, the parties’ positions
overwhelmingly coincide on two points. First, an absolute majority of the parties identify
the independence of Kosovo and European integration as their primary goals. Several
parties (the LNDSH, the PNDSH, the PRK) advocate closer cooperation or unification
with Albania. Second, all the municipal programs emphasize the immediate needs of
reconstruction, such as job creation, education, health services, infrastructure, etc., but
only some o f them204 address the issue of ethnic tolerance and minority rights.
Among Albanian parties the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the Party for
Democratic Progress (PDK) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) stand out in
popularity, resources and organization. During the past years these three parties have been
the key players in the Kosovo political life. They continue to play important roles in the
UNMIK structures and organs of self-government. Let us have a closer look at them.

2<MThe issues of minority rights and commitment to ethnic tolerance are found in the programmes
of the LDK, the KP, the PDK and the PShDK. See, Political Party Guide, online: OSCE
Homepage < http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/pdf/ppg-e.pdf>
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Since 1989 the LDK was a leader of the Kosovo resistance movement. During
this period the organization has developed a wide net of regional offices and acquired
experience in local and international policy-making. The party and its leader Ibrahim
Rugova have received over 80% of the votes in 1992 and 1998 elections to the Kosovo
parallel governmental structures.205 Rugova’s leadership was also recognized on the
international level. He participated in many international negotiations on Kosovo
(including the Rambouillet talks) and since December 1999 was a member of the
UNMIK-created Interim Administrative Council (IAC).206
As proclaimed during the municipal electoral campaign, the general aims of the
LDK are the independence of Kosovo, democratic institution-building, the rule of law
and respect for minority rights. At the municipal level, the LDK prioritizes development
of agriculture and infrastructure, job creation, education, and health care.
Another two parties - the AAK and the PDK - have their root in the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA). Following the demilitarization of the KLA in 1999, the majority
of its members joined one of the structures - the Kosovo Police Service, the Kosovo
Protection Corps or the newly formed Party of Democratic Progress in Kosovo
(PPDK).207 In May 2000 the ex-KLA leader Hashim Thaci was elected the party
president and the name of the party was changed to the PDK.208 Before the emergence of
other former KLA leaders on the political arena in 2000, the PDK was considered the
sole inheritor of the KLA and the sole beneficiary of the ex-KLA support.209 This
position provided the PDK with membership in the IAC.
Among the major goals of the PDK are freedom, independence and democracy,
ethnic tolerance and European integration. At the municipal level, it seeks to improve
infrastructure, education, health care, to create jobs and to promote women’s
emancipation.

Political
Party
Guide,
at
12,
online:
OSCE
Homepage
<
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/pdf/ppg-e.pdf> About parallel Kosovo structures see.
Chapter I.
206The structure and the role of the IAC will be discussed in the following section.
207 Political Party Guide, supra note 205.
208 Ibid., at 15.
209

j
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The AAK led by another ex-KLA leader - Ramush Haradinaj - is a coalition
of six smaller parties.210 The majority of the parties united in the AAK actively
participated in the resistance movement. Two of them closely cooperated with the KLA.
The AAK prioritizes political and economic reforms. It advocates that politics has to start
at the grassroots, with the engagement of the people in political and social life at
individual, family and community levels.
Although Albanian parties form a central segment of the Kosovo political system,
there are a number of minority parties (Ashkali, Bosniac, Gora and Turk parties). The
distinction between the Albanian and minority political entities can be drawn not only
along the line of ethnic affiliation, but also by their political priorities. Albanian parties
define the Kosovo status, more precisely, Province’s independence as a top priority.
Minority parties211 view peace, security and minority rights as their main objectives. For
them security and freedom are much more important than the debate about the future
status o f Kosovo. The emphasis of minority parties on security and minority rights is one
of clear indicators that currently available protection of minorities is insufficient.212
Because of the difference in main political goals, minority and majority parties may have
fewer areas for cooperation and less incentive for the formation of grand coalitions. The
result of the cooperation will to great extent depend on the willingness of both Albanian
and minority parties to understand and reconcile each other’s priorities.
There is one positive move in this direction. Two of the largest Albanian parties the PDK and the LDK - included promotion of ethnic tolerance and minority rights in
their platforms. This shows that they sought to moderate their positions in order to gain
support of more than one ethnic group in the elections. Such moderation creates

210 It includes: the Alliance of Citizens of Kosovo (AQK), the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo
(PPK), the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK), the Peoples Movement of
Kosovo (LPK), the Albanian Unification Party (UNIKOMB), and the Albanian Union of
Christian Democrats (UShDK). See, Political Party Guide, supra, note 205 at 6-8.
211 Here I am talking only about Ashkali, Bosniac, Gora and Turk parties, which took part in the
municipal elections.
212The issue of judicial protection will be discussed in Chapter IV.
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favourable ground for the pooling of votes across ethnic lines and opens the door for the
formation of pre-electoral and post-electoral multiethnic coalitions.213

Interim conclusion
The analysis of the Kosovo ethno-political situation leads us to the following
conclusions. First, Kosovo may be considered a plural society as defined by Lijphart. The
Province is territorially and politically fragmented along ethnic lines, that is, the society
is divided into segments. Second, Kosovo is a society where ethnic majority rule is likely
to disadvantage minorities and to be a permanent source of instability for the Province.
Given the superior number of Albanians in the Province, better organization of Albanian
parties and the refusal of some ethnic communities to participate in power sharing and
elections (e.g., Serbs), Kosovo will apparently have an Albanian majority rule. There is a
threat that ethnic majority will use its advantageous position in the organs of government
in order to strengthen its own protection. At the same time, the high concentration of
Serbs in Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic may lead to the exclusion of Albanian
minorities from administration there and possibly their disadvantaged position in those
municipalities.

The

ethno-territorial

distinctiveness

of

the

three

northern

municipalities,214 reinforced by political differences (it terms of which parties are in
power there), may deepen the de facto separation of Kosovo in Albanian-dominated and
Serb-dominated areas. This stronger separation threatens to intensify the tension between
Serbs and Albanians and may give rise to attempts of secession of the Serb municipalities
from Kosovo.

Consequently, if this separation is not mitigated, it will constitute a

continuos threat to reconciliation and stability in the Province.
Taking the above into consideration, it may be concluded that Kosovo needs the
techniques of consociationalism in order to develop stable democratic government. As
seen in Chapter I, consociationalism has certain limitations in terms of its application in
Kosovo. Perhaps only its three elements - proportionality, grand coalition and mutual
213 Another thing is that Albanian parties do not need inter-ethnic coalitions to win the majority of
votes. Thus, they are unlikely to enter into multiethnic coalitions unless the incentives for that are
created through the electoral system.
214 See, section A of this Chapter, Chapter HI at 87, Chapter IV at 149.
215 This can serve as a conformation of our previous conclusion in Chapter I that segmental
autonomy would not be an appropriate means for Kosovo.
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veto - would be suitable for the initial stages if democracy-building in the Province.
Moreover, the success of consociationalism will to a great extent depend on the way it is
implemented through substantive and procedural rules adopted by the UNMIK and its
organs. The next sections examine these rules in greater detail.

B. Development of Self-government in Kosovo
The development of local self-government is one of the central tasks of the
international administration in Kosovo. On the one hand, participation of local parties in
provincial management is required by SCR 1244.216 On the other hand, it is a practical
necessity: without the support from local political forces, any reconstruction activity
would be doomed to failure. Local organs of self-government are necessary, first, as
partners of the international community in reconstruction o f the Province; and, second, as
a precondition for the gradual transfer of authority from international to local structures.
The self-government of Kosovo is developed in two ways: through elections and
through the establishment of mixed (intemational-Kosovar) bodies that carry out
administrative management until all elected bodies are put into operation. The creation of
representative organs through elections is intended to occur in two stages - elections at
the municipal level217 and all-Kosovo elections.218 Having opted for the "bottom- up"
approach,219 the UNMIK has held municipal elections first.
For the period of time until the elections were held and representative bodies were
put in operation, the UNMIK had to introduce other means by which local communities

216 According to paragraph 11 of SCR 1244, the international civil administration is responsible
for “organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and
autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections
and transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while
overseeing and supporting the
consolidation o f Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities."
Emphasis added.
217Municipal elections took place on October 28,2000.
218 All-Kosovo elections are schedules for November 17, 2001.
219 In the Report on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo the UN
Secretary-General emphasized that “democracy must take root at the municipal level” and noted
that all parties and sectors of Kosovo society should be prepared to cooperate with municipal
assemblies. See, Report o f the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo, S/2000/1196, 15 December 2000 at 17, online: United Nations Homepage
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/da/kosovo/kosovo3a.htm (date accessed: 8 February 2001).
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could participate in the administration of local affairs.220 The establishment of the
UNMIK-Kosovar organs was adopted as means to promote such participation.
These mixed organs provided an immediate access of local political forces to the
provincial and municipal decision-making. In contrast to elected organs, the composition
of the UNMIK-created bodies did not reflect popular will. The representatives to
provincial and municipal organs were appointed by the SRSG and the UNMIK
Administrators accordingly. The appointees were chosen from political forces deemed to
be the most politically influential at that time. To a certain extent, such appointments
strengthened the leading position of those local forces. At large, the created organs
reflected the so-called Rambouillet formula (three Kosovo Albanian political parties and
their leaders who participated in the Rambouillet talks - Rugova, Thaci and Qosja). In
addition to that, appointed organs sought to represent the political, religious, and ethnic
diversity of Kosovo.221
To date the administration of Kosovo includes both appointed and elected
organs.222 The Section analyzes the powers of the Kosovo organs from two perspectives:
1) the correlation of the powers of the SRSG and the Kosovar self-government - whether
the necessary preconditions are created for the development of the responsible and
independent self-government; 2) the internal structure of the organs of self-government how it reflects the principles of consociationalism and how it facilitates minority
protection and interethnic reconciliation.

220 Note our previous discussion about the issue of legitimacy.
221 See, composition of the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC).
222 Here is a quick reference about the system of elected and appointed organs in Kosovo:
according to the Agreement between the Kosovo Albanian leaders (Rugova, Thaci and Qosja)
and the SRSG of December 13, 1999 (also know as the JIAS Agreement), the citizens of Kosovo
participate in management of the Province through the UNMIK appointed Joint Interim
Administrative Structure (JIAS) at the provincial level and municipal councils at the municipal
level. In November 2000 municipal boards and councils were replaced by the newly elected
municipal assemblies. In contrast, there are currently no elected representative bodies at
provincial level. The JIAS is functioning until the all-Kosovo elections are held in November
2001.
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1.

Constitutional Framework fo r Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo

On May IS, 2001 the SRSG promulgated the Constitutional Framework for
Provisional Self-Government of Kosovo.223 The adoption of the Framework became
crucial for the future of Kosovo in many respects. First, it more clearly defined the
objectives of the international reconstruction in Kosovo (the preamble stated the goal of
developing parliamentary democracy).224 Second, it promoted the further transfer of
authority from the international administration to Kosovo authorities.225 Third, it clarified
the correlation of power between the institutions of self-government and the international
administration.226 Fourth, it proved that leaders of different communities and parties can
effectively cooperate with each other and with the international officials in the process of
Kosovo reconstruction.227
The Framework regulates the most urgent issues of constitutional government:
individual and collective rights, structure and competence of the Kosovo legislature, the
executive and the judiciary as well as the authority of the SRSG and KFOR, which they
retain over the provincial affairs.
The Framework provides for the establishment of the Provisional Institutions of
Self-government, which “shall work ... towards ensuring conditions for a peaceful and
normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo, with a view to facilitating the determination of
Kosovo’s future status...”228 These institutions have not been established yet, but their
formation will start with the all-Kosovo elections in November 2001.

223 The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government o f Kosovo,
UNMIK/Reg/2001/9 (2001) [hereinafter Constitutional Framework].
Ibid., preamble.
225 The Framework grants to self-government many responsibilities, which were concentrated
with the UNMIK, thus allowing the local forces to assume real decision-making power. For the
discussion of these powers see, below.
226 The Framework distinguishes between the areas of responsibility of the UNMIK and those of
the self-government. See, discussion below.
227 The text of the Framework was elaborated during the seven weeks of negotiation among
Kosovo political parties, ethnic and religious communities, civil sector and the international
administration. It represented a compromise in the position of the local political forces and the
international administration. See, UNMIK Press Release of IS and 16 May 2001, online: UN
Homepage < http://un.org/peace/kosovo/press/tempI.pr.581 .html > (date accessed: 20 may 2001).
228 Ibid., preamble.
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a. Competencies o f the Provisional Institutions
The Provisional Institutions will take over the UNMIK-created organs at the
provincial level. The Provisional Institutions are granted responsibilities over a wide
range of local affairs, including economic regulation, industry and investment, trade,
education, health, transport and telecommunications, agriculture, etc.229 They are also
assigned special responsibilities in judicial affairs, mass media and emergency
preparedness. However, all international and external contacts are exercised only in
coordination with the SRSG.
The balance of power among the branches of self-government clearly points to
parliamentary democracy. The legislative authority in Kosovo will be exercised by the
Assembly. The Assembly has several key powers: to adopt laws and resolutions on the
matters within the competence of the provisional self-government; to elect the President
of Kosovo; to appoint Kosovo officials, including the Prime-Minister and ministers of the
government; to endorse international agreements; and to decide on a motion of noconfidence in the government.230
In contrast to the powers of the Assembly, the President of Kosovo has a rather
limited role. He is elected by the Assembly. His main powers include proposing the
candidature of the Prime-Minister, exercising external relations in coordination with the
SRSG and reporting to the Assembly on the state of affairs in Kosovo.231
The Government of Kosovo has executive authority. It is responsible for
proposing draft laws to the Assembly and implementing the laws adopted by the
Assembly.

The Assembly can exercise control over the government through its power

to express no-confidence in it. Given the necessity to have the government functioning,
the Framework specifies that the Assembly can express no-confidence only if it
simultaneously appoints a new prime-minister and ministers of the government.233
The division of power in this form of parliamentary democracy creates the generally
favourable ground for the development of consociationalism in Kosovo. In fact.

229 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, ch.5.
230 Ibid., s. 9.1.26.
231 Ibid., s. 9.2.
232 Ibid., s. 9.3.
233 Ibid., s. 9.3.10.
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parliamentary democracy is considered the only form of government that allows the
development of consociationalism.234 Thus, the founding preconditions for more inclusive
democratic government for Kosovo are in place. In the process of successful implementation
of this model, a lot depends on the chosen correlation of powers between the SRSG and the
Provisional Institutions (in terms of how much control the international administration
retains over the developing self-government) as well as on the composition and decision
making procedures within the Provisional organs themselves.

b. Correlation o f the powers o f the SRSG and Provisional Institutions
When the Framework will be implemented, Kosovo will have a system of
administration that comprises two structures - the Provisional Institutions and the
international administration. Although structurally and in terms of the balance of power
the Provisional Institutions can be viewed as an independent system of government, they
are limited in terms of competence. The Framework specifically distinguishes the powers
of the SRSG and the powers of the Provisional Institutions. In many respects, the
Provisional Institutions remain under control of the international administration. The
establishment of the provisional self-government does not affect or diminish the powers
of the SRSG to ensure full implementation of SCR 1244.235 A wide range of key
economic and political matters continues to be the exclusive domain of the SRSG. The
SRSG retains the two most important powers: to issue Regulations and to appoint and
remove international officials in Kosovo. In addition to that, the SRSG has reserved
powers in relation to monetary policy, the UNMIK Customs Service, the Kosovo
Protection Corps, law enforcement and correctional service, international relations,
administration of state and public property, cross-border transit of goods and other
matters.236 At the same time, the SRSG has to take necessary steps to facilitate the
transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Provisional Institutions.237 An interesting
point is that, on the one hand, the Provisional Institutions are granted a number of powers
that were previously exercised by the SRSG on behalf of the international administration.
234 See, Lijphart, supra note 41, Van Parijs, supra note 59.
235 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, ch. 12.
“ ibid., s.8.1.
237 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 14.2.
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On the other hand, notwithstanding this transfer, the scope of the powers of the UNMIK
did not decrease. Rather, I would say, some powers became “dormant” - they are
exercised by the Provisional Institutions, but the SRSG can intervene at any time when he
considers this to be necessary to ensure full implementation of SCR 1244. Interestingly,
the power to introduce amendments to the Framework is also usurped by the SRSG. He
can make such amendments on his own initiative or upon a request supported by twothirds of the members of the Assembly.238 Moreover, such an authority of unilateral
amendment of the Framework is not limited in time and presumably can be exercised
even when the Provisional Institutions are substantially developed (given that the
international civil presence continues in the Province).
The power of the SRSG to amend the Framework unilaterally is highly
controversial. It means that the people whose will is expressed through the Assembly are
excluded from the government, that they are denied one of the essential rights - to define
the way of their future development. In this respect, the unilateral amendment of the
Framework by the SRSG not only undermines the authority of the developing selfgovernment, but also contradicts the earlier affirmed principles of the involvement of
local parties in decision-making239 and the democratic principles of the UN.240
Many powers of the SRSG and of the Provisional Institutions are closely
interrelated. Even the normatively stipulated distinction between their areas of
responsibility may not be a sufficient guarantee against confusion about their respective
competencies. One of the first concerns is parallel exercise of functions by the SRSG and
the Provisional Institutions over the same matter and the problem as to whose decision
takes precedence. For instance, the Provisional Institutions are responsible for economic,
fiscal and budgetary policy.241 At the same time, the SRSG is the final authority to set
financial and policy parameters. The problematic point is the interpretation of these two
provisions in relation to each other. The “final authority” of the SRSG may mean either
that he can overrule the decisions of the Provisional Institutions or that he can make a
decision if the Provisional Institutions are incapable of reaching consensus on an issue or
238 Ibid., s. 143.
239 See, SCR 1244, supra note 106, preamble and para 10; the JIAS Regulation, s. 1(a).
240 See, also discussion about moral issues of peace-building in Chapter 11(B).
241 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 5.1(a) and s. 5.1(b).
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both these possibilities. In any event, the “final authority” gives the SRSG power to
control the decision-making of the Provisional Institutions and even substitute their
decisions with his own. While the “final authority” of the SRSG may be useful to
overcome procedural deadlock242 and elaborate more effective financial policy, its
frequent exercise is likely to be objected to by the Kosovar organs as too interventionist.
Another example concerns the power of the SRSG to appoint and remove judges
and prosecutors. According to s. 5.3(a), the Provisional Institutions are responsible for
“making decisions regarding the appointment of judges and prosecutors.”243 At the same
time, the SRSG has a reserved power of “exercising final authority regarding the
appointment, removal from office and disciplining of judges and prosecutors.”244 The
ultimate scope of this “final authority” is not clear. Most likely, this power means that the
SRSG is in position to remove a judge or prosecutor appointed by the Provisional
Institutions and unilaterally appoint a new person. The preservation of controlling powers
of the SRSG is necessary to oversee the newly elected organs and to assist their initial
activities. At the same time, the frequent use of the broad powers of the SRSG may
undermine and limit the power of legitimately created institutions of self-government.
On these two examples we have seen that provisions of the Framework can be
interpreted in a variety of ways, conferring a broader or narrower authority on a particular
organ. There may be many different opinions on the interpretation of the same provision,
each of which may be adequate. The question is not in finding a right interpretation, but
the one which is politically acceptable and provides an equitable result and consistency in
the approach to self-government and its development. For this reason, there is a need for
authoritative interpretation of the Framework’s provisions. The SRSG, with his ample
powers of supervision over the Provisional Institutions also has a final say in the
interpretation of the Framework. According to Chapter 12, the SRSG can determine
whether the actions of Provisional Institutions are consistent with SCR 1244 and the
Constitutional Framework,245 which necessarily involves interpretation of the powers of
Provisional Institutions and of the SRSG.
242 See, discussion about mutual veto in Chapter I.
243 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223.S. 5.3 (a).
244 Ibid., s. 8.1(g).
245 Ibid., ch. 12.
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None of the characteristics of peace-building directly relates to the limits on the
powers of the SRSG. The powers of the SRSG should be restrained by the general aim of
peace-building for the development of sustainability and independence of local organs.
The usurpation of the power to interpret the Framework by the SRSG, may slow down or
preclude the Kosovo’s constitutional development - an area crucial for the well-rounded
protection and inclusiveness of minorities.
The power of the SRSG to interpret the Framework’s provisions also creates
certain concerns about the imposition of “Western” values and understanding of the
reconstruction process. In my view, the legitimate interpretation of the Framework should
emanate from a judicial organ. In the spirit of the democratic tradition, the Supreme
Court of Kosovo246 should have the power to interpret the Framework’s provisions.
However, there is nothing in the Framework that suggests such authority.

c.

Composition and decision-making in the Provisional Institutions

As mentioned before, the functioning of consociationalism to a great extent
depends on the design of the decision-making procedures and the composition of the
organs of government. These requirements should be unified by a common aim of
providing more stable and inclusive government.
The Constitutional

Framework establishes special

requirements

for the

composition of the provincial organs and decision-making procedures in the Provisional
Institutions, which reflect some consociational principles. Let us first examine these
procedures and the potential effect they may have on the protection of minority interests.
The popularly elected Assembly consists of 120 members elected by the
population. 100 seats are distributed among all parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and
independent candidates proportionately to the number of votes received by them in the
elections.247 20 are seats reserved for non-Kosovo Albanian communities. Among them,
10 seats are allocated to parties representing Serb communities, 4 seats for the Roma,

246 The Supreme Court will have more legitimacy in its interpretation as a collective organ, given
that it is consociadonally composed.
247 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 9.1.3(a).
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Ashkali and Egyptian Communities,248 3 - for the Bosniac Community, 2 for the Turkish
Community and 1 for the Gorani Community.249 Within each category the seats are
distributed proportionately to the number of votes received by respective parties in the
elections.
The existence of reserved seats in the Assembly and the method of allocating
them may be regarded as an attempt to satisfy two principles of consociationalism:
proportionality and grand coalition. The very existence of reserved seats is a guarantee
that the leaders of major ethnic segments of the Kosovo society are included in the
Assembly. Their inclusion is a precondition for cooperation among various leaders,
which, in turn, may help the formation of a grand coalition. Proportionality used for seat
allocation ensures that each community has appropriate weight in decision-making.
The composition of the organs created by the Kosovo Assembly is also influenced
by the principles o f proportionality and grand coalition. For example, the Chairmanship
of the all Committees of the Assembly has to be distributed proportionately among
parties and coalitions represented in the Assembly.250 The seats of the Budget Committee
are allocated proportionately among parties and coalitions represented in the
Assembly.251 The Committee on Human Rights and Interests of Communities has to
include two members of each Kosovo community elected by the Assembly.
Generally, the decisions of the Assembly, including adoption of laws, are made
by majority of the present and voting members.252 This threshold is higher - two-thirds
majority - for the election of the President of Kosovo.253 However, there is no special
requirement that a candidate for president has to receive minority support. Since most
likely the Assembly will be more than 2/3 Albanian, there will be no incentive for a
candidate to moderate his position in order to try to win minority support. Thus, the
procedure for the election of the president does not seem to increase the chance of having
248 Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptians were often viewed by international actors as interconnected
and ethnically similar groups. Probably for this reason, they altogether are allocated four seats in
the Assembly. This seat allocation is likely to produce disagreements among the Roma, Egyptians
and Ashakaeli groups, which view themselves as distinct communities.
249 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 9.1.3 (b).
250Ibid., s. 9.1.21.
251 Ibid., s. 9.1.11.
252Ibid., s. 9.1.33.
253 Ibid., s. 9.2.8.
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a panethnic candidate as a President of Kosovo. Although the president does not have
significant powers, the very presence of nationalistic politician on this post would have a
negative impact of the reconciliation processes in Kosovo.
In relation to the adoption of laws, the Framework incorporates a very interesting
procedure to protect minority interests against being overridden by the ethnic majority of
the Assembly. Instead of a mutual veto, which threatens procedural deadlock, it
introduces another procedure, which allows both to escape the deadlocks of the veto and
to protect the interests of minorities. Within 48 hours from the approval of a law by the
Assembly six members of the Assembly can submit a motion to the Presidency claiming
that the law in total or in part violates vital interests of the community to which they
belong.254 The Presidency of the Assembly designates a panel which examines the matter
and prepares a “consensus proposal”255 to the Assembly. If the Assembly rejects the
proposal or accepts a proposal for the rejection of the motion, the law stands as
previously adopted.256 In my opinion, this model of a moderate veto is a particularly good
idea which allows to safeguard the interest of minorities, but reduces the risk of deadlock
or delay in resolution of vital public matters. In this respect, such practice may be viewed
as contributing a new tool to the consociational model. The veto is utilized only in
relation to the adopted laws - the means that have serious impact on the position of
minorities.
Similar to the Kosovo Assembly, the government is composed sensitively of
ethnic division. The Framework does not specify the number of ministers, but requires
that at least two of them be from communities other than the community that has the
majority in the Assembly.257 At least one of those ministers has to be from the Serb
community and another from another community. The selection of these ministers is
exercised during consultation with parties representing non-majority communities. This
procedure resembles grand coalition decision-making where minorities have to cooperate

254 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 9.1.39.
255 Ibid., s. 9.1.40.
256Ibid., s. 9.1.42.
257 Ibid., s. 9.3.5.
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and compromise in order to select the most suitable candidates. The decisions of the
Government have to be reached by consensus if possible.258
Generally, I would assess the composition and the decision-making procedures in
the Kosovo Provisional Institutions as sound and sensitively incorporating the some
principles of consociationalism. Some procedures and guarantees are particularly well
tailored. For example, the moderate mutual veto seems to provide sufficient flexibility for
both protection of minority interests and effective decision-making. Another important
achievement is that the incentives for grand coalition and the principle o f proportionality
are incorporated not only in relation to the legislative branch, but also in relation to the
executive and the organs created by the Kosovo Assembly. This way the application of
consociationalism becomes fairly well-rounded and coherent. The exception to this
coherency is the procedure for the election of the President of Kosovo, which does not
sufficiently guarantee the panethnicity of the head of the Province. On the one hand, I
agree that not every step of the decision-making should be burdened with the pursuit of
panethnicity. On the other hand, the President of Kosovo is one of the key political
Figures in the Province (although he nominally does not have very ample powers) and the
absence of any consociational-type requirements for his election may become a serious
impediment for the success of consociationalism in Kosovo.

2. Joint Interim Administrative Structure
The JIAS is an organ that currently provides the participation of Kosovars in the
decision-making at the provincial level.239 The JIAS was established by the Agreement
signed between the leaders of the “Rambouillet formula” (Hashim Thaci, Ibrahim
Rugova, Rexhep Qosja) and the SRSG Bernard Koucher on December 13, 1999. The
Agreement determined that the citizens of Kosovo “will work in the Joint Interim
Administrative Structure through participation in the Kosovo Transitional Council, the
Interim Administrative Council, Administrative Departments, as well as in the different
administrative structures at the municipal level.”260 The creation of the JIAS sought to
resolve several problems: eliminate parallel governments, which undermined the
258 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 9.3.16.
259The structure is intended to be in operation until the Provisional Institutions are put in place.
260Agreement, 13 December, 1999, http://www.un.org/peaceJcosovo/press/agree.htm
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authority of the UNMIK;261 integrate minorities in governing structures; and promote
cooperation among local actors as well as between local political forces and the UNMIK.
The main points of the Agreement were subsequently endorsed in the UNMIK
Regulation 2000/1 on a Joint Interim Administrative Structure, which authorized the
establishment of the JIAS. The Regulation affirmed that local political forces share
administrative management of the Province with the UNMIK.262 The JIAS became a
unified organ of Kosovo administrative management. All Kosovo structures as of
December 1999, whether they were legislative, executive or judicial, had to integrate into
the JIAS.*63 Importantly, this also concerned the Kosovo parallel governments - the
Provisional Government of Kosovo' led by Thaci and the Presidency of the Republic of
Kosovo' associated with the LDK. On merger in the JIAS, those structures ceased to
exist.264
The JIAS is placed within the structure of the UNMIK and is headed by the SRSG
Office (See, illustration 2). No JIAS body has power to issue binding decisions and
serves only as a consultative body for the UNMIK. The SRSG retains full legislative and
executive authority in the Province.
The JIAS consists of two bodies: the Kosovo Transitional Council and the Interim
Administrative Council. The Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) is the highest
consultative body of the JIAS. The Interim Advisory Council (IAC) is an executive board
for the JIAS and an advisory body for the SRSG. The IAC represents the political forces
of Kosovo, while the KTC is intended to express the voice of the wider Kosovo
community - religious and community leaders, NGO sector, independents.
The inclusiveness of local communities and political elites in both organs of the
JIAS was tailored in light of the grand coalition and proportionality principle. In relation

Agreement, 13 December, 1999, http://www.un.org/peace.kosovo/press/agree.htm
At the time of the UNMIK deployment, there were two shadow governments in Kosovo: one
associated with the KLA (the Provisional Government of Kosovo' headed by Thaci) and another
- with the LDK (the Presidency of the Republic of Kosovo*).
262 Regulation on the Kosovo Joint Interim Administrative Structure, UNMK/Reg/2000/1, s.l(a)
(2001),
online:
United
Nations
Homepage
<
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/regO 1.html> (date accessed: 21 January
2001).
263 Ibid, s. 1(c).
264Ibid.
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to the IAC these principles are applied in a “selective” way. The IAC consists of eight
members, four of which are representatives from Kosovo and another four representatives
from the UNMIK.265 All the members are appointed by the SRSG. The Kosovo
representatives should include three Kosovo Albanians and one Kosovo Serb. Currently,
the IAC includes three Kosovo Albanian leaders (Rugova, Thaci and Qosja - Rambouilet
formula), a representative of the Serb National Council (Rada Trajkovic) as an observer,
four UNMIK representatives and an observer for each side.266 Observers can participate
in discussions, but do not have a right to vote. Such composition of the IAC may be
regarded as a grand coalition between the international administration and the main
(Albanian and Serb) political segments of the Kosovo society, but it does not represent a
grand coalition of the segments of the whole Kosovo society. I see the explanation for
this selective inclusiveness in the following. First, at the time of the formation of the
JIAS it was not possible to ensure the representation of all the Kosovo communities.
Large numbers of Kosovars remained in refuge abroad or were internally displaced.
Consequently, there was no opportunity to obtain a clear idea about the numbers of
particular minorities that required representation. Moreover, many minority communities
were not organized politically to effectively represent the whole ethnic segment in the
JIAS. Second, it might have been easier and more efficient to negotiate a political
agreement with the key Kosovar leaders rather than with a handful of leaders of larger
and smaller segments.

Regulation on the Kosovo Joint Interim Administrative Structure, supra note 262, s. 4.
366
Interim
Administrative
Council,
online:
United
Nations
Homepage
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/twelvemonths/jias.html (date accessed: 18 November
2000).
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Picture 3. The Structure of the JIAS.
Source: UN Homepage, United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/twelvemonths/jiasimages.html

The two main powers of the IAC are to make recommendations to the SRSG in
regard to the regulations to be adopted or changed and to provide policy guidelines for 20
Administrative departments. The decision-making procedures of the IAC represent a
form of a mutual veto: “Members of the Interim Administrative Council shall try, to all
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possible extent, to reach consensus.”267 This formula, on the one hand, requires
consensus. On the other, it permits derogation from the requirement of consensual
decision-making, thus, mitigating the danger of deadlock. The Regulation also
incorporates an additional safeguard against deadlock: the SRSG can make a decision
himself if the IAC is not able to do so by consensus or by three quarter majority.268 In
addition to this, the SRSG is able to control the decisions through his another power:
even if a decision is made by consensus or by three quarter majority of the IAC, the
SRSG can advise the Council to make a different decision.269 At the same time, the
concern about deadlock was not very high because the IAC served as a forum for the
expression of opinions of the local communities, but not as an organ adopting binding
decisions where outcomes may be vetoed. In this respect, the power of the SRSG can be
viewed as an expansion of the coercive power of the international administration rather
than the means to overcome deadlock associated with mutual veto.
Although the IAC does not have power to produce binding decisions that affect
the Province, the body plays an important role in the more effective exercise of the
international administration. First, it helps to promote dialogue between the leaders of the
major Kosovo political forces.270 Second, it is a mechanism for providing greater
legitimacy to the UNMIK decisions271 and a way of obtaining political support to
international initiatives among local structures.
The KTC represents the Kosovo political, ethnic and religious groups. It consists
of 36 members. Among them are 4 Kosovo members of the IAC, 11 representatives of
Kosovo political parties,272 3 representatives of religious communities,273 10 civil society

267Regulation on the Kosovo Joint Interim Administrative Structure, supra note 262, s. 6.1.
268 Ibid., s. 6.3. See, the suggestion that was made in Chapter I concerning the possibility of
international intervention in order to prevent deadlocks associated with mutual veto.
269Ibid., s. 6.2,6.3.
270 The IAC is not exactly an example of a grand coalition because it includes only the Kosovo
political elites - the three parties that participated in the Rambouillet talks - and a Serb
representative in recognition of the importance of the Serb segment in the Kosovo society.
Because of this selective inclusiveness the IAC represents a coalition not of all segments of the
Kosovo society, but only of those deemed to be the most influential.
271 The UNMIK does not make decisions unilaterally, but consults with the local parties. This
helps to reduce the criticism of the neo-colonialist nature of an international administration.
272 The following parties have their representatives in the KTC: LDK, PLK, PDK, PRK, LKCK,
PPK, LBD, PShDK, PSDK. An interesting thing is that all of them are Albanian. The only
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representatives, and 8 representatives of national communities.274 Because of its more
comprehensive composition (compared to the IAC), the KTC more resembles a grand
coalition as defined by Lijphart. Interestingly, this grand coalition body has more limited
competence than the “elite club” of the IAC. The Regulation on the Establishment of the
JIAS does not spell out the competencies assigned to the KTC. This fact is surprising.
The UNMIK sought to involve the local parties in provincial management, but it does not
give any specific powers to an organ which broadly represents Kosovo society. This state
o f affairs is, however, understood from the practical perspective. It was easier for the
UNMIK to deal with several most influential leaders rather than debate issues with
numerous leaders of smaller segments.
The JIAS was not intended to serve as an organ of self-government. Rather, the
structure was designed as means to assist the more effective work of the UNMIK.
Perhaps due to the “assistant” role of the JIAS, the principles of consociationalism were
applied to it in a limited way. The proportionality principle - an important precondition
for a variety of opinions and perspectives - was sufficiently observed only in one of the
JIAS organs, the KTC. The mutual veto existed in a very weak form in the IAC and was
not prescribed for the KTC. The weak mutual veto might be seen as appropriate for the
JIAS, which played a consultative rather than a real decision-making role in the Kosovo
administration.
The structure of the JIAS allows for both close cooperation between the SRSG
and Kosovo leaders (through the IAC) and consideration of the opinion of the wider
Kosovo community (through the KTC). Neither of the JIAS organs has legislative or
executive authority. Moreover, the SRSG has significant control over the structure by
virtue of his powers to appoint the JIAS members and influence the decision-making.
Thus, I see the importance of the JIAS in two areas. First, it has a symbolic nature of
power sharing between the UNMIK and local political forces. This power sharing confers
more legitimacy on the UNMIK decisions. Second, it provides an opportunity to obtain
support for international initiatives by Kosovo political, community and religious leaders.
explanation that I can find for this is that the major part of minority parties was not officially
formed at that time. However, this explanation does not seem to be convincing enough.
273 Muslim community, Roman Catholic Church, Serb Orthodox Church.
274Turks, Roma, Serbs, and Bosniacs.
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Through the JIAS, the UNMIK partially resolved one of the controversies of peace
building - retaining the full control of the international administration over the provincial
decision-making, but at the same time securing sufficient legitimacy for its decisions.273

3. Municipal boards and councils
At the municipal level the system of interaction between the UNMIK officers and
local political forces was designed similarly to the JIAS described above.276 A municipal
board appointed by an UNMIK Municipal Administrator was put in charge of the
municipal administration.277 The local parties and communities participated in
administration

through

municipal

councils

also

appointed

by

the

Municipal

Administrator. A municipal council, which represented the citizens of the municipality,278
served as a consultative body to the Municipal Administrator. The Regulation on the
Joint Interim Administrative Structure, which also serves as the basis for the structure of
the municipal administration, does not refer to any consociational-type techniques either
in regard to the composition or decision-making in Municipal Councils.279
The analysis of the data on municipal councils and boards appointments,280 gives
rise to the conclusion that representatives to municipal councils were appointed with an
attempt to proportional representation of each party and ethnic community in a given
municipality. Although attempts were made to ensure wide representation of political
parties and other actors in municipal boards and municipal councils, these bodies, as a
rule, were dominated by the largest ethnic majority parties registered in a municipality.
Since prior to the elections there was no authoritative reference as to the level of
popular support for a particular party, the appointments from parties representing the
273 I mean that the involvement of the local parties in decision-making mitigates the critique that
peace-builders impose the solutions that they deem appropriate.
*6 Please, note that the structure has changed after the 2000 municipal elections. The discussion
of the current powers of municipalities is to follow.
277Regulation on the Kosovo Joint Interim Administrative Structure, supra note 262, S . . 8 . 1.
278 Ibid.
279 The requirement that “the Municipal Council shall represent the citizens of the municipality”
may be interpreted as a requirement for proportionate representation. However, I am inclined to
think that this phrase means that the Municipal Councils are working in capacity of representative
organs for a municipality.
280 Profiles o f the Municipalities in Kosovo, online: OSCE Homepage
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/docuinents/ieports/municipal profiles/ (date accessed: 3 May 2001).
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same ethnic group usually were contingent on the authority of that party within the JIAS
(and particularly in the IAC). Consequently, in the majority of Kosovo municipalities, the
LDK and the PDK had more seats than other Albanian parties. Minorities often were not
sufficiently represented even in multiethnic municipalities.
At the provincial level the UNMIK developed a rather elaborate structure for the
involvement of diverse elements of Kosovo society in the administration of the Province.
In contrast, at the municipal level the consociational techniques were given less attention.
In my opinion, such a step is consistent with the situation in Kosovo in 1999 and early
2000. The elaboration of a certain political settlement and stability in Kosovo was
primarily contingent on the agreement between the main Kosovar leaders and the
UNMIK. In my view, one of the tendencies of Kosovo political life is that authority and
decision-making flows from the center to the peripheries. The parties’ local offices
follow the stance of the headquarters, rather than actively participate in shaping the
party’s position. Thus, obtaining support and consensus of the main Kosovar leaders was
the main precondition for more or less permanent political settlement. Consequently, the
UNMIK was more concerned with the functioning of the organs at the provincial than at
the municipal level.

4. Powers of municipalities
After the 2000 October elections in Kosovo the structure of the municipal
administration and powers of the municipal organs were altered. The change took place
according to Regulation 2000/45 on Self-government of Municipalities in Kosovo. The
Regulation spells out the substantive and procedural details of the “democratic and
autonomous self-government at the municipal level.”281 Most importantly, it defines the
powers of municipalities and the relations between the Central Authority and a
municipality. It also sets up the foundations for minority participation in municipal
decision-making.

281 Regulation on Self-government o f Municipalities in Kosovo, UNMK/Reg/2000/45, s. 1,
online:
United
Nations
Homepage
<
http://www.un.org/Deace/kosovo/Dages/repuladons/ref045.htnil> (date accessed: 1 June 2001).
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According to the Regulation, municipalities are the basic territorial unit of local
self-government, which exercise all powers not expressly reserved to the UNMIK.282
Such autonomy is not precisely segmental autonomy as described by Lijphart. According
to him,283 segmental autonomy is given to a segment of a society, not merely to a
territorial unit. In the case of Kosovo, territorial units do not necessarily coincide with the
territorial concentration of ethnic minority segments. This may be true only for the three
northern municipalities inhabited by Serbs. In other municipalities minorities are
concentrated in particular areas. For them, segmental autonomy would be a level of selfgovernment lower than municipal (e.g., a district).
The highest representative body of a municipality is the Municipal Assembly284
elected directly by the people. Municipalities are responsible for a wide range of local
affairs, including licensing of building and other development; management of municipal
property; health care; primary and secondary education; public services; social services;
and control over public utilities, etc.28S Municipalities do not have power over local
police, which remains under the Central Authority. The responsibility for financial
administration will not be transferred to municipalities until an independent auditor
certifies that necessary management systems are in place.286
As a general rule, the decisions of Municipal Assemblies and their organs are
made by simple majority of present and voting members.287 If they are made by majority,
it is quite probable that the ethnic majority will be able to make key decisions without
minority support. However, such important municipal officials as the president of the
Assembly288 and the Deputy-president are elected by two-thirds majority.289
The Regulation provides for the mechanisms of control over the activities of
municipal administration (in terms of both general administration and protection of
“ Ibwl. s. 2.
283Lijphart, supra note 41 at 14.
284 Ibid., s. 10.1.
285Ibid., s. 3,3.1.
186 Ibid, s. 46.2.
287Ibid., 14.4.
288 The President of the Assembly is responsible for general supervision of the execution of
decisions adopted by the Assembly and of the financial administration of the municipality. He or
she also has other responsibilities assigned to him/her according to the Statute and the Rules of
Procedure. Ibid., s. 28.
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minorities). Supervision over the actions of municipalities is exercised at three levels: by
the Central Authority, by the Municipal Administrator and by the Provisional Institutions
of Self-government.
The responsibilities of the Provisional Institutions in the field of local
administration will be two fold. On one hand, the Provisional Institutions provide
guidance and assistance to municipalities. On the other, they supervise municipalities in a
number of ways. For example, they oversee the municipalities’ compliance with powers
delegated to them and monitor the quality of municipal services.290
The Regulation on Self-Government of Municipalities reserves the right of the
Central Authority to exercise administrative supervision over municipalities.291 The
SRSG can set aside decisions of municipalities if they are in conflict with SCR 1244 or
do not “sufficiently take into account the rights and interests of the communities which
are not in the majority in the territory of the municipality.”292 He can remove members of
municipal assemblies for misconduct and dissolve an Assembly.293 The SRSG can issue
Administrative Directions to

municipalities concerning

municipal

budgets and

finances.294
Another important power of the SRSG concerns minority protection. The SRSG
can co-opt additional members to the Assembly to ensure representation of communities
according to SCR 1244.295 This power allows the SRSG to exercise post-facto
"correction” of the electoral results. Section D of this Chapter describes how the SRSG
used this power in relation to the municipal elections.
The Municipal Administrator, as an agent of the Central Authority, exercises
immediate control over decision making at the municipal level. He can intervene to
ensure compliance of the decisions with SCR 1244, including the observance of
289 ibid., s. 24.1.
290Regulation on Self-government o f Municipalities in Kosovo, supra note 281, s. 5.2.
291 Ibid., s. 3.5.
292 Ibid., s. 47.2. One can argue about the too broad construction of this provision. The
determination of what remedies “sufficiendy take into account the rights and interests of the
communities which are not in the majority in the territory of the municipality” may be very
subjective. It confers wide discretion on the SRSG in interpretation and, basically, creates no
barrier for his interference at the municipal level.
293 Ibid., s. 47.5.
294Ibid., s. 47.8
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fundamental human rights and interests of communities.296 An Administrator can suspend
a decision or refer the matter to the SRSG. He approves the budget and continues to be
responsible for the administration of municipal property.297
Similarly to the SRSG, the Municipal Administrator has powers in relation to
minority protection. The Municipal Administrator approves the appointments and the
dismissal of senior staff to ensure that they fairly reflect the proportion of qualified
candidates from each community.298 He may also appoint members of the Communities
Committee and the Mediation Committee299 who are not members of the Municipal
Assembly.300
In addition to the powers of the SRSG and the Municipal Administrator, the
Regulation establishes another mechanism of minority participation and protection of
minority rights - the municipal committees. This may be regarded as a mechanism of
municipal internal self-regulation. If the committees work well for the protection of
minority interests, the interference of the Municipal Administrator and of the SRSG may
be minimized.
According to section 2.1 of the Regulation, the Municipal Assembly appoints the
Policy and Finance Committee, the Communities Committee and the Mediation
Committee. The Communities Committee and the Mediation Committee are the core
structures, which ensure that municipality’s minorities (communities301) are not sidelined
within the Municipal Assemblies.
The composition and powers of the Committees are designed so as to allow
meaningful participation of minority communities in decision-making and coordinated
action for minority protection at the municipal level.

The Communities Committee

295 Ibid., s. 47.3.
296 Regulation on Self-government o f Municipalities in Kosovo, supra note 281, s. 48.1.
297Ibid., s.48.14.
398 Ibid., s.48.12
299 The two committees are entrusted with the promotion of minority participation and minority
protection in a municipality. Their functions are described below.
Regulation on Self-government o f Municipalities in Kosovo, supra note 281, s. 49.1
301 Interestingly, the Regulation refers not to “minorities,” but to “communities.” As some
researchers contend, this was made to comfort Serb sensitivity over being called a minority.
Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy? International crisis Group Report, 7 July 2000,
at
3,
online:
ICG
Homepage
<
http.7/www.intl-crisis-
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includes both members of the Assembly and representatives of communities (at least one
representative for each of the communities residing in the municipality).302 Further, the
community that has the majority in the municipality shall have less than one half of the
membership in the Committee and the remaining membership shall “fairly reflect the
number of other communities.”303 The composition of the Committee is tailored with the
consideration of proportionality ("fairly reflect the number of ... communities”) and
grand coalition principle (at least one representative for each of the communities residing
in the municipality).
As stems from the Regulation, the Communities Committee has primarily
watchdog powers. It ensures that public officials do not discriminate against anyone on a
ground of language, religion, ethnic origin or affiliation; that everyone enjoys equal rights
and equal employment opportunities in municipal services; and that the municipal civil
service has a fair proportion of candidates from different communities.304 Importantly,
the powers of the Communities Committee are broad enough to embrace, not only the
protection of minority rights, but also the general promotion of human rights and
equality. However, the powers of the Committee seem to be limited in another way.
First, the Committee can examine only actions taken “by or on behalf of the
Municipal Assembly.”305 This means that other instances of violations are not within the
scope of the Committee’s power. Moreover, because the Regulation mentions only
“actions” it is not clear whether an act adopted by the Assembly can be challenged by the
Committee. Apparently, the Committee does not have authority to review the acts of the
Municipal Assembly. However, it may be useful to give it a power similar to the
Presidency of the Kosovo Assembly - to accept a challenge to an act and to make
recommendations to the Assembly in regard to a challenged act, but to leave the power to
decide on the rightfulness of such a challenge to the Assembly. Second, the Regulation
does not provide standing for natural persons or even municipal officials. As stems from
the provisions, the Committee initiates an examination of a particular matter on its own
grouD.org/proiects/balkans/kosovo/reports/A400Q07 07072000.pdf > (date accessed: IS March
2001) [hereinafter Elections in Kosovo].
302Regulation on Self-government o f Municipalities in Kosovo, supra note 281, s.23.3
303 Ibid., s. 23.3
304Ibid., s. 23.4
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initiative. Third, if a violation occurs, the Communities Committee is not entitled to take
an action itself - it has to refer the case to the Mediation Committee. Fourth, I doubt the
ability of the Committee to be independent and impartial because part of its members are
members of the Assembly, thus, they may be reluctant to investigate and expose to
attention wrongful actions “by or on behalf of the Municipal Assembly.”
The Mediation Committee is another organ concerned with the protection of
communities and its members. It consists of an equal number of the members of the
Municipal Assembly who are not members of the Communities Committee and
representatives of communities who do not belong to the community that forms the
majority in the municipality.306 As follows from the context of the Regulation, the
Mediation Committee cannot bring a matter itself, but deals with the issues referred to it
by the Communities Committee.
The Mediation Committee investigates the matter and tries to resolve the problem
by mediation. It has to submit a report on each matter with recommendations to the
Municipal Assembly. The Assembly decides what further action to take. If the Municipal
Assembly does not make any decision within 21 days after the submission of the report,
or if the Communities Committee is dissatisfied with the decision of the Municipal
Assembly, it (the Communities Committee) may refer the matter to the Central Authority.
The municipal system of minority protection presupposes close cooperation
between the Mediation Committee, the Communities Committee and the Municipal
Assembly. If they function harmoniously, the whole system might work well for the
protection of communities. However, this mechanism has certain drawbacks. One of
them is the separation of the authority to investigate from the authority to make a final
decision about the action to be taken. The Regulation creates a four-step approach to
investigation and resolution of violations. Initially, the Communities Committee
examines the matter and refers it to the Mediation Committee. Then, the Mediation
Committee investigates the matter and tries to resolve it by mediation. If mediation fails,
the Municipal Assembly has to make a decision about the further action. Next, if the
Communities Committee is dissatisfied with the decision, it may refer the matter to the

305Ibid., s. 23.6
306Regulation on Self-government o f Municipalities in Kosovo, supra note 281, s. 23.3
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Central Authority. The loose time frame for dealing with matters (28 days for the
Mediation Committee to submit a report to the Municipal Assembly and 21 days for the
Municipal Assembly to decide on the action to be taken) may result in substantial delays
in the resolution of urgent matters. This is particularly harmful if the Mediation
Committee had failed to resolve the matter by mediation and is waiting for the Municipal
Assembly’s decision to proceed by other means. The above-mentioned drawbacks may
limit the capabilities of the Municipal structures to deal effectively with the instances of
violations. It would be advisable to establish a special procedure for dealing with matters
requiring urgent resolution. It would also be helpful to create a possibility for referring
the most serious cases to prosecutor or a judge for further investigation.
The Regulation left sufficient discretion for the Assemblies to establish the rules
of procedure for the organs created by the Assemblies. For example, it did not set the
decision-making procedures for the Communities Committee and for the Mediation
Committee. As we have already seen in relation to the Kosovo Assembly, the decision
making procedure may be an important safeguard for taking into account interests of all
the communities. Perhaps such delimitation was not necessary because the composition
of the Committees is itself a safeguard against the domination of majority community
(e.g., the Communities Committee has to have less than a half of the members of the
community which forms majority in the municipality). The procedural discretion of the
Municipal Assemblies opens the door for the development of their responsibility and
independence. Even more importantly, the survey of the adopted approach by Municipal
Assemblies will provide the UNMIK with the important feedback about the general
willingness of the Assembly members to create additional guarantees for minorities
where it is not legally required.

Interim conclusions
There has been a gradual expansion in the role of local political forces and
communities from mere consultation with the UNMIK to independent exercise of
administrative functions. This process evidences the realization of the principal goals of
peace-building. With the adoption of the Regulation of Self-Government of
Municipalities in Kosovo, municipalities obtained sufficient powers to administer
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municipal affairs. After the implementation of the Framework, organs of self-government
will also be established at the provincial level.
While elected organs have primary responsibility for the administration in
assigned areas, the international administration retains the power to control and supervise
them. The SRSG can exercise control over self-government through his dormant powers.
Some of these dormant powers can be exercised without seeming restrictive (for
example, the SRSG can issue administrative directions to Municipal Assemblies or take
measures to ensure that the needs of a village or settlement are properly addressed, or
decide whether measures sufficiently take into account the interests of minorities). Such
an extensive power may become an impediment to the development of independent selfgovernment in Kosovo and may violate the provisions of the peace-building concept.
The system of local organs and the supervision of the international administration
has to be flexible enough to allow for the development of self-government. The challenge
for the future is to determine the extent to which international bodies can and should
continue to intervene in local administration after all representative bodies start
functioning. It is necessary to carefully balance the need to control self-government in
Kosovo and the need to develop responsible local organs. Theoretically, any activity
should be measured by its potential to advance the goals of peace-building transformation and sustainability. After the election of the Kosovar organs on both
municipal and provincial level, the basic process of transformation may be considered
completed. After that, the focus has to be shifted to the development of sustainability,
that is, to the development of independent and responsible self-government. The latter
goal should serve as a guideline for making a decision about the interference of the SRSG
in the activities of self-government.
In terms of the implementation of the consociational techniques, the JIAS more
followed the existing political trends and was more guided by the expediency
requirement. For example, more powers were given to the “elite club” of the IAC rather
than to the KTC because it was easier to reach key decisions with the several major
Kosovar leaders. The legal framework for permanent self-government seeks to reflect
more fully the principles necessary for inclusive government. The plans include quite
extensive implementation of consociationalist techniques, such as proportionality and
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mutual veto, at the provincial level. For example, the adoption of laws in the Kosovo
Assembly allows for some kind of post facto moderate mutual veto. The composition of
the representative organs and organs created by the Kosovo and the Municipal
Assemblies follow the proportionality principle.
At the municipal level the principles of consociationalism are incorporated in a
very limited way. The decision-making procedures of the Municipal Assemblies do not
include any mutual veto type techniques. The composition of the municipal committees
follows the principle of proportionality, but this is not enough for the protection of
minority interests. Similar unequal implementation of consociationalism at the provincial
and municipal level was observed in relation to the UNMIK-created organs. This may
evidence a general tendency of the UNMIK to pay more attention to the provincial rather
than the municipal structure. If this is true, such an imbalance may have an adverse effect
on the democratization of Kosovo.
The inclusive effect of the rules regulating competencies and functioning of both
municipal and provincial self-government depends not only on the extent to which these
rules incorporate the requirements of consociationalism, but also on the “human element”
in the representative organs. Individual positions and the perceptions of the assembly
members will have a great impact on the atmosphere in the organs of self-government.
The tool that can be used to influence the “human side” of representative organs is the
rules of electoral campaigning and conduct. They are like a filter, which reduces the
number of radical nationalist elements in representative bodies and creates preconditions
for more cooperative organs of self-government. The section that follows discusses the
regulation of the electoral process in Kosovo.

C. Elections in Kosovo
1. Municipal elections
a.

Organizationalframework fo r elections

While the UNMIK-created organs are important for immediate involvement of
local political forces in decision-making, elections are a fundamental step in the
development of the Kosovo self-government.
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The preparation and conduct of elections was a joint effort of the UNMIK pillars.
Although the OSCE was assigned a leading role in the electoral preparation,307 other
international organizations were also involved in one or another stage o f this process.
The cooperation among organizations acquired different forms. The UN Civil
Administration set up the basic rules for elections and participated in the civil
registration. The KFOR provided secure environment for the OMIK personnel and voters
during the polling.308 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) assisted the
OSCE in civil registration of the applicants from outside Kosovo.
The complex process for the organization of elections involves several core
activities: 1) creation of basic electoral rules - was provided by the SRSG; 2) technical
preparation of elections - civil registration, setting up polling stations, media campaign,
etc. - was carried out by the OSCE, IOM, the Civil Administration pillar and Municipal
Election Commissions (MEC);309 3) supervision of compliance with electoral rules - was
exercised by two independent bodies - the Central Election Commission (CEC) and the
307 This task is carried out through an appropriate organizational structure - the OSCE mission in
Kosovo (OMK).The OMIK was established by a decision of the OSCE Permanent Council with
the purpose to “take the leading role in matters relating to institution- and democracy-building
and human rights.” To fulfill its mandate the Mission has set up five departments: Police Training
and Education, Democratization, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Media Affairs and Elections.
308 The OSCE and KFOR have concluded three agreements regulating their cooperation during
the 2000 municipal elections: the Technical Agreement between the KFOR and the OSCE, the
General Arrangement and the Local Arrangements for the Exchange of Information. The
Technical Agreement between the OSCE and the J8 branch of KFOR sets up financial procedures
regarding KFOR support It defines that the OSCE will seek KFOR support only in regard to
mission essential tasks and lists the services, which may be provided to the OSCE pending
subsequent reimbursement. The General Arrangement between the KFOR and the OSCE
provides further details about the responsibilities of each of the parties. The arrangement affirms
the importance of successful elections and the necessity to establish procedures for close
cooperation between the OSCE and KFOR, "with the aim of creating optimal conditions for
municipal elections." Cooperation between the structures is to be exercised, inter alia, through
the OSCE/KFOR Joint Elections Operations Center (JEOC). While the OSCE is wholly
responsible for the organization and preparation of elections, KFOR undertakes to provide a "safe
and secure environment and freedom of movement for OSCE ...and the UNMIK personnel and
voters in close coordination with UNMIK police." The Local Arrangements for the Exchange of
Information between KFOR and OSCE regulate the release of information between the two
organizations.
309 The Municipal elections Commission (MEC) carried out election administration at the
municipal level. The responsibilities of MEC included providing information to voters and
parties, coalitions and candidates concerning the elections, assisting in the technical arrangements
at the Polling Stations, ensuring proper counting and compiling the electoral results. For details,
see Electoral Rule 2000/4, online: OSCE Homepage.
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Electoral Complaints and Appeals sub-Commission (ECAC). While each of these
activities represents an interesting topic for a scholarly discussion, this thesis is primarily
interested in the content of the electoral rules and their enforcement.310
b. Legal rules
The regulation of the 2000 municipal elections was based on two sets of legal
rules: Regulations issued by the UNMIK and Electoral Rules issued by the CEC within
the powers delegated to it by the UNMIK. The UNMIK-created law on preparation and
conduct of elections includes five core Regulations: Regulation 2000/45 On Selfgovernment in Municipalities in Kosovo, Regulation 2000/39 On the Municipal Elections
in Kosovo, Regulation 2000/21 On the Establishment of the Central Election
Commission, Regulation 2000/13 On the Central Civil Registry, and Regulation 2000/16
on the Registration of Political Parties in Kosovo. These Regulations set up the
foundations for the administration and supervision of the electoral process. In particular,
they defined the powers of municipalities and their representative organs; set up the
electoral system; and authorized the establishment of the CEC.
The rules issued by the CEC concern the procedural side of elections, such as
certification of political parties and coalitions; appeals and complaints procedures; voter
registration; registration of candidates, etc.

c.

Electoral system

UNMIK Regulation 2000/39 defined that the municipal elections were to be held
according to the proportional system of voting with an “open” ballot (both party names
and names of candidates appear on the ballot).311 Initially, “open” list was not favoured
by international officials because it is more difficult to administer.312 However, the
“open” ballot was ultimately adopted because it provides a voter with more information

310 Please, note that the first part of this section is devoted to the analysis of the 2000 municipal
elections only. A brief overview of the electoral rules for the all-Kosovo elections is to follow.
311 Regulation on the Municipal Elections in Kosovo, UNMDC/REG/2000/39, online: United
Nations Homepage < http://www.un.ory/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg039.html> (date
accessed: 5 June 2001).
312Elections in Kosovo, supra note 300 at 4.
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about a party and candidates, thus, giving a voter an opportunity to make a more
conscious choice.
The proportionate system is one of the components of the consociational system
and a reflection of the principle of proportionality. Theoretically, it is the most suitable
for ethnically divided societies. It affords each ethnic group a vote proportional to their
weight in the total population313 (assuming that those ethnic groups have political
formations, which represent them). The proportional system allows small parties
(minority parties) to gain access to municipal councils even without getting a large
number of votes. It was also contended that this was the only electoral system that could
be applied on the basis of the existing municipal boundaries.314
At the same time, critics suggest that such a system can be toothless against
majority rule. “Where parties are ethnically based,... list PR is perfectly compatible with
the domination of some groups by others.”315 A proportionate electoral system usually
does not provide incentives to create grand coalitions as opposed to majority
coalitions.316 This effect is also true for Kosovo. As we will see in more detail in section
D of this Chapter, Albanian parties won an overwhelming majority of votes in the 2000
municipal elections. No inter-ethnic pre-electoral coalitions were formed. Still, the
proportionate system allowed several minority parties to get seats in a few municipalities
with significant concentration of particular minorities (for example, in Dragas, Kosovo
Polje, Prizren). Unless electoral regulations contain special requirements stimulating the
formation of inter-ethnic coalitions (and the mentioned UNMIK Regulation did not), the
proportionate system as such does not promote inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation.
The major positive effect that the proportionate system may have is to secure (under
favourable circumstances of active participation of minority voters and parties in the
elections and high concentration of a particular minority in a certain district) a certain
number of elected representatives for each segment of the society. For Kosovo the
proportionate system was important in two respects: 1) to guarantee at least the minimal
possibility for minority parties to obtain seats in the local legislature; 2) to create
313 Barnes, supra note 28 at 9S.
314OSCE Press Release, “SRSG Signs Municipal Electoral Law,” 10 July 2000.
313 Horowitz, supra note 33 at 2S8.
316Ibid.
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preconditions for less interference by the SRSG in co-option of minority members. In
fact, in at least one municipality - Dragas, Decani, Malishevo - the proportionate system
achieved the desired effect.

It provided for the election of a sufficient number of

minority representatives so that no co-option by the SRSG was necessary.

d. Norm-creation: the CEC
The CEC was established by Regulation 2000/21 as an independent and impartial
body,317 “responsible for the conduct of elections in Kosovo.”318
The SRSG assigned the CEC with competence in two major areas. First,
preparation of basic electoral rules governing the conduct of elections. The basic rules
concern the term of office of elected officials, the selection of the electoral system, the
authority of the SRSG to certify the registration process and the final results of the
elections. These rules are prepared by the CEC, but have to be promulgated by the SRSG
as regulations.319
The second area of CEC responsibilities includes the preparation and issuance of
electoral rules for implementation of the electoral rules promulgated by the SRSG. These
rules regulate the procedural aspects of elections, such as polling, voter registration, party
registration, electoral conduct, etc. They do not require promulgation by the SRSG.
However, the SRSG has authority under SCR 1244 to suspend or revoke any of these
rules or decisions.320
The Regulation adheres to the “tradition” of mixed Kosovar-intemational
membership. The CEC consists of nine Kosovars and three international members. The
Kosovar members include the representatives from the LDK, the PDK and the LBD321 as
well as representatives of media, NGOs, Slavic Muslim and Turkish communities. The
place was also reserved for Serbs, but they chose not to participate.

317 Regulation on the Establishment o f the Central Election Commission, UNMIK/REG/2000/21,
s.
1,
online:
United
Nations
Homepage
<
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg021 ,html> (date accessed: 7 May 2001).
318 Ibid., s. 4.1.
319Ibid., s. 4.2.
320 Ibid., s. 4.4.
321 The OSCE required all political party representatives to resign all their leadership positions,
but they could retain party membership.
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The Regulation on the Establishment of the CEC does not spell out the powers of
the CEC in great detail. It only distinguishes the areas regulated by the basis rules and
those governed by the rules of the CEC. The CEC has used its power to issue Electoral
Rules in order to develop its own powers. In particular, it has established its authority to
appoint and remove members of MECs and the ECAC;322 to certify the eligibility of
parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent candidates to participate in
elections;323 to accredit elections observers;324 and to review applications for candidate
registration.323 In general, the powers of the CEC may be characterized as combining the
primarily norm-creative function with the responsibility for the general electoral
supervision.

e. Electoral Rules
The CEC adopted 14 Electoral Rules that regulate various aspects of the
municipal elections. Rule 1 contains the Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Coalitions,
Citizens’ Initiatives, Candidates, and Their Supporters.326 Rules 2 and 4 established the
ECAC and MECs accordingly. The other eleven rules focus on the certification of
parties, coalitions, independent candidates and citizens’ initiatives; voter registration
appeals; voter information; election observers; registration of candidates; voters’ lists
confirmation; conduct of media during elections; finance disclosure of the parties; polling
and counting of ballots.
Although the regulation of every aspect of the electoral process is important,
particular attention should be paid to regulation of the conduct of political organizations
contesting the elections. Their conduct and pre-electoral tactics have a crucial impact on
Electoral
Rule
4
&
2,
online:
OSCE
Homepage
http://www.osce.ory/clections/electoralrules.php37rules2 (date accessed: 10 May 2001).
333
Electoral
Rule
3,
online:
OSCE
Homepage
httpi/www.osce org/elections/electoralrules.php3?rule=2 (date accessed: 10 May 2001).
334
Electoral
Rule
8,
online:
OSCE
Homepage
http://www.osce.org/elections/elcctoralrules.phD37rules2 (date accessed: 10 May 2001).
335
Electoral
Rule
9,
online:
OSCE
Homepage
http://www.osce.ory/elections/clectoralrulcs.Dhp37rules2 (date accessed: 10 May 2001).
336 The Code o f Conduct fo r political parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives, independent
candidates, their supporters and candidates, CEC/Electoral Rule 1/2000, online: OSCE
Homepage [hereinafter Code o f Conduct].
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the general stability of the electoral campaign and the electoral results.

As we have

noted before, ethnic parties have a tendency to exploit ethnic sentiment (inter alia,
through making nationalistic statements and otherwise inciting inter-ethnic hatred) in
their electoral campaigns. The use of such methods of campaigning can, first, have a
destabilizing effect on the interethnic relations, and, second, help radical nationalist
parties to legitimately win seats in the legislature. These potential dangers can be
minimized through appropriate electoral regulation. The supervision of the activities of
political organizations can be exercised at several levels: 1) when a party seeks to enter
the political arena - through registration and certification of parties; 2) during the
electoral campaign - through establishment of binding rules of electoral conduct and
organs for their enforcement; 3) after the elections - through financial disclosure of the
expenses on the electoral campaign. Each of the three procedures is intended to monitor
the activities of parties and to prevent them from exploiting ethnic sentiment and other
inappropriate techniques in their electoral campaigns. In turn, this monitoring creates the
foundations for more peaceful electoral processes and potentially more tolerant and
cooperative representative bodies.

/. Pre-electoral regulation: Certification and registration o f parties, coalitions,
independent candidates or citizens’ initiatives
According to the existing rules and regulations, the “admissibility” of a political
party to participate in elections in Kosovo is conditioned on fulfillment of two
requirements: registration and certification. Registration is exercised according to
UNMIK Regulation 2000/16 On the Registration and Operation of Political Parties in
Kosovo.327
Registration allows the exercise of the initial control over a party. One of the
central aims of such control is to prevent the legitimization of openly nationalist parties.
This control is exercised, inter alia, through verification of the content of a party’s statute
and political programme.

327 Please note that registration is required for political parties only, while certification is
mandatory for parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent candidates.
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The Regulation requires that the political objectives of the party “specifically
include a commitment to democratic principles and the protection and promotion of
human rights as well as an affirmation of respect, tolerance and understanding for all,
irrespective of their ethnicity.”328 If a party’s statute and programme is inconsistent with
the UNMIK Regulations and the applicable law, registration is denied. Registration can
also be denied if the name of the party may incite hatred or violence or if a party violates
a prohibition that individuals indicted by the ICTY or any other war-crime tribunal
cannot hold any elective position in a party.329 However, to date there is no information
that a party has been denied registration on such a ground. A party may also be
sanctioned by suspension or revocation of registration if it violates Regulation 2000/16
during the exercise of its activities.330
Another part of the pre-electoral monitoring is certification of parties, coalitions,
independent candidates and citizens’ initiatives. To participate in elections a party,
coalition, independent candidate or citizens’ initiative has to certify its eligibility with the
CEC. A necessary part of the application for certification is a statement of a party,
coalition, or citizens’ initiative or an independent candidate that they abide by the
Electoral Rules, applicable Regulations and Directions and Procedures.331 This statement
is an express proof of a party’s obligation to honour the rules of the Code of Conduct. As
we will see below, the ECAC often referred to these statements in its decisions.
ii. Regulation o f the electoral conduct

The Code of Conduct
The Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Coalitions, Candidates and Their
Supporters can be regarded as the central means for the regulation of the behaviour
during the electoral campaign. The Code sets up major affirmative standards of the
electoral campaign and the limits of admissible electoral conduct. The Code is binding on
all the parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives, candidates, and their supporters.
338 Regulation on the Registration and Operation of Political Parties in Kosovo,
UNMK/REG/2000/16,
s.
2.2
(e),
online:
United
Nations
Homepage
<http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/iegulations/reg016.html> (date accessed: 9 May 2001).
329ibid.,
330Ibid..
331 Electoral Rule 2, supra note 321, s. 3.35
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The Code affirms two of the most important means of electoral campaigning: the
right of the parties332 to hold large public meetings and the right to publish and distribute
placards, posters and other materials for the purposes of parties’ electoral campaigns.
Importantly, political organizations do not need a permit to hold public meetings.
However, in order to reduce the risk of disturbances of public law and order during such
rallies, the Rule requires the organizers to give a notification to the International Civilian
Police (ICP) at least four days prior to the event.333
The Code defines actions prohibited during the electoral process. The majority of
these prohibitions seek to prevent the promotion of ethnic hatred, violence and voter
manipulation. In particular, it is prohibited to disturb gatherings of other political parties;
carry and display weapons at political meetings; destroy placards and other materials
used by other parties in their political campaign; use language that can provoke violence
or spread hatred, etc.334 The Code specifically outlaws intimidation and the use of
violence during the electoral process.335
Additional restrictions on electoral activities are imposed during 24 hours prior to
polling. The Code prohibits holding meetings, presenting any materials at polling
stations, use of public address systems and other means that may influence the voters’
choice.
The Code is only a part of the control mechanism over the electoral conduct. It
sets the norms of admissible behaviour, but does not contain any sanctions for violations
of its provisions. The Code’s standards of behaviour are complemented by enforcement
mechanisms described below.

Enforcement of electoral rules: the ECAC
Proper election supervision requires rules and an enforcement mechanism to
ensure that parties comply with those rules.336 Enforcement can be exercised in several

332 For more convenience I will use the term “parties” instead of “parties, coalitions, citizens’
initiatives, and independent candidates.”
333 Electoral Rule 2, supra note 321.
334 Ibid., s. 1.10.
335 Ibid.
336 Daniel Bessington, "From Dayton to Sarajevo: Enforcing Election Law in Post War Bosnia
and Herzegovina" 12 Am U Inti L. Rev. SS3 at SS7.
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ways - either by the political authority itself, like the UN, on an ad hoc basis or by a
special enforcement body created for that purpose.337
In Kosovo, the main role in the enforcement of electoral rules was assigned to the
Electoral Complaints and Appeals sub-Commission (ECAC). The ECAC was established
by the CEC Electoral Rule 2 in May 2000.338 The mandate of the ECAC includes
“adjudicating all complaints concerning the electoral process as established in all
applicable Regulations,

Administrative Directions

and Electoral Rules”339 and

adjudicating appeals on decisions of the Joint Registration Taskforce concerning voter
registration.340 The ECAC issues decisions and advisory opinions.
Special procedures ensure that the hearing of complaints is conducted fairly and
in a timely manner. The ECAC can exercise its power only if a complaint is admissible.
A complaint must be submitted by a person who has a legal interest or who claims that
his rights were violated. It must be submitted no later than three days after the violation
has occurred or become known. The ECAC shall refuse to adjudicate a manifestly illfounded complaint.341
The Rule restricts the standing to individuals who have a legal interest, or whose
rights have been violated. This requirement has a well-founded practical justification - to
prevent overloading the Sub-commission with complaints. At the same time, this
restriction may have an adverse effect on the protection of electoral rights. Many
individuals may fear lodging complaints or may merely be unaware of this right. It would
be advisable to allow the UN and the OSCE officials and electoral observers to bring
electoral complaints because they are competent enough to realize when a violation has
occurred and to take appropriate legal action to correct that violation.
Besides the power to hear complaints and appeals, the ECAC has enough coercive
power to “stimulate” parties to comply with the Electoral Rules. The CEC authorized the
ECAC to impose penalties on parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent
337Blessington, supra note 336 at 643.
338 Regulation 2000/12 on the Establishment of the CEC expressly provided for the authority of
the CEC to create an electoral complaints body. S. 4.3(i).
339Electoral Rule 2, supra note 321, s. 2.0 (a).
340 Ibid., s. 2.25 (a).
341 Note, that the Regulation does not clarify what complaint may be regarded as “manifestly illfounded.”
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candidates. Electoral Rule 2 prescribes two types of sanctions that can be imposed for
violation of Electoral Rules. The first group includes a remedial collection action and
fines up to 10 000 DM.342 These sanctions are intended for less serious violations of
electoral conduct and can be imposed by the ECAC alone. The other group is comprised
of more severe penalties: removal of members of a MEC, Confirmation Centre Staff or
members of the Polling Station Committee; removal of candidates from the candidate’s
list; removal of candidates from party lists without the possibility for a party to replace
him;343 exclusion of a party, coalition, independent candidate or citizens’ initiative from
running in the elections; exclusion of a candidate or party, coalition, independent
candidate or citizens’ initiative from taking part in the elections for up to six years.344
These penalties may be imposed by the ECAC only after the approval of the Chairman of
the CEC in consultation with the CEC.345
The procedure concerning electoral appeals is similar to the procedure with
electoral complaints described above. Appeals can be submitted by an individual who has
a legal interest or who claims that his rights have been violated. The appeal has to be
submitted within three days after the decision of the Joint Registration Taskforce has
been communicated to a person.346 An applicant has to exhaust all administrative means
before filing an appeal with the ECAC.
According to Electoral Rules 5 and 7, the ECAC has the authority to include an
applicant’s name in the Voters’ List if the ECAC finds that a voter meets the eligibility
requirements. The ECAC can also impose all the above-mentioned penalties on
individuals responsible for registration violations. Decisions on electoral appeals are final
and binding.
The ECAC occupies a special position in relation to the CEC. In terms of
competence, the CEC and the ECAC are established as separate bodies with distinct
functions and powers. In particular, the ECAC cannot adjudicate complaints on the
343Electoral Rule 2, supra note 321, s. 2.20(a).
343 The ECAC usually does not indicate a particular candidate that has to be stricken. This
decision is left for the party. However, the electoral rules impose a certain restraint on such
decision: a female candidate cannot be stricken from the list
344Electoral Rule 2, supra note 321, s. 2.20(b).
345Ibid.
346Ibid., s. 2.25(b).
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decisions of the CEC.347 The decisions of the ECAC cannot be appealed to the CEC.348
However, in certain respects the ECAC is subordinated to the CEC. The Chairman of the
CEC appoints the members of the ECAC.349 The CEC decides on the term of the ECAC’s
mandate. The sub-commission has to report to the Chairman of the CEC.350
The ECAC is a quasi-judicial body. Similarly to judicial bodies, the ECAC has
established and affirmed its authority through its decisions. For example, in Advisory
Opinion N o.l, the ECAC affirmed its power to penalize parties, coalitions, independent
candidates and citizens’ initiatives for violations of applicable laws, regulations and rules.
It also stated that the ECAC’s powers to investigate and punish violations will continue
through Election Day. The ECAC will remain in operation, enjoying its full powers until
all complaints are resolved and the ECAC’s “job is complete.”351
The ECAC has also assumed the power to interpret the Electoral Rules. In
Advisory Opinion No.2, it decided whether mosques and churches are public buildings
within the meaning of Electoral Rule 2000/1 sec. 1.10.2.352 The ECAC held that the
communal use of mosques and churches gives these places a public character. Thus,
mosques and churches are public buildings within the meaning of the Electoral Rule and
placing posters or other signs related to the election campaign on them will constitute a
violation of those rules.
The ECAC has issued decisions on a variety of violations of electoral rules. These
decisions may be roughly categorized according to the issues that they addressed: 1)
notification about public meetings; 2) incitement of violence; 3) display of weapons; and
4) inappropriate behaviour of political parties and their supporters.

1) Notification about public meetings
The ECAC has adjudicated several cases concerning notification about electoral
rallies, including three similar cases involving the LDK, the PDK and the AAK.
347Electoral Rule 2, supra note 321.
348 Ibid.
349 ibid
330 Ibid., s. 2.0(e).
351
Advisory
Opinion
No.l,
online:
OSCE
Homepage
<
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/ecacdecisions-e.pho37ns5 > (date accessed: 29 May 2001).
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According to section l.S (b) of the Code of Conduct, parties have to notify the
ICP about their public meetings/events at least four days in advance. The ECAC has
emphasized that, according to s. 3.35(a), of the Electoral Rule on the certification of
political parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent candidates parties signed
a statement that they will abide the Electoral Rules and all applicable regulations.353
Following the principle that punishment has to be commensurate with the gravity of
offence, the ECAC distinguished the failure to give proper notification about political
rally (i.e., notify the ICP about a meeting no less than four days in advance) and the
failure to give any notification at all. Parties that failed to properly notify the ICP about
meetings were fined 250 DM per meeting. Parties that gave no notification at all were
fined 500 DM per meeting.
The decisions of the ECAC included an “incentive” for parties to pay fines
without delay: if fines were not paid by the deadline, the ECAC reserved a right to
recommend the removal of one candidate from the candidate’s list.

2) Incitement o f violence
The international organizations working in Kosovo reported numerous acts of
violence and intimidation during the electoral campaign. Intimidation took varying forms,
from threats to physical abuse.
The ECAC heard a case concerning verbal threats and incitement of violence
against the LDK.354 The complaint concerned the statements by the vice-president of the
PDK - Skenderbe Hebibi. He was reported to declare on at least three occasions that the
PDK would not allow the LDK to win the elections and that even if the LDK wins, the
PDK would not allow it to take seats and would resort to violence, if necessary.
Given its authority under Electoral Rule 2, the ECAC summoned Mr Hebibi for a
hearing to comment on the accusations. Mr Hebibi declared that he had never made such

352 The provision prohibits display of nodces, placards or names and slogans relating to the
election campaign in or on public buildings.
353 See, section C(l(e)) of this Chapter.
354 Case No. 2000/035, online: OSCE Homepage www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/ecacdecisionse.php3?n=0 (date accessed: 10 June 2001).
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statements and that his party will fully support the implementation of the electoral results,
regardless of their outcome for the PDK.
The ECAC did not End evidence to prove the accusations. In order to clarify any
doubts in regard to Mr Hebibi’s political intentions, the sub-Commission obliged him to
make a public statement that he denounces violence, supports peaceful electoral
campaign and the outcome of the elections.
Although the ECAC’s decision did not result in any severe punishment, it
demonstrated that the Sub-commission would monitor and investigate cases of speech
inciting violence. It was also important that the ECAC obliged an alleged violator to
make a public statement about the denunciation of violence and support for the results of
the elections, regardless of their outcome for the PDK. No matter how formal such
statements are, they help to create a certain attitude335 in regard to the elections among
party supporters and the electorate in general.

3) Display o f weapons
Carrying and displaying weapons at political meetings was another concern
during the electoral campaign. The ECAC examined a complaint on the PDK rally in
Glogovac, where the PDK supporters carried guns and fired them into the air.356 The
Code of Conduct specifically prohibits carrying and displaying weapons at public
meetings.

Moreover, it obliges political parties to ensure that their supporters abide by

the Code of Conduct.358 The sub-Commission stressed its disapproval of the presence of
weapons at political events and declared that it will not hesitate to move against any party
that fails to comply with Electoral Rules.359 The PDK was found responsible for the
actions of its supporters and was fined 1 OOODM for violation of the Code of Conduct.

333 By “certain attitude” I mean commitment to support the certified electoral results and their
implementation and awareness of what conduct is admissible. The position that a party takes in
relation to these issues in many respects defines the behaviour of its supporters.
336 Case No. 2000/030, online: OSCE Homepage www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/ecacdecisionse.php3?n=0 (date accessed: 10 June 2001).
3 Code o f Conduct, supra note 325, s.3.2.
338 Ibid., s.l.
339 Judgment in the Matter of a campaign held by the PDK in Glogovac, 26 September 2000, ME
2000/030, online: OSCE Homepage http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/ecacdecisionse.php3?n=3
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4) Inappropriate behaviour o f party supporters
Many electoral complaints concerned inappropriate behaviour by the supporters
of political parties. Such behaviour, for example, included disruption of the rallies of
political opponents, display of graffiti and placards on public buildings, participation of
members of Kosovo Corps in political meetings, etc.
One of the cases decided by the ECAC concerned the disruption of the LDK rally
by PDK supporters in Lipjan.360 The actions of the interveners included chanting “Thaci
Thaci”, throwing eggs at the LDK candidates and supporters and physical abuse. Having
examined the photographic and video evidence, the ECAC concluded that the disruption
was planned and organized beforehand. The actions of the PDK supporters prevented the
LDK from the exercise of its right to “organize and hold large public meetings/events in
which they [parties] can freely express their positions in order to gain support from the
voters.”361 Further, the actions of the LDK supporters involved violence, which is strictly
prohibited during the election campaign.
Notwithstanding the PDK’s responsibility to ensure that their supporters abide the
Code of Conduct, the party not only did not stop the actions of its supporters, but
encouraged the escalation of the situation.362 The ECAC found the PDK to be in violation
of s. 1.0,363 1.10 (4)364 and 1.13 (a)365 of the Code of Conduct and penalized the PDK by
striking one candidate from the PDK list in Lipjan.
Similar clashes between the LDK and the PDK supporters occurred in Suva
Reka.366 Although the LDK supporters provoked the incident, both sides resorted to
verbal confrontation, followed by physical abuse. Again, the ECAC referred to the
prohibition to disturb gatherings of other political parties and prohibition of violence
during the electoral process. The sub-Commission found that both the PDK and the LDK

360Judgment in the Matter of a rally disruption in Lipjan, case No. 2000/037,25 September 2000,
OSCE Homepage http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/ecacdecisions-e.php37ns0
361 Code o f Conduct, supra note 325, s. 1.5 (a).
362Judgment in the Matter of a rally disruption in Lipjan, supra note 359.
363 The responsibility of parties to ensure that their supporters abide by the Code of Conduct.
364Prohibition to disturb gatherings of the other parties.
365Prohibition of violence and intimidation during the electoral campaign.
366 Judgment in the Matter of a rally disruption in Suva Reka, case No. 2000/043, 22 September
2000, online: OSCE Homepage http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/ecacdecisions-e.php37nsO
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supporters violated these rules. Since the parties failed to ensure that their supporters
observe the Code of Conduct, both were penalized. The LDK, whose supporters
provoked the incident, was fined 1 000 DM. The PDK, whose supporters responded to
the provocation, received a warning.

iii. Post-electoral regulation
The means of post-electoral control over party conduct include the requirements
on financial disclosure of party’s income and campaign expenditures. According to
Electoral Rule 2000/12,367 all parties, coalitions, independent candidates and citizens’
initiatives that were certified to participate in elections have to file with the CEC two
financial reports: financial disclosure report, showing all income received and payments
made and a campaign expenditures report. The financial disclosure report is filed twice:
prior to elections and 30 days after the electoral results have been certified.

The

campaign spending disclosure report is submitted to the CEC 30 days after the
certification of the electoral results. The campaign spending limit is established at a
maximum of one Deutsche Mark per registered voter in each municipality where as party
stands for elections.368 If either report is not completed in a satisfactory manner, the CEC
can refer the party, coalition, independent candidate or citizens’ initiative to the ECAC
for appropriate action.369
The requirements of financial disclosure are an important means to control the
sources of party’s income and spending. The spending limits put parties on fairly equal
footing in terms of the scope of their electoral campaigns. Unfortunately, the enforcement
of the expenditure requirements seems to be somewhat incomplete. As appears from the
Electoral Rule, the only possible action against violation of financial requirements is to
refer the case of incomplete report to the ECAC “for appropriate action.” The wording of
the Rule suggests that punishment is imposed for non-compliance with procedural
requirements of reporting rather than for the very violation of expenditure limits and
admissible sources of financing. The Rule also does not define what “appropriate action”
367
Electoral
Rule
12,
online:
OSCE
Homepage
www.osce-org/kosovo/elecUons/electoralrules.phD3??ru:e=l2 > (date accessed: 26 May 2001), s.
**Ibid, s. 12.5
369Ibid., s. 12.0 & s. 12.10.
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the ECAC may take. Nor does the Electoral Rule on the Establishment of the ECAC give
details about penalizing parties for non-compliance for the disclosure procedures. The
lack of guidance in this area leaves unclear the means available the ECAC to control
party’s compliance with financial requirements.

Interim Conclusion
To sum up, the ECAC addressed the most typical violations during the electoral
campaign: disturbing political meetings, incitement of violence, display of weapons at
political meetings, etc. In its judgements, it did not apply the stiffest penalties, like
prohibiting participation of a candidate or a party from running in elections. On several
occasions it struck a candidate from the party list, but in the majority of cases fines were
imposed. Moreover, in relation to the least serious violations (e.g., non-compliance with
the requirements of proper notification about their public meetings), the ECAC issued a
party with a warning and only repetitive violation of the rule led to imposition of stricter
sanctions.
The practice of the ECAC reveals several common features in the policy of
enforcing electoral rules. First, the ECAC strictly observed the principle that a penalty
has to be commensurate with the gravity of offense. Because the majority of the cases
heard by the ECAC did not involve particularly grave violations of electoral conduct, it
did not need to resort to the strictest penalties. In this respect, the ECAC managed to
balance the enforcement and the goal to proceed with elections.370
Second, the ECAC penalized parties for the actions of party supporters. This
measure prevented Kosovo parties from using the tactics which they otherwise would
have adopted: to act through their supporters and thereby escape being immediately
responsible and penalized for the destructive actions.
Third, the ECAC had to provide for special guarantees that a violator will comply
with an ordered action. In many decisions the sub-Commission reserved the right to
recommend striking a candidate from the candidates’ list if a party does not pay an
ordered fine on time.

370 Enforcement of electoral rule is a balancing act: “rough justice” may lead to boycott of the
elections; weak regulation may encourage violation of rules.
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In general, although the ECAC cannot be regarded as a too interventionist
enforcement body, its decisions created necessary “incentives” for the parties to be more
careful about the methods to promote their electoral campaigns. In turn, these
“incentives” contributed to fairer and more peaceful competition among parties.
The ECAC’s work did not represent an immediate instance of the implementation
of consociationalism. It was created to ensure the compliance of political entities and
public officials with the rules of electoral conduct and procedure rather than to facilitate
the inclusiveness of minorities in the government. Moreover, by the criteria of
composition and decision-making procedure, the ECAC cannot be regarded as a
consociational body. The Electoral Rule on the Establishment of the ECAC does not
require proportional representation of the major segments of the Kosovo society in the
sub-Commission. Perhaps no proportionality could be introduced because of the small
number of members on the ECAC - three national commissioners and an International
Chief Commissioner.371 At the same time, given the ethnically sensitive character of
many violations, the diversity in representation on the ECAC is important for fairer
decision-making. The decision-making procedure of the ECAC reflects two extremes mutual veto or unilateral dictatorship of the Chief Commissioner: decisions have to be
adopted by consensus, but if no consensus can be reached, the Chief Commissioner “shall
decide.”372
The absence of an expressly consociational character in the ECAC does not mean
that this body has failed to contribute to the broader process of Kosovo democratization.
To the contrary, many aspects of the ECAC’s activities may be regarded as creating a
generally more favourable climate for the implementation of the consociational
techniques. For example, the requirement of stricter compliance with electoral rules will
motivate parties to look for cooperative ways of winning elections. Instead of relying on
speculation over ethnic sentiment, or using officials to manipulate the elections, parties
will have to look for other means to embrace larger numbers of the electorate. In
particular, they may choose moderating their positions on ethnic issues and creating
multi-ethnic coalitions.

371Electoral Rule 2, supra note 321, s. 2.5.
372 Ibid.. s. 2.15.
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The instance of the ECAC’s work demonstrates that democracy in an ethnically
divided society can be developed through a variety of means, both those that directly
contribute to inclusiveness and those which have an indirect impact on the formation of
consociational government. Moreover, not all the organs have to be composed
consociationally in order to be able to contribute to the development of consociationalism
and democracy in a society.

2. All-Kosovo elections
The previous discussion concerned only rules applicable to municipal elections.
In anticipation of the all-Kosovo elections, the CEC prepared a new set of Electoral
Rules. To date it adopted eight electoral rules: the Code of Conduct, the Rule on
Certification of Parties, Coalitions, Citizens’ Initiatives and Independent Candidates, the
Rule on the Establishment of the ECAC, the Rule on the Municipal Election
Commissions (MEC), the Rule on the Election Observers, the Rule on Voter Information,
the Rule on Media During the Electoral Campaign and the Rule on The Registration of
Candidates.373
Basically, the new rules represent a revised version of the rules used for the
regulation of the municipal election campaign. Since the major objectives and principles
of the regulation remained the same, I will briefly review only the new and amended
provisions of the Electoral Rules.
a. The Code o f Conduct
The Code of Conduct remains essentially the same, except two amendments
concerning the notification about political rallies and conduct of public employees during
electoral campaign. The first amendment extends the period for notification about
political rallies (now notification must be given to the police authorities 120 hours prior

373 See, online: OSCE Homepage <
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/regulatorv info/electoral rules-php3 > (date accessed: 24
August 2001).
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to the event374 as opposed to 96 hours during the municipal electoral campaign). The
second amendment imposes prohibitions on certain actions by public employees during
the electoral campaign. No political entity may encourage or take advantage of a public
employee by using his public position to campaign for a political entity.375 This provision
was motivated by the experience with the municipal electoral campaign. Numerous acts
of corruption were reported during the municipal electoral campaign. It was often the
case that the KLA and PDK-tied officials that held the key positions in the municipal
administration were able to influence the conduct of the electoral campaign in favour of
the PDK or the AAK.
Now any use of public position to campaign for a political entity is prohibited.
The Code provides for broad interpretation of a “public employee.” A public employee
includes, but is not limited to, a person employed by a local administration whose
remuneration is received from the Kosovo Consolidated Budget.376 The Code even
contains an example of prohibited behaviour - the head of an educational institution
requiring students to attend a meeting organized by a particular political entity.
It will be interesting to observe how this prohibition will be enforced - whether
both an official and a political party for which he campaigned will be penalized or only a
political party or only an employee. I would suggest that an electoral complaint may be
filed on both actions of a party and actions of a public employee. The ECAC may regard
a public employee as a supporter of a particular political entity. According to the Code of
Conduct, parties are obliged not only to abide by the Code, but also to ensure that party’s
supporters do not violate its provisions. If a party fails to ensure a supporter’s compliance
with the Code, that party can be held responsible for this violation. The existing electoral
rules provide for penalties, which may be readily imposed on political entities as well as
on natural persons.
Apart from the two mentioned amendments, the rest of the Code’s provisions
have remained the same. Some of them have been reformulated in a more precise and

374 The Code o f Conduct for political parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives, independent
candidates, their supporters and candidates, CEC/Electoral Rule 1/2001, s.3 (c), online: OSCE
Homepage [hereinafter Code o f Conduct].
375Ibid., s.5.
316Ibid.
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clear manner. For example, the new Code of Conduct not only imposes on political
entities a duty to abide by its provisions, but also expressly states that any failure to
comply with the provisions may result in the imposition of sanctions by the ECAC.377
Another example is the formulation of prohibited actions. The current Code of Conduct
prohibits “using language, in oral or written form, which incites or provokes, or is likely
to incite or provoke, another person to commit an act of violence against other persons or
property...”378 In contrast, the Code that applied to the municipal elections referred only
to the “use of language which could incite or provoke someone to violence or spread
hatred.”379

b. The ECAC
Having adopted Electoral Rule 2001/2, the CEC laid the foundations for the
creation of a new ECAC. The competence of the sub-Commission and the appeal
procedures remain the same as during the municipal electoral campaign. The Rule
contains two new provisions. First, it provides more guarantees for broader participation
of communities in the Sub-commission. The Sub-commission consists of one
International

Chief

Commissioner

and

three

national

Commissioners.

The

Commissioners should be appointed in a manner that represents ethnic groups and
national diversity in Kosovo. The Chairperson of the CEC has the discretion to increase
the number of the Sub-commission’s members to 5 in order to allow broader participation
by communities.380
Second, the Rule stipulates stiffer penalties for the violation of electoral rules. In
particular, the failure to take a remedial action ordered by the ECAC, or the failure to pay
a fine within 7 days of the Sub-commission's decision, is now considered a violation of

377 The Code of Conduct applied to the municipal elections stipulated only that the Code is
binding on all political entities.
378 Code o f Conduct, supra note 374, s.4 (1).
379 The Code o f Conduct, supra note 326, s. 1.10(10).
380 Compare to a similar provision of the old Electoral Rule on the Establishment of the ECAC:
“The Election Complaints and Appeals sub-Commission shall consist of one International Chief
Commissioner and three national deputy Commission members. Members of the Election
Complaints and Appeals sub-Commission should have appropriate expertise and experience in
the administration of elections.” See, Electoral Rule 2000/2.
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the Electoral Rule. The ECAC has to notify the CEC about such a violation and can
impose any of the stiffer penalties spelled out in the Electoral Rule.381
During the municipal campaign, the failure to take a remedial action ordered by
the ECAC, or the failure to pay a fine within the deadline, was not considered a violation
under the Electoral Rule. In fact, a prototype of such a norm can be found in the ECAC
decisions regarding the municipal elections. Those decisions often contained a provision
that the sub-Commission reserved the right to strike a candidate from the list if the
applicable fine was not paid on time. Now, not only the failure to comply with the
ECAC’s ordered correctional actions and financial penalties is a violation, but it can be
punished by stiffer penalties.

c.

MECs and electoral observers

The MECs are professional and non-political bodies that assist in the conduct of
elections at the municipal level. They were established by the CEC in June 2000 in each of
Kosovo's 30 municipalities. One of the significant changes for the MECs is that now all
members must agree to comply with the Code of Conduct.382 This was seen as a key to
ensuring that the entire electoral process meets international standards.
Observers are important to provide transparency in the electoral process and to
develop trust in the elections and their results. More than 6,000 representatives of domestic
NGOs and political entities participated as observers during the municipal elections.383
Observers will continue playing important roles for the all-Kosovo elections. The Rule on
Electoral Observers allows representatives of NGOs and political entities to observe voter
registration and electoral process. To participate as an observer, a person must be a
registered voter and sign a statement agreeing to abide by the electoral rules. All observers
must be accredited by the CEC.

381 Code o f Conduct, supra note 374, s. 5.
382The Rule on the Establishment of the MECs applied to the municipal elections did not contain
such a requirement
383 Kosovo Elections: Rules adopted on Municipal Election Commissions and Election
Observation,
online:
OSCE
Homepage
<
http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php37news_idsl800> (date accessed: 17 July 2001).
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In general, the new electoral rules are more precise and stricter. The changes were
inspired primarily by two factors: the crucial character of the Kosovo-wide elections,384
and experience from the municipal electoral campaign.383
The new rules adopted by the CEC demonstrate the determination of the
international administration to require strict compliance with the norms of electoral
conduct. The adoption of a strict policy that the international community will not tolerate
violence and other forms of party misconduct creates certain expectations within local
political structures and may constrain their inappropriate tactics. At the same time,
coercion should be used carefully, given that most parties are in the early stages of their
formation.
The balance between coercion and democracy will alter, depending on the stage
of rehabilitation. Coercion may be more readily applied at the beginning of
democratization, but reduced over time, when the conditions for democratic government
become more stable.
The new electoral rules as such are not more consociational than the rules for the
municipal elections. Generally, the electoral regulation is targeted not so much at
ensuring the inclusion of minorities, but at providing fairness in electoral competition and
a reduction in voter manipulation. In terms of the indirect impact that electoral regulation
has on the formation of interethnic coalitions and moderation of the position of parties,
the effect of the rules will depend mainly on the determination of the international
administration to hold to their strict enforcement. The electoral rules for the all-Kosovo
elections are stricter against the speculation over ethnic sentiment and the misuse of
public position, so if enforced actively they may stimulate the exclusion of these
384 The main concerns about the upcoming elections are: providing a secure and stable
environment during the electoral campaign (the electoral campaigns of the parties will inevitably
include debates over Kosovo independence, which may be destabilizing for Kosovo); ensuring
legitimacy of the electoral process and the newly created Assembly (It can be expected that when
seats in the Kosovo legislature are at stake, parties will campaign more actively and use more
aggressive techniques. This poses a threat of increased violence and corruption); providing that
the elected bodies cooperate with the international administration; and that the Assembly consists
of moderate supporters of the Kosovo independence who are not likely to take any unexpected
actions as, for example, demanding Kosovo independence.
383 The municipal campaign provided important feedback about the effect of the adopted
regulations. It demonstrated situations in which the regulation was insufficient or ambiguous. As
a result, the new rules contain more precise and detailed provisions.
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techniques from parties’ electoral tactics and make them turn more attention to
cooperative means for winning elections.

Interim Conclusion
Electoral regulation has two aspects. Its Erst and primary purpose is to ensure
maximum stability during the electoral campaign and fair competition among parties.
Second, carefully tailored electoral rules and their appropriate enforcement facilitate the
implementation of the consociational techniques and achievement of a consociational
result.
We have analyzed the rules that regulate the party behaviour at different stages of
electoral campaigning - when a party seeks to enter the political arena, during the
campaigning period and after the elections. The international administration was able to
create a comprehensive regulatory mechanism, which included both standards of
behaviour and means to enforce those standards. In their unity the pre-electoral, electoral
and post-electoral regulation of party conduct plays a crucial role in ensuring more
peaceful and fairer competition among political parties. This is especially important in a
post-conflict society where violence and intimidation are still considered justifiable
means for achieving political goals.
The electoral regulation has far-reaching impact on the composition of
representative organs and their work: through the registration of parties, authorities can
prevent the legalization of openly nationalistic parties; sanctions for violation of electoral
conduct exclude radical parties, which use intimidation, violence and incitement of hatred
in electoral campaigns, from running in elections. The above-mentioned means prevent
extremist elements from entering the legislature, thus, making these organs potentially
more cooperative and more sensitive to minority issues. This, in turn, creates basis for a
workable grand coalition. This is especially important in the light of previously analyzed
rules of procedure and decision-making in the Municipal Assemblies. Because many
decisions can be made by majority and there are no strong mutual veto powers, minorities
are more vulnerable. The fact whether their interests will be given enough attention to
great extent depends on how understanding and supportive to minority interests the
majority members are.
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Although the described means may provide for more cooperative members of the
Assemblies, these means as such are not intended to facilitate minority inclusion. They
may only create some favourable grounds for realization of the principles of
consociationalism - proportionality and grand coalition. Thus, to mitigate the ethnic
majority victory in the elections, the international community had to resort to other
means, in particular, appointment of minority representatives to newly elected legislative
organs. The next section describes the results of the municipal elections and the
appointment of minority representatives in Municipal Assemblies.

D. Electoral Process and Electoral Results3**
1. Local peculiarities
As pointed out at the beginning of this Chapter, the electoral process in Kosovo is
influenced by a number of factors: 1) ethnically motivated behaviour of the population;
2) ethnic distribution of the population among municipalities; and 3) non-participation of
some minorities in elections. We have briefly discussed what impact these factors are
likely to have on electoral results.387 Now let us look at the actual situation with the
elections in Kosovo.
The municipal elections were held throughout all the Kosovo. However, because
of the Serb’s boycott of both elections and voter registration, the elections effectively
took place only in 27 out of 30 Kosovo municipalities. In three northern municipalities
inhabited mostly by Serbs - Leposavic, Zubin Potok and Zvecan - the elections were
held, but their results were not certified because the majority of Serb population neither
registered nor voted.
The general voter turnover appeared to be high - 79% of voters.388 The turnover
of minority members varied from community to community. For example, few Kosovo

386This Section describes only the results of the 2000 municipal elections in Kosovo.
387 See, section A of this Chapter.
388 Press
Release,
10
November
2000,
online:
OSCE
Homepage
<
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/news/generate.php37news id=1266 > (date accessed: 5 January
2001).
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Turks and Roma came to vote. At the same time, other communities, like the Kosovo
Bosniac and Gorani communities showed high levels of participation.389
A negative impact of non-participation on the electoral process can be observed in
two aspects. First, it denies certain ethnic communities the right to have their
representatives elected. Second, it requires the use of co-option of minority members by
the SRSG, thus, making minority representation contingent on outsider regulatory
interference.
Earlier, we have theoretically predicted that votes in Kosovo will be split along
ethnic lines. The empirical evidence about the correlation of minority population in a
particular municipality and the percentage of votes obtained by party based on particular
ethnic affiliation confirms this proposition. The data is presented both in a table (below)
and in a graphic format (For graphs, see Appendix 3 and 4).

Table 3. Minority population per municipality
Municipality

shkali

Gllogovc/Glogovac
Malisheve/MaliSevo
Skenderaj/Srbica
Kaqanik/Ka• anik
Ferizaj/UroSevac
Podujeve/Podujevo
Suhareke/Suva Reka
Shtime/Stimlje
Deqan/De• ani
Rahovec/Orahovac
Vushtrri/Vu• itm
Prishtine/Pristina
Kline/Klina

389

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo, S/200W1 1%, December 15,2000.
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Viti/Vitina
Peje/Pe•
Mitrovice/Mitrovica
Prizren/Prizren

12000

Gjilan/Gnjilane
Istog/lstok
Lipjan/Lipljan
Fushe Kosove/Kosovo
Polje
Gjakove,/• akovica
Kamenice/Kamenica
Obiliq/Obili•
Novoberde/Novo Brdo
Strpce/Shterpce
Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok

15,79

Dragash/DragaS
Zve* an/Zvegan
Leposavi• /Leposaviq
Source: KFOR and OSCE Estimates

Table 4. Votes per Municipality, %

DAShK

Municipality

Ashkali)

Deqan/De* ani
Dragas/Dragas
Gjakove/• akovica

190 The KTHP did not win any municipal council mandates.
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Gllogovc/Glogovac
Gjilan/Gnjilane
Istog/lstok

2 51

Kaqanik/Ka• anik
Kline/Klina
Fushe Kosove/Kosovo
Polje

4.11

Kamenice/Kamenica
Mitrovice/Mitrovica
Lipjan/Lipljan

0.3

0.5

l.i

Novoberde/Novo Brdo
Obiliq/Obili•
Rahovec/Orahovac
Peje/Pe•

2.1

Podujeve/Podujevo

0.4

Prishtine/PriStina

0.11

0.11

Prizren/Prizren

2.8

Skenderaj/S rbica
Shtime/Stimlje

0 .'

titrpce/Shterpce
Suhareke/Suva Reka
Ferizaj/UroSevac

1.0

Viti/Vitina
Vushtrri/Vu• itm
Malishev'e/MaliSevo

Source: The data is accumulated from the Kosovo Elections Results, online:
OSCE Homepage
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/archive/2000/results parties.php3>
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As we see, there is quite a clear correlation between the numeric weight of
particular ethnic groups in a municipality and the percentage of votes received by parties
of the same ethnic affiliation. For example, in Pec where the Bosniac community
amounts to 6 000 people (approximately 6% of the population), the SDA received 2,8%
of the total votes. Similarly, in Kosovo Polje (the municipality with a substantial Ashkali
community), the Ashkali party won 4,1% of votes.
Among the parties of the same ethnic affiliation, the success of a party mainly
depends on the history of its previous activities, rather than its current platform. Among
Albanian parties, the LDK and the KLA-tied parties have a historical record,391 which
ensures them popular support. Those who fought for Kosovo independence are most
likely to vote for the PDK or the AAK. The electoral results show that the PDK won the
majority of votes in municipalities where the KLA had the strongest influence. For
example, this is the case in Glogovac. The elderly people and more moderate supporters
of the Kosovo independence are likely to vote for the LDK.

2. Electoral results
The results of the 2000 municipal elections will be viewed in two dimensions.
First, we will evaluate the statistical data showing which parties won the elections and the
number of seats they received. Second, we will consider the number of minority
representatives appointed by the SRSG and the ethnic balance within the Municipal
Assemblies and organs created by them. In both cases I will look at the correlation of the
ethnic breakdown of population in a municipality and the number of representatives from
each ethnic community in the municipal organs.
Because of the low participation of minority parties, the main competition at the
elections developed among Albanian parties. The three major Albanian parties - the
LDK, the PDK and the AAK - most actively participated in the electoral campaign. The
AAK and the LDK stood for elections in 29 out of 30 municipalities. The PDK had its
candidates in 27. The LDK led by Ibrahim Rugova won a majority in 21 municipalities,
391 See, section A(i) of this Chapter. It should be noted that at the first elections, the electorate’s
support for the parties de facto in power during the conflict, is not surprising. Rather, it is a
predictable refection of people’s fears, intimidation and preference to follow the known
established leader.
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with the total of 58% of votes in the Province.392 The PDK and the AAK together won
about 35% of the total vote.393

Electoral Results by Municipality,
October 2000

□AAK

municipalities

Minority parties stood for elections in 13 municipalities. Representatives of
minority parties were elected in 5 municipalities. In particular, in Dragas the Gorani
Citizens’ Initiative (GIG) won three seats and the Bosniac Party of Democratic Action of
Kosovo (SDA) won two seats. The SDA also won seats in Istok and Pec. The Democratic
Party of Albanian Ashkaelia in Kosovo (PDAShK) won one seat in Kosovo Polje. In
Prizren, the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action (BSDAK) won two seats and the
Democratic Reform Party of Muslims (DRSM) won one seat. Nevertheless, the SRSG
has co-opted additional minority representatives in all these municipalities, except
Dragas. This situation demonstrates that the proportionate system ensured the election of
some minority representatives, but still their number was not sufficient to guarantee
meaningful participation of minorities in government. Consequently, the co-option of
minority members by the SRSG became necessary. Let us seen in more detail how this
process was carried out.
392 Municipal
Elections
2000:
Final
Results,
online:
OSCE
Homepage
http://www.globeandmail.com/gani/ROB/20010312/RAlRR.html (date accessed: January 17,
2001).
393 Ibid.
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3. Appointments
Because of the non-participation of some minorities in the elections and limited
success of minority parties even in municipalities with significant minority population,
the elections did not provide for intended proportional representation of minorities in the
Municipal Assemblies. To ensure fair representation of all ethnic communities, the SRSG
had to use his power to co-op minority members to Municipal Assemblies.394
As of 1 March 2001, 123 representatives were appointed. Among 123 appointed
and 869 elected members of Municipal Assemblies, 91 were Kosovo Serbs, 14 Bosniacs,
10 Ashkalia, 9 Roma, S Turks, 4 Egyptians and one Croat.395 Minority members were
appointed in addition to the fully elected Municipal Assembly, thus increasing the
number of assembly representatives over the figure stipulated by the UNMIK Regulation
On Self-Government in Municipalities.396 According to the OSCE Report issued in
March 2001, no nominations were made in Decani, Dragas, Glogovac, Mali she vo, Suva
Reka and Kacanik. There were either no minorities reported, or very small ethnic
communities there.
The number of appointees varies from municipality to municipality. (See Table 5)

Table 5. Minority Appointees in Municipal Assemblies
Municipality
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0 N7AV
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3
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2

Mbs,
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.

0
1

Tbrk

14
2

394 Under the Regulation on the Self-government of Municipalities in Kosovo, the SRSG has the
power to co-opt additional members to the Municipal Assemblies to ensure fair representation of
the local communities.
395Assessment o f the Situation o f Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, OSCE Report, March 2001, at 22.
396Regulation on the Self-government o f Municipalities in Kosovo, supra note 281.
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As a rule, minority representatives should be appointed proportionally to the
number of that particular minority in the municipality’s population. As we can see from
Table 5, this rule was not always followed. One can notice significant differences
between the percentage of the minority population and the number of appointed
representatives in many municipalities. For example, in Mitrovica 7% of the population
are Serbs, but the number of Serb appointees amounts to 22% of the Municipal
Assembly. There are 0.5% Serbs in Srbica, but Serb representatives in the Municipal
Assembly constitute 6%. At the same time, the Roma community in Istok (8% of the
municipality’s population) did not receive any representation. The absence of a rational
correlation between the percentage of minorities and the number of minority appointees
led to numerous complaints about the criteria for appointment. For example, the Turkish
community in Vucitm (there is an estimated 300 Turks397 there) complained that they
have not benefited from co-option. They submitted a petition to the SRSG, but no
appointments were made as of March 2001.398
There is an inconsistency between the theoretical approach to the formation of
representative organs and its practical implementation. On the one hand, all the basic
documents issued by the UNMIK399 emphasize fair and proportionate representation of
communities. On the other hand, when it comes to implementation there is no data about
the number of ethnic communities that can be used as a criterion for appointment. As
mentioned, the Joint Registration Taskforce did not collect data on the ethnic affiliation
of the applicants. Thus, there was no official record on a number of minorities in a given
municipality. As a result, it was difficult to assess which minorities were under
397Assessment o f the Situation o f Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, OSCE Report, September 2000 at
54, online: OSCE Homepage http://www.osce.org/kosovo/Dublications/Ddf/mibrep.pdf (date
accessed: February 12,2001).
398 Ibid., at 22.
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represented and what level of co-option they required. Thus, the appointments by the
SRSG are arguably legitimate because it is not clear what objective standard have been
used for making decisions. The co-option by the SRSG, on the one hand, advances
consociationalism by implementing proportionality and creating more preconditions for
grand coalition. On the other hand, the original consociational model has nothing to do
with such interventionist techniques as co-option. To my mind, such deviation from the
original consociational model is justifiable given the peculiarities of the Kosovo situation.
The power of the SRSG would not contradict the spirit of consociationalism so far as it
advances more inclusive grand coalition government.
However, from the position of the peace-building concept, co-option by the SRSG
is more problematic. The lack of clarity about the criteria for appointment creates doubt
about transparency and objectivity of the decision-making process. In this respect, the
administration itself seems to violate the two principles that it seeks to introduce in the
self-governing bodies. In acting so, the UNMIK undermines its own democratic tenets
and consequently its credibility with the local population.

4. Effect of appointments and elections on minority participation in decision
making
The appointment of minority representatives is only the first step in ensuring
minority participation in decision-making. The long-term impact of the elections on the
formation of consociational democracy and minority protection in Kosovo depends on
the work of the organs created by Municipal Assemblies.
The powers and policy of municipalities are formulated through the structure of
its organs. Consequently, the ability of minority representatives to have a real say in
municipal management depends on the position that they occupy within municipal
organs. To examine the actual role that minorities may assume in relation to municipal
organs, let us look at the composition of municipal organs (Appendix 5). It is apparent
that minority representatives have assumed seats in the Mediation Committee and the
Communities Committee as required by the Regulation on Self-government of
i m

See, e.g., Regulation on Self-government of Municipalities in Kosovo, the Constitutional
Framework for provisional Self-government of Kosovo.
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Municipalities. In relation to other organs, where minority participation is not required
(e.g., the Finance and Policy Committee, the Board of Directors), the seats have usually
been divided among two or three parties that received a majority of votes in that
municipality. (See, Appendix 6)
For example, as a result of the LDK victory, it received the position of the
presidency and deputy presidency in 21 municipalities. The PDK representatives were
elected presidents of Municipal Assemblies in S municipalities and deputy-president in 6
municipalities. In Serb municipalities where the SRSG appointed all the members, the
presidency and deputy-presidency was given to minority parties and independents.
Another two important municipal bodies - the Policy and Finance Committee400
and the Board of Directors401 - are also dominated by the representatives of the Kosovo
Albanian parties in the majority of municipalities. In these organs minorities are
represented only in five municipalities: Dragas (GIG and SDA members), Gnjilane (one
Kosovo Serb), Novo Brdo (three Kosovo Serbs), Kamenica (two seats for Kosovo Serbs)
and Vitina (two seats reserved for Kosovo Serbs). The inclusion of minorities in those
municipalities may be viewed as a positive trend towards the inclusion of minority
representatives even when it is not legally required.

E. Conclusions to the Chspter
As evidenced from the Kosovo study, both substantive and procedural legal rules
play important roles in the general development of democratization as well as in the
implementation of the elements of consociationalism. The following may be regarded as
the three most important aims that a legal regime helps to achieve in post-conflict
democratization:
1)

Legal rules define and support goals that international and local actors seek in the

post-conflict reconstruction. For Kosovo, the most vivid example is the Constitutional
Framework for Provisional Self-government. It was the first document that, after the two
400 The Policy and Finance Committee is responsible for proposing the budget and formulating
and researching the future strategic direction of the municipality. See, REgulaiton on Selfgovernment o f Municipalities, supra note 281, s.22.1.
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years of international presence, finally defined what institutional model of democracy is
to be built in Kosovo. The positive effect of such definition is twofold. First, it
demonstrated that the UNMIK has a clear idea about the model to be pursued in Kosovo
and, consequently, created certain expectations about the formation of the political
system, the balance of power between the branches of government and other tendencies
of political life inherent in the parliamentary model. Second, it has helped to channel all
the international activities towards an ultimate end - parliamentary democracy. Third, it
indicated the system of organs in which the elections had to be held and, thus, allowed
the planning of the relevant international activities.
2)

Legal rules provide a framework for power sharing. For Kosovo, the power

sharing is exercised in a vertical dimension (division of responsibilities between the
SRSG and the Provisional Institutions) as well as in a horizontal dimension (separation of
powers among the branches of self-government). The recently adopted Constitutional
Framework provides for wider competence of the Provisional Institutions of Selfgovernment. At the same time, many core questions of internal administration and
external relations remain within the authority of the SRSG. Even with the election of the
Municipal Assemblies and the prospective development of Provisional Institutions, he
retains his two most essential powers - to legislate and to appoint and remove all the
officials in the administration. This situation reveals a contradiction between two trends:
on the one hand, the UNMIK attempts to promote the accountability of local organs and
the delegation of powers to them; on the other hand, it facilitates the monopolization of
power in the hands of an international representative. It is not clear how the international
administration will develop responsible self-sustainable self-government if the
administration exercises constant control over the most significant steps taken by local
bodies. The Framework’s provisions do not establish clear criteria as to the conditions
under which the SRSG may resort to his dormant powers. Thus, one can only trust that
the wisdom of the SRSG will not allow excessive use of his powers. In this respect, the
potential of legal rules to provide guarantees for the development of self-government has

401 The Board of Directors assists the Municipal Assembly and its committees by providing all
necessary information and reports for the decision-making process; assists the President and the
Chief Executive Officer, and implements all decisions of the municipality. See, ibid., s.31.2.
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not been used fully. The rules might have been more precise about the limits of the
interference by the SRSG.
From the point of view of the peace-building concept, the existence of such powers
of the SRSG may be acceptable. The contradictions may arise at the stage of the
enforcement of these powers. Though the control of the SRSG over self-government is
necessary, it is important that it is not abused. Otherwise the functioning of the Kosovo
administration will remain contingent on external interference and local political parties
will not be ready to maintain the created structure after the withdrawal of the
international presence. One of the most difficult points in this respect is to define a clear
and objective criterion which would allow one to judge when the intervention by the
SRSG is appropriate and when it threatens to usurp the decision-making power of the
self-government organs.
3)

The legal regulation of the electoral process has two aspects: 1. The design of the

electoral system is stipulated in legal rules. This helps to create the preconditions for
minority inclusion in representative bodies, for the creation of interethnic coalitions, and
for moderation of positions of political parties. 2. There are also rules regulating the
electoral conduct and ways of its enforcement. This side of regulation provides an
important contribution to the general stability of the situation in the Province during the
electoral campaign, for fairer competition among the parties, and for the creation of more
cooperative representative bodies.
The elements of consociationalism are mainly implemented through legal rules,
which stipulate the design of the electoral system, the composition of state organs and the
decision-making procedures in those organs.

On the one hand, the existence of an

international administration in Kosovo offers some avenues for the implementation of
consociationalism. Due to the coercive power that the UNMIK has in the Province, it
makes possible the implementation of consociational techniques, which are otherwise not
likely to be adopted by the parties. On the other hand, because the maintenance of those
consociational techniques is dependent on international pressure, the crucial question is
how to make the existing system of organs and rules sustainable.
Here is a brief summary of how the elements o f consociationalism were
implemented in Kosovo. Its principles were used to a different extent at the provincial

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

133
and at the municipal level. At the municipal level, proportionality was used for the
electoral system, for appointment of co-opted minority members and for the allocation of
seats in some organs created by the Municipal Assemblies (e.g., the Communities
Committee and the Mediation Committee). At the provincial level, proportionality was
employed as a basis for the electoral system and as a guideline for allocation of seats in
some organs created by the Assembly. Through the proportional allocation of seats
among majority and minority communities, the international administration sought to
achieve inclusiveness of the ethnic segments of Kosovo society. The existence of such
participation is a precondition for the creation of grand coalitions. Another precondition willingness of the segment leaders to cooperate - was to a certain extent ensured through
the rules of electoral conduct. This helped to prevent more openly nationalistic parties
entering the legislature.
Mutual veto as a means to protect the interests of minorities is also used differently
at the municipal and provincial level. The rules regulating the functioning of the Kosovo
Assembly create a very beneficial moderate mutual veto. In contrast, at the municipal level
minorities have no veto power. On the one hand, a mutual veto is appropriate only for
resolution of the most important matters concerning the whole Kosovo population or
particular minority groups. A mutual veto at the municipal level might be regarded as an
unreasonably complicated system of decision-making. Moreover, the municipal committees
may be viewed as sufficient guarantees for the protection of minority interests.
Unfortunately, the municipal committees have limited powers and, in my opinion, cannot
provide sufficiently effective protection of minority interests. The lack of such protection
means that more responsibility for monitoring and minority protection will be put on the
provincial institutions, including the SRSG. hi turn, the more interference by an
international administration is required, the less the chances are for the development of
responsible and sustainable self-government, which contradicts the goal of peace-building.
Thus, I would recommend some model of a moderate mutual veto to be adopted, not only at
the provincial, but also at the municipal level.
In relation to the Kosovo Assembly there is a imbalance in the application of the
elements of consociationalism to different organs. For example, the rules for the election of
the Kosovo President do not require him to receive minority support. Given the symbolic
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nature of the president’s office, it is important to ensure that he is considerate of the minority
interests. Thus, in relation to the electoral procedure, the available tools of consociationalsm
were not utilized to full extent. At the same time, such an element as proportionality is
excessively used as a requirement in the composition of the Assembly’s committees. I have
some doubts if proportionality will not override the criterion of individual merit. Because
much of the work of the Assembly is done through its committees, it is important to ensure
that they are composed of people with an appropriate level of expertise.
In general, the very implementation of the elements of consociationalism through
substantive and procedural rules may be viewed as a good precondition for minority
incisiveness and mitigation of the tensions among the majority and minorities. Some
mechanisms are particularly well-tailored and constitute an important contribution to the
development of the practice and theory of consociationalism; others were not elaborated
with necessary care. There is still a search for the happy medium between more minority
protective consociational techniques and techniques that are politically acceptable to
international and local actors.
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Chapter IV
Re-establishment of the Judiciary and the Police
One of the necessary requirements for successful peace-building is coherency in its
strategy. This, inter alia, means that certain principles, like those of consociationalism, are
introduced in relation to all branches of government and all institutions where applicable.
Lijphart considered that minority and majority inequality can be resolved mainly through the
representative branch of government and, accordingly, addressed his recommendations to the
legislature and partially to the executive. I argue that, similarly to proportionate
representation of minorities in the government, multi-ethnic judiciary and police contribute to
meaningful participation of minorities in governmental structures and to the sense of their
inclusiveness in social and political structures. Thus, special consociational techniques are
also necessary for the judiciary and the police. I do not automatically apply to the judiciary
and the police the principles of consociationalism which were developed specifically for the
representative branch. Rather, I try to show the particular way in which courts and the police
can contribute to the meaningful inclusiveness of minorities in society and how
consociational techniques can reinforce their role in this process.
In this Chapter I look at the institutional structure of the judiciary, the applicable law
and the actual application of that law by the courts. In addition to that, I dedicate a separate
section to the activities of the law enforcement authorities in Kosovo and their cooperation
with the courts. My task here is not to describe all the inconsistencies in the application of
law by judges and prosecutors, but rather to review the most common violations and to
project their effect on the democratization of Kosovo. The ultimate purpose of this analysis
is to reveal the role of the institutional structure of the judicial and police systems and of the
applicable law in ensuring equal protection to members of all ethnic communities, as well as
strengthening their inclusiveness in state structures.

135
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A. The role of the judiciary and police in ethnically divided societies
1. General Observations
Many political science scholars402 who analyzed the preconditions for stable
democratic governance in ethnically divided societies have concentrated their attention
primarily on the role of representative bodies in providing inclusiveness for all ethnic groups.
In this respect, the judicial and police systems seem to be unreasonably ignored. Similarly to
representative bodies, courts and police are subject to the influence of ethnic division. Courts
dominated by ethnic majority judges may be biased or perceived as biased against minority
defendants. The ethnic composition of the police affects how it performs its duties, how
willing it is to accord equal protection to members of all ethnic communities or to
discriminate against them. Further, control over organs of law enforcement may often be a
guarantee for continuation of the dominance of the ruling group. Because of that, “[ejthnic
groups who are underrepresented in state security forces see the military-police imbalances
as reflections of their overall political vulnerability.” 403 Since in a long-term the composition
and functioning of the judicial and police systems becomes a factor that can solidify ethnic
exclusion and inter-group tension, particular attention should be drawn to the founding
principles and functioning of the judiciary and the police.
The role of the judiciary in a post-conflict society is several fold: 1) supporting the
rule of law and contributing to the maintenance of order and security; 2) providing
inclusiveness of minorities through their fair treatment and representation in the judiciary; 3)
providing policy guidelines through constitutional adjudication and interpretation concerning
the balance of power among the branches of government, the scope of individual and
collective rights and limits on the authority of the state to interfere with the exercise of those
rights, etc.404 In sum, the role of the courts falls within one of two broad categories - policy
making or the routine resolution of practical matters.405 During the first years after a conflict,
courts usually have to concentrate primarily (if not exclusively) on the resolution of practical
402Horowitz, supra note 33 & 35; Lijphart, supra note 41; Wippman, supra note 58.
403 Cynthia H. Enloe, Police, Military and Ethnicity (New Brunswick: Transactions Inc., 1980) at 146.
404 hi one way or another each of these issues has an impact on the position of minorities in society.
405 In a common law system decision of any case may be regarded as a policy making development.
Here, I would like to distinguish the high profile policy making by the Supreme court which is likely
to have effect on all levels of government from the minor, local, potentially policy-making role of
lower courts.
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matters. Commonly, one of the primary concerns of an international mission is restoration of
law and order. For an international mission, “[t]he failure to address past and ongoing
violations promptly and effectively, and to create a sense of law and order, can impede the
broader objectives of the operation.”406 The lack of adequate law enforcement can undermine
the authority of the mission and negatively affect the willingness of the population to respect
law. Thus, criminal adjudication and general law enforcement become one of the immediate
priorities of an international administration.
Only with time will the development of the courts’ power of constitutional
adjudication take place. Because immediately after a conflict the policy-making role (through
constitutional adjudication) of the highest court is usually absent (at least that was the case
with Kosovo), the pressure to provide inclusiveness and equality shifts to routine criminal
and civil adjudication.
Generally, courts contribute to the inclusiveness and protection of minorities is
several ways. First, through the composition of courts. For all types of adjudication, the
diversity of the judiciary is important as a precondition for overcoming stereotypes and
biases. The representation of different perspectives in the judiciary, including the one
stemming from particular ethnic affiliation, is important for a more flexible and open-minded
judicial process and decision-making.407 Such diversity is particularly important for supreme
courts that play an active role in policy-making.
Second, courts contribute to inclusiveness through actual decision-making,
application and development of law. Through constitutional adjudication courts provide
policy guidelines for other branches of government and in this way influence minority
inclusiveness and the protection of collective minority rights at the national level. Criminal
and civil adjudication works more at the level of individual and local community and is more
concerned with individual rights and protection. To date, the practice of the Kosovo courts
has primarily targeted the resolution of criminal matters. Thus, criminal adjudication will be
the context for the assessment of the role of the courts in providing inclusiveness.

406 Hansjorg Strohmeyer, “Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations
Mission in Kosovo and East Timor” (2001) 95 AJ1L 46 at 47.
407See, e.g., R. Devlin, A. Wayne MacKay & N. Kim, “Reducing the Democratic Deficit:
Representation, Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary, or Towards a ‘Triple P” Judiciary” (2001) 38
Alb. L. Rev. 734 at 792-808.
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The role that the re-established or newly created courts assume in a post-conflict
society is largely defined by a combination of three factors: the approach of the international
administration to the re-establishment of the judicial system

(principles on which the

judiciary is built, the definition of the applicable law, the time frame for the re-establishment
of the court structure, etc.); the composition of courts and courts’ willingness and ability to
utilize applicable law; and the attitude of the population to the court system.
In the first months after a conflict, an international administration plays a founding
role in relation to the court system. It not only provides the structure and jurisdiction of
courts, but also specifies what laws should be applied and how. In addition to that, the
international administration monitors the compliance of the courts with established standards
of fairness, independence and impartiality. However, some areas, like the ability and
willingness of judges to utilize applicable law, are difficult to control by legal means. I
support a view that judicial decisions are not solely the result of a judge’s logic and
rationality, but also a result of the judge’s personal and professional characteristics. After a
deadly ethnic conflict, judges will not always be willing to put law and human rights above
personal fears, intolerance or hatred. Those feelings find their expression in judicial bias,
which is likely to have tremendous impact on court procedures and decisions. This trend is
especially dangerous at the initial stages of the reconstruction when the law enforcement
system operates in emergency mode (i.e., the rules imposing stricter penalties or extended
detention, etc. are introduced). The prioritized activity of restoring order may, to a certain
extent, interfere with the exercise of the second function of the courts - fair treatment and
protection of minorities. The emergency powers of the courts and law enforcement organs
may sometimes be utilized by biased officials as tools to discriminate against minority
members. This question will be discussed in the following sections.
Another factor in the functioning of courts is the ability of judges to apply human
rights standards. In states exhausted by a lengthy conflict, judges may often lack knowledge
of law and up to date legal training, especially in the field of human rights. Moreover, in
many post-socialist states human rights laws have never been applied before and,
consequently, the judiciary does not have the necessary knowledge in this field.
The functioning of courts in the first years after cessation of hostilities is likely to
have significant impact on the population’s perception of the court system. The certainty in
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protection and non-discrimination, the belief in court system as legitimate, independent and
impartial is one of the founding stones for political and social stability.
Having described the importance of the judicial system in general, I would like to
proceed to a more detailed analysis of the Kosovo situation.

2. Kosovo peculiarities
In order to fully understand the challenges of establishing and administering the
judiciary and police in Kosovo, one should be aware of the security situation in Kosovo in
the first months after the UNMIK deployment.
The security situation in Kosovo was shaped by a number of factors. The Yugoslav
and Serb police forces were withdrawn from the territory of Kosovo according to the
requirements of SCR 1244.408 The Yugoslav and Serb forces stopped functioning or were
withdrawn before the international security presence assumed effective control over the
Province. This temporary security vacuum resulted in a deteriorated security situation.409 In
the absence of effective state authority, Kosovo military and criminal groupings attempted to
expand their influence over the province’s territory,410 competing for the areas of influence.
For example, the KLA was able to establish de facto control over the majority of Kosovo
municipalities.411Thus, the situation was difficult to control and the UNMIK had to reconcile
its power with the de facto authorities. The security challenge was reinforced by the
unregulated return of refugees412 and constant move of internally displaced persons.
According to the Report of the Secretary-General of 12 July 1999,650,000 refugees returned
to Kosovo in June-July 1999.413 Because of limited resources the returnees had literally to
compete for housing and material support. They often resorted to violence and intimidation
to satisfy these needs, thus increasing instability in the Province.414 At that time, the KFOR
was not capable of dealing with multiple security challenges because it was still in the
408 Security Council Resolution 1244, supra note 106, para 3.
409 Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para. 5 at 2.
410 Strohmeyer, supra note 406 at 52.
4I! Assessment o f the Situation o f Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, OSCE Report, September 2000, supra
note 295 at3.
412 The conflict produced an estimated 800,000 refugees and 500,000 internally displaced persons.
See, Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para. 5.
413 Ibid., para 9 at 3.
414 Strohmeyer, supra note 406 at 48.
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process of building up its forces.415 The limited capacity of the KFOR and the UNMIK
Police in law enforcement made it possible to respond only to the most serious crimes. These
circumstances explain the focus and the development of the judiciary and the police towards
the resolution of criminal matters.
At the time of the UNMIK deployment, not only law enforcement institutions were
not functioning, but the judicial system collapsed. Thus, the crucial link between law
enforcement and the judiciary was broken. Even after the establishment of the Emergency
Judicial System (EJS) the coordination between the courts and law enforcement organs was
not very effective. The four provisional courts of the EJS were overloaded with work and
were not able to hear the cases in a timely manner. Thus, more detainees were kept in
custody for extended periods of time often without a possibility to challenge the lawfulness
of their detention.416 Moreover, there were hardly any mechanisms to monitor the fairness of
procedures in the courts. For example, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights reported
that in many instances the release of the arrested was ethnically motivated or pressured by
the KLA or other influential groups.417
Given the combination of the mentioned security challenges, the Erst task of the
UNMIK was to create a police force and a court system of sufficient capacity to resolve
numerous security concerns. At the same time, the procedure for their re-establishment had
to include mechanisms providing for their legitimacy, impartiality and independence.

B. Institutional structure off the judiciary
As I mentioned in the introduction, the institutional structure of the judiciary and of the
police (composition and principles of their re-establishment) may be one of the factors that
influences people’s perception about these organs. I specifically look at the methods that the
UNMIK employed in order to ensure multi-ethnicity of the judiciary and the police.
To understand the challenges of providing judicial protection in Kosovo, it is necessary
to trace the stages of the development of the judicial system. Because the judiciary had to be

415 Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para. 6 at 2.
416 This question will be discussed in detail in section C of this Chapter.
417A Fragile Peace: Laying the Foundationsfo r Justice in Kosovo, Report of the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights, October 1999, online: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Homepage
h t tp : / /w w w .l c h r .o r f / D u b s / k o s o v o f i il l 1099.htm (date accessed: 20 May 2001).
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established from scratch, initially, it was not able to function at full capacity, that is, to provide
civil, criminal and constitutional adjudication.
The development of the judicial system and affiliated institutions in Kosovo took
place in two stages - the establishment of the Emergency Judicial System and its further
transformation into the Regular Judicial System. The Emergency Judicial System (EJS) had
extremely limited functions and, basically, provided only immediate response to the
deteriorating security situation. The Regular Judicial System (RJS) assumed wider functions
of criminal and civil adjudication. Ultimately, with the adoption of the Constitutional
Framework for Self-government in Kosovo preconditions were created for the development
of constitutional adjudication. At each of the three stages, the judiciary provided different
levels of protection for individuals - from very basic during the EJS to more comprehensive
after the implementation of the Constitutional Framework.

1. Principles of re-establishing judiciary
The international administration had to re-establish the judicial system from scratch.
In the Report of 12 July 1999, the UN Secretary General defined the principles and stages of
the reconstruction of the judiciary and related institutions in Kosovo. The major objective
was to create “an independent, impartial, and multi-ethnic judiciary.”418 The initial steps in
this process included the establishment of a court hierarchy as well as the organs providing
technical and administrative support to the courts. In particular, the institution-building
priorities comprised re-establishment of the Supreme Court of Kosovo, which was abolished
in 1991; re-establishment of the correctional system; revival of the Kosovo Bar Association;
and establishment of a technical advisory commission on the administration of the judiciary
and the prosecution service.419

2. Organs providing technical and administrative support to courts
SCR 1244 has granted the international administration ample powers over the
provincial affairs, including the authority to administer the judiciary.420 This task is

418 Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para 66 at 10.
419Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para 70-73 at 11.
420Ibid.
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cooperatively managed by two UNMIK pillars - the UN-led Civil Administration and the
OSCE-led Institution-building pillar.
Both pillars established divisions specifically responsible for various aspects of
judicial affairs. The OSCE Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law is responsible for
monitoring, protecting and promoting human rights. It develops mechanisms to ensure that
the police, courts, administrative structures operate in accordance with human rights
standards.421
The three divisions of the Department of Human Rights are responsible for support of
the judicial system. The Judicial Support Unit provides logistical and technical support to
newly established courts in Kosovo. The Training Unit is responsible for running a Kosovo
Judicial Institute 422 The Legal System Monitoring Section (LSMS) oversees the functioning
of the judicial system. The Monitoring Section plays a particularly important role in
assessing the applicable law and overall functioning of the Kosovo courts. The LSMS
consists of independent monitors who do not represent either the Civil Administration or any
group or individual.423 The Section regularly produces reports on the state of the judicial
system in Kosovo and provides recommendations for its improvement.
The UN-led Judicial Affairs Office deals with the four core areas of judicial affairs:
the administration of courts, prosecution and prisons; the development of legal policy; the
review and drafting of the legislation; and the assessment of the quality of justice in
Kosovo.424
In September 1999 the SRSG established a Technical advisory commission on the
judiciary and prosecution service.423 It includes 10 local and 5 international members
appointed by the SRSG. The Commission assesses the needs of Kosovo in levels and

421 Annual Report on the OSCE Activities (2000), online: OSCE Homepage <
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/misc/anrepOOe activ.htm#Anchor-1.-41834 > (date accessed: 7
July 2001).

Zlb
i(L on the Expiration o f Detention Periods for Detainees, LSMS Report No. 4, March 18,
Update
2000, online: OSCE Homepage < http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/lustice/ > (date
accessed: 25 June 2001).
424Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para 67 at 11.
425 Regulation on Recommendations fo r the Structure and Administration o f the Judiciary and
prosecution
Service,
UNMIK/REG/1999/6,
s.l,
online:
UN
Homepage
http://www.un.org/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg6.htmi (date accessed: 16 August 2001).
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categories of judicial bodies and advises the SRSG on the structure and administration of the
judiciary and prosecution in Kosovo.426
In March 2000 the SRSG established another structure for managing the judicial
system and correctional service - the Administrative Department of Justice within the JIAS
structure. It is responsible for the overall management of the judicial system and the
correctional service.427 It implements the guidelines provided by the LAC and gives
recommendations to the IAC about the overall strategy in the development of the judicial
system. Other responsibilities of the Department include cooperation with other departments
and organizations on matters of the judicial system and correctional service, provision of
courts with appropriate resources, assistance in training of judges, prosecutors, lawyers and
other judicial personnel, internal prison inspection, etc.428

3. Emergency Judicial System
The Emergency Judicial System (EJS) of Kosovo was put in operation in June 1999
and ran its activities approximately until the end of 1999. The system had limited structure
and exercised only minimal judicial functions. The EJS provided an immediate response to
the deteriorating security situation in Kosovo. The main task of the EJS was to conduct pre
trial hearings of persons arrested by the KFOR. No civil hearings were held until spring
2000.429 Given the limited functions of the EJS, it is reasonable to look at its contribution to
minority inclusiveness mainly through its composition.
There were only four provisional district courts and prosecutors’ offices set up in
Pristina, Prizren, Mitrovica and Pec. The Pristina district court had mobile judicial units,
which covered all other areas where courts were not set up.430

*-*lbuL, s. 1,5.1.
427 Regulation on the Establishment o f the Administrative Department o f Justice,
UNMIK/REG/2000/25, s. 1.1.
428 Ibid., s.2.2.
429 The Development o f the Kosovo Judicial System (10 June through 12 December 1999), LSMS
Report,
17
December
1999,
online:
OSCE
Homepage:
<
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/> (date accessed: 25 July 2001) [hereinafter
Development o f the Kosovo Judicial System].
430 Criminal Justice System in Kosovo, LSMS Report, July 2000, online: OSCE Homepage <
www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/law/crjustice.pdf> (date accessed: 28 July 2001) [hereinafter
Criminal Justice System].
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Because at the time of the UNMIK deployment there was no functioning judiciary,
the first task of the international mission was to select and appoint judges and prosecutors.
Given the importance of such appointments for the future democratization in Kosovo, it was
essential to tailor a transparent selection procedure, which would give legitimacy to the
newly appointed courts.431 The selection and appointment had to be based on fair criteria of
experience, training and moral integrity of the candidates. Another two criteria kept in mind,
were political acceptability of the candidates and ethnic balance within the re-established
judicial system.432
The UNMIK established a special body - the Joint Advisory Council on Provisional
Judicial Appointments (JAC) - to screen and select candidates for judicial positions. The
main task of the JAC was to advise the SRSG on the matters related to the provisional
appointment of judges, prosecutors and other judicial personnel.433 As the EJS itself, the JAC
was created as an organ of temporary nature. The duration of its existence was defined by
two factors: the fulfillment of the purpose of its creation - advise the SRSG on appointments
of the judicial personnel - and the establishment of a permanent commission for the selection
of judges and prosecutors.434 The initial term of the JAC members was limited to two
months.
Like the majority of the UNMIK-created organs, the JAC included both local (4
members) and international (3 members) experts. The composition of the Council had to
reflect ethnic diversity of the Province. It consisted of two Kosovo Albanians, one Bosniac
and one Serb.435 All the members were appointed by the SRSG.
The JAC was responsible for reviewing the applications from Kosovo legal
professionals and making written recommendations to the SRSG on candidates for
appointment to judicial office.436 The SRSG had final authority to approve or reject a
candidate recommended.
One of the major difficulties for the international administration was finding qualified
candidates who were willing to apply for positions. Many Kosovo Albanian lawyers who
431 Strohmeyer, supra note 406 at 51.
432Strohmeyer, supra note 406 at 52.
433 On Joint Advisory Council on Provisional Judicial Appointments,Emergency Decree 1999/1, art.1.
434 Ibid., art. 9.
435 The Development o f the Kosovo Judickd System, supra note 429.
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were persecuted during the Serb regime had escaped before the deployment of the UNMIK.
Those who left were considered collaborators of the Serb regime and their appointment was
vigorously apposed by Kosovo Albanian political forces. A significant number of Kosovo
legal professionals have not been practicing law and were not able to update their legal
knowledge for almost a ten-year period.437 In making appointments, the international
administration had to maneuver between political considerations, professional requirements
and the desire to achieve a certain ethnic balance within the judiciary. Given the limited
number of candidates, this was a difficult task and many appointments were compromised in
order to most fully meet the three objectives.
By the end of June 1999, the SRSG was able to appoint nine judges and prosecutors
(among them three Serbs).438 The judges and prosecutors of the Emergency Judicial System
were appointed for a three-month renewable period.
Between June and September 1999 the SRSG appointed 55 judges and prosecutors.439
Among them 42 were Kosovo Albanians, 7 Serbs, 4 Muslims, 1 Turk and 1 Roma.440 All the
appointees have previously served as judges and prosecutors, but most of them have not
practiced law in the preceding ten years.441 During July-October most of the Serb judges and
prosecutors resigned because of the lack of security, discrimination and insufficient
remuneration.442 As a result, by mid-December 1999 only 47 judges and prosecutors
remained in the system.443
The process of the formation of the EJS shows that two concerns of peace-building
and consociationalism were attempted to be addressed: 1) legitimacy of the re-established
judiciary and participation of the local parties in its re-establishment; and 2) inclusiveness of
minority members in the judiciary.

436 On Joint Advisory Council on Provisional Judicial Appointments, supra note 431, art 6.
437 A Review o f the Criminal Justice System (1 September 2000 —28 February 2001), LSMS Report,
March 2001, at 1, online: OSCE Homepage < http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/
> (date accessed: 25 June 2001).
Criminal Justice System, supra note 430.
439 Ibid.
440 Ibid.
441 The Development o f the Kosovo Judicial System, supra note 428.
442 Ibid.
443 Ibid.
|4 A
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From the position of the peace-building criteria, the establishment of the JAC was
important and necessary for the legitimate process of selecting judges. This organ assisted in
the formation of a professionally qualified, impartial and diverse judiciary - a foundation for
fair and equal treatment of defendants. In turn, fairness of court procedures raises the
population’s faith in the court system and the confidence of minority communities in being
protected. The sense of protection and confidence of minorities in being treated fairly and
impartially is a part of their general feeling of being included in a society and of being its free
and equal members.
Given the difficulty of the post-conflict situation, the UNMIK may be regarded as
having coped with the task of nominating a multi-ethnic judiciary sufficiently well. While at
the stage of selection a lot of effort was dedicated to attracting applications from minority
professionals, much less support was provided to help keep them in the system once
nominated. The lack of such mechanisms was one of the reasons why many minority judges
and prosecutors left the system. Thus, being initially quite diverse, the courts and the
prosecutorial office have gradually lost the desired multi-ethnic characteristic.

4.Regular Judicial System
a. Appointments
By the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000, the EJS had been gradually
transformed into a regular judicial system. The regular judicial system contains not only a
more elaborate judicial structure with wider functions, but also a new organ responsible for
the selection of candidates for judicial appointments - an Advisory Judicial Commission
(AJC).444 In October 1999 the AJC replaced the JAC of the Emergency Judicial System.
Similarly to the JAC, the Commission reviews applications, selects candidates and
recommends them to the SRSG.
During November-December 1999 the AJC carried out the selection of candidates for
judicial positions. Starting November 1999, the AJC received 700 applications and

444Regulation on Appointment and Removalfrom Office o f Judges and Prosecutors,
UNMIK/REG/1999/7, online: UN Homepage <
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg7.html> (date accessed: 16 June 2001).
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conducted approximately 560 interviews.445 The AJC encouraged minorities to submit
applications for judicial positions, but these efforts had limited success.
In December the AJC selected 301 professional judges, prosecutors and lay judges.446
Initial swearing in was held in January 2000. A number of appointed judges and prosecutors,
especially those from minority communities, did not attend the swearing in ceremonies.
Among 301 appointed judges and prosecutors, only 245 judges and 42 prosecutors were
actually sworn in.447 Among them, only 8 were minorities, including Kosovo Serbs. Among
42 prosecutors, only 2 were representatives of minority communities. As of July 2000, 230
judges, 235 lay judges and 41 prosecutors worked in the system. Further appointments were
made in August 2000.
With the adoption of Regulation 2000/34, the SRSG obtained power to appoint
international judges and prosecutors.448 As of September 2000, six international judges and
two prosecutors were appointed.449 The involvement of international judges and prosecutors
is not a consociational technique. However, because of the objective sought through the
assignment of international judges and prosecutors - fairness of procedure - it may be
regarded as contributing to the protection and inclusiveness of minorities and, thus,
supporting the important goals of peace-building.

b. Structure o f the regular judicial system
District Courts were established in each of the five Kosovo regions: Pristina, Prizren,
Pec, Gnjilane and Mitrovica. Now the majority of municipalities has a court of minor
offences and a municipal court (See table 6). Compared to the rest of municipalities, the three
predominantly Serb regions - Leposavic, Zubin Potok and Zvecan - have somewhat distinct
court system. According to the OSCE Municipality Profiles,450 by the summer of 2000, no
legal courts functioned in those municipalities. However, former municipal courts and minor
offences courts still existed. The municipal court in Leposavic was even funded by
445 Criminal Justice System, supra note 430.
446Ibid.
447 Ibid.
448 International judges may be appointed to any court throughout Kosovo. They have the authority to
select and take responsibility for new and pending cases in the court where they were appointed.
449 Criminal Justice System, supra note 430.
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Belgrade.451 Although the judges in Leposavic and Zubin Potok were re-appointed, they did
not swear in or otherwise officially assume their positions. The distinct character of the
judicial system in Serb dominated municipalities and their maintained connection with Serbia
strengthen the de facto division of Kosovo in predominantly Serb and predominately
Albanian areas.
The jurisdiction of the Kosovo courts is differentiated. District courts adjudicate
criminal cases that lead to a sentence of more than five years. Municipal courts adjudicate
cases, which carry a sentence of up to five years. The minor offences’ courts adjudicate cases
that carry up to two months of imprisonment452 Although criminal matters remain an issue
of primary concern, courts have also started adjudicating civil matters. For example, the
municipal court in Klina deals with all civil cases, except divorces, which are dealt by the
District Court.453 The municipal court of Lipjan also deals with both criminal and civil cases.
At the Kosovo level, Pristina hosts the highest courts in the hierarchy: the Supreme
Court of Kosovo, which is the highest appellate body, the Highest Court for Minor Offences
and a Commercial Court.
The Supreme Court of Kosovo454 was re-established by the UNMIK Regulation in
September 1999. It has the powers of the Supreme Court, which exercised its jurisdiction in
Kosovo before 1991, as regards appeals against decisions of district courts in criminal
matters and detention terms.455 The five judges of the Court are appointed by the SRSG, in
consultation with the JAC.

Table 6. Kosovo Courts
Prosecutor’s
Municipality

District Court

Municipal court Court of minoi office
offences

450 Municipality Profiles, online; OSCE Homepage < http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/ > (date
accessed: 10 July 2001).
451 Ibid.
452 Ibid.
453 Ibid.
454Formally known as the Ad Hoc Court of Final Appeal.
453 Regulation on the Establishment o f an Ad Hoc Court o f Final Appeal and an Ad Hoc Office o f the
Public
Prosecutor,
UNMK/REG/1999/5,
s.l,
online:
UN
Homepage
<
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg5.html> (date accessed: 8 August 2001).
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Zubin Potok/Zubin

Yes

Potok

Kosovo Serbs

-

Zve* an/Zve$an

All
Yes
Yes

Source: OSCE Municipality Profiles.

As we can notice from the table, the Kosovo judiciary is predominantly Albanian.
Among the municipalities only Prizren courts can be regarded as multiethnic. Their
composition fairly reflects various ethnic communities of Prizren.
However, the general trend is that in predominantly Albanian municipalities (that is,
the major part of Kosovo), an absolute majority of the judges are Albanian. In Serbdominated municipalities courts are dominated by Serbs. Such ethnic composition creates
doubts about the ability of those courts to be objective in deciding cases involving minorities
in respective municipalities. As the illustrations from the practice of the Kosovo courts will
show, these concerns have sufficient grounds.
At the level of the Kosovo Supreme Court, the High Court for Minor Offenses, and
the Commercial Court all judges are Albanians. Taking into account the potential policy
making role of the highest courts, there may be serious concerns about the ability of purely
Albanian courts to be sensitive enough to the needs of minorities. At this point, the courts’
composition cannot be characterized as sufficiently contributing to the inclusiveness of
minorities.

c. Constitutional framework
As we already know,456 the Constitutional Framework for Self-government of Kosovo
established important guidelines for the further development of the institutions of selfgovernment in the Province. According to it, the government in Kosovo will be exercised
through three branches of government - the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. The
intended judicial structure includes the Supreme Court of Kosovo, District Courts, Municipal
Courts and Minor Offense Courts.457 The international judges will continue to serve within the
See Chapter m.
437 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 9.4.4.
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Kosovo judicial system according to the rules established by the SRSG.458 The composition of
the judiciary has to reflect the diversity of the people of Kosovo 459 Interestingly, the Framework
does not provide any guideline about what are the criteria to judge if the judiciary sufficiently
reflects the diversity of the people of the Province and what standard should be applied to ensure
such diversity.
Currently the administration of the judiciary is exercised by the SRSG and other organs
of the international administration. As intended by the Framework, the Provisional Institutions
of self-government will soon assume many of those responsibilities. In particular, they will be
responsible for the organization and proper functioning of the courts; for maintenance of court
and prosecutorial services; for appointing, training and disciplining members of judicial support
staff; for coordination between the judicial system and the correctional service; for providing
information and statistics relating to the functioning of the judicial system and correctional
service, etc.460 The Provisional Institutions will also have the power to decide on the
appointment of judges and prosecutors.461 Because the Framework refers to the Provisional
Institutions in general, it is not clear which organs - the Assembly, the President, the
Government or other organs - will be responsible for each of the mentioned matters.462 In any
event, one of these organs, most likely the Kosovo Assembly, will decide on judicial
appointments and, thus, define the composition of the courts and the prosecutorial office.
Because no special procedures and criteria are spelled out in the Framework, appointments are
left to the political process, for the discretion of the majority vote. In such a situation, there
exists a threat that the Albanian majority parliament will effectively resist the nomination of
minority (first of all, Serbian) judges. Another problem may be the formation of monoethnic
segments of the judiciary in particular territories of the Province - nomination of mostly Serbs
in predominately Serb municipalities and mostly Albanians in predominantly Albanian areas.
At the same time, the SRSG retains powers over the judicial affairs, which he had
according to the UNMIK Regulations. In particular, he decides on requests about assignment of

458 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223.
459 Ibid., s. 9.4.7.
460 Ibid., s.5.3
461 Ibid., s. 5.3 (a).
462 For example, will the Assembly have power to appoint judges and prosecutors or will the
Government be responsible for maintenance of courts and correctional service.
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international judges or prosecutors and change of venue;463 exercises control over law
enforcement institutions and correctional service; 464 and exercises the final authority in regard
to the appointment, dismissal and disciplining of judges and prosecutors.465 According to section
9.4.8, judges and prosecutors will continue to be appointed by the SRSG from the list of
candidates proposed by the Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council and endorsed by the
Assembly.
There seems to be a contradiction about the power of the SRSG to appoint judges and
prosecutors and power of the Provisional Institutions to make decisions on appointment of
judges and prosecutors. “Making decisions” reasonably suggests competence to decide whether
a candidate is appointed or not. However, as a result of section 9.4.8, the powers of the
Assembly are limited to the endorsement of candidates only. This constitutes a controversially
restricted interpretation of the powers of the Provisional Institutions, which potentially can
impede the development of sustainable self-government and contradicts the principles of the
peace-building concept.
The Framework affirms the right of individuals to judicial review of the legality of a
decision of the Government or other executive agency.466 This provision gives courts the power
of constitutional adjudication. The provision does not specify the court in which an act can be
challenged. We can assume that an application for review can be Hied with a municipal or
district court. This seems to be an implication for establishment of a decentralized system of
judicial review characteristic of common law countries. Thus, the Kosovo courts at all levels can
potentially be policy-makers. Then, the composition of the courts becomes even more
important. Diverse backgrounds and affiliations of judges create an opportunity for them to
examine issues from a variety of perspectives of its members, to be more flexible in choosing
solutions and more successful in overcoming ethnic and other biases and stereotypes.
Unfortunately, the area of constitutional review in regard to an individual complaint is
limited to the executive branch only. An individual cannot challenge either an act adopted by the

463 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 8.1(h). This power is spelled in more detail in the
Regulation On Assignment of International Judges/Prosecutors and/or Change of Venue.
464Ibid., s. 8.10).
Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 8.1(g).
466Ibid.
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Kosovo Assembly or the actions and decisions of the UNMIK. Perhaps, the possibility to
challenge legislative acts will be provided in the future.
The Framework also contains important foundations for the development of the Supreme
Court’s power of constitutional review and interpretation. This function is

particularly

important as a tool to resolve numerous contradictory provisions467 in the Framework. The
Framework confers on the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court powers to decide:
(a) At the request of the President of Kosovo, any member of the
Presidency of the Assembly, any Assembly Committee, no fewer than five
members of the Assembly, or the Government, whether any law adopted by
the Assembly is incompatible with this Constitutional Framework, including
the international legal instruments specified in Chapter 3 on Human Rights;
(b) In the event of disputes between or among Provisional Institutions
of Self-Government, or between a Provisional Institution of Self-Government
and an Assembly Committee, one or more members of the Presidency of the
Assembly, or one or more members of the Assembly on the extent of their
rights and obligations under this Constitutional Framework;
(c) At the request of any independent body or office referred to in
Chapters 10 and 11, whether a decision of a Provisional Institution of SelfGovernment infringes upon the independence and responsibilities of the
relevant independent body or office; and
(d) At the request of the Office of the Public Prosecutor, whether an
act by a member of the Assembly, a member of the Government or the
President of Kosovo constitutes an official act and as such is covered by
immunity under this Constitutional Framework.468
As one can notice, the Chamber has power of judicial review and interpretation only in
relation to the Provisional Institutions. Nothing in the Framework suggests that the Chamber can
decide on the scope of the SRSG competence or resolve controversies regarding the competency
of the SRSG and the Provisional Institutions. At the same time, the Framework contains
sufficient grounds to suggest that the SRSG has authority to resolve such disputes. According to
the Framework, the SRSG oversees the Provisional Institutions and can take measures if the
actions of the Institutions are inconsistent with SCR 1244 or the Framework. Definition of

467 See, discussion in Chapter HI, section B(l).
468 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 9.4.11.
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consistency with the Framework presupposes the power to interpret the Framework’s
provisions, including those relating to the power of self-government and the SRSG.
Another question is whether the authority of the SRSG goes as far as judging on the
compatibility of the Chamber’s action with the Framework. Such a case may, for example,
include a situation in which the Chamber has allegedly exceeded the limits of its constitutional
jurisdiction.

Interim conclusion
In less than a year, the UNMIK managed to resurrect the Kosovo judiciary. The re
establishment of the judiciary is itself a significant achievement. However, the judiciary will
advance the long-term goals of peace-building only if it provides fair and impartial hearings and
an equal protection for all minority and majority members.
The development of the judiciary was achieved through several stages starting from the
limited functions of the Emergency Judicial System to prospective constitutional adjudication.
At each stage the international administration sought to tailor the transparent and objective
process for the selection of judicial personnel. The purpose of such a process is to guarantee the
legitimacy of the re-established organs and develop the credibility of the system with the
population. (Unfortunately, the intention of creating a multi-ethnic judiciary have not been fully
reached in practice.) The UNMIK also gradually created preconditions to allow the court system
to function at full capacity, that is, to provide not only civil and criminal, but also constitutional
adjudication. The adoption of the Constitutional Framework served a serious step in the
expansion of the courts’ role to the area of constitutional adjudication - a field crucially
important for the development of individual and collective rights and clarifying checks and
balances within the self-government. The expansion of the role of the judiciary to the area of
constitutional adjudication is an important precondition for a fuller role of the courts on
consociational government. When courts exercise only criminal adjudication, the inclusiveness
is provided mainly through the composition and fair application of law to all defendants.
Constitutional adjudication provides the policy protection for whole communities.
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C. Law and Its Application in Kosovo
The structure and the composition of the courts is one factor which influences
people’s perceptions about the justice system and their expectations of such system. Another,
even more important, factor is law and its actual application by the courts. Because the major
focus of the court proceedings in Kosovo is the trial of criminal cases, I will concentrate on
legal guarantees for criminal defendants. In particular, I will look at the three most important
rights of the detained and accused - the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention, the
right to defense counsel and the right to a fair trial.

1. General characteristic of the applicable law
SCR 1244 does not expressly address the issue of the law applicable in Kosovo, but it
confers on the international administration all the legislative and executive authority in the
Province.469 The provisions of the Resolution were further spelled out in the Report of the
UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo. The Report
stipulated for the precedence of human rights standards and regulations of the SRSG over the
laws of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia. The UNMIK respects the laws of the FRY and
of the Republic of Serbia “insofar as they do not conflict with internationally recognized
human rights standards or with regulations issued by the SRSG.”470 The SRSG may “change,
repeal, or suspend existing laws to the extent necessary for the carrying out of his functions,
or where existing laws are incompatible with the mandate, aims and purposes of the interim
civil administration.”471
After the deployment, one of the first steps of the international administration was to
define what law was applicable in Kosovo. On 25 July 1999 the SRSG issued Regulation
1999/1, which provided that the law applicable in Kosovo will be “laws applicable in the
territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999” insofar as they do not contradict the
international human rights standards.472 The practical reasons for such a decision were, first,
to avoid a legal vacuum at the initial stage of the transitional administration; second, to avoid
469Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para 34.
470 Ibid., para 35.
471 ibid., para 39.
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the need for local lawyers to be introduced into entirely new legal standards which local
professionals did not know.473
As noted before, the main laws that were applied by courts during the first month of
the international administration in Kosovo were criminal laws and rules of criminal
procedure. The law applicable according to Regulation 1999/1 included the FRY Criminal
Code, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Criminal Code, and the Socialist
Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Criminal Code. The Kosovo judges and prosecutors willingly
conducted proceedings under the FRY Criminal Code and the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia Criminal Code, which were both in force before Kosovo was deprived its
autonomous status.474 The Socialist Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Criminal Code, which
replaced the Kosovo Penal Code (KPC) after Kosovo became a part of Serbia, was regarded
by Kosovar judges and prosecutors as “Serbian” discriminatory law and was associated with
the Milosevic regime.475

Consequently, many of them refused to apply the Socialist

Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Criminal Code and applied the KPC instead.476 This situation is
a very vivid illustration of the influence of psychological factors on professional behaviour.
Interestingly, the KPC and the Serbian Code are similar in many respects,477 but their value
for the judiciary is measured not by the content, but by their symbolic connection to the
“statehood” of Kosovo.
The unsanctioned application of the KPC had a negative impact on the legality of
proceedings and respect for the rule of law.

In December 1999, the SRSG promulgated

Regulation 1999/24478 (later amended by Regulation 2000/59), which repealed Regulation
1999/1 and reinstated the laws applicable during the time of the Socialist Autonomous
Province of Kosovo.
Currently the law in Kosovo is comprised of the following sources:

472 Regulation on the Authority o f Interim Administration in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/1999/1, online:
UN Homepage http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/Dages/regulations/regl.html (date accessed: 19 May
2001).
473 Strohmeyer, supra note 406 at 58.
474 Criminal Justice System, supra note 430.
475Ibid.
476 Ibid.
477Ibid.
478 Regulation on the Law Applicable in Kosovo, UNMK/REG/1999/24, online: UN Homepage
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg24.html (date accessed: 20 April 2001).
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-

regulations promulgated by the SRSG;

-

the law in force in Kosovo on March 22 1989;

- the law on force in Kosovo between March 22, 1989 and June 10, 1999 (the date
when Regulation 1999/24 is deemed to enter into force); if a subject matter is not
covered by UNMIK Regulation, or the law in force on 22 March 1989, but is
covered by the law in force after 22 March 1989, courts can apply that law given
that it is not discriminatory and complies with the international human rights
standards;
-

international human rights standards.479

All persons undertaking public duties and holding public offices in Kosovo are bound
by international human rights standards that are reflected in the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against; the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child.480
Regulation 1999/24 sets out only basic guidelines about applicable law, leaving
several points unclear. First, it does not answer the question whether the UNMIK Regulation
or law in force in Kosovo take precedence over one another if they both regulate the same
matter and both are consistent with human rights standards. Second, the Regulation does not
specifically spell out the laws or identify the elements, which are inconsistent with human
rights standards 481 Rather, it places the burden of interpretation on local lawyers who are
usually unfamiliar with human rights law.482 Human rights law has never been applied in
Kosovo before. The use of the case law, which serves as a guideline for the practical
application of human rights standards, is unknown. The Supreme Court of Kosovo have not
yet assumed powers under the Constitutional Framework, which would allow it to provide

479 Ibid., s. 1-3.
480 ibid., s. 1 (3).
481 Strohmeyer, supra note 406 at 59.
482 Ibid.
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guidance about the applicability of constitutional standards in Kosovo. These ambiguities
impede the ability of the Kosovo courts to apply laws effectively.

2. Guarantees of the ECHR and the ICCPR
Criminal matters were and are the major concern for the Kosovo courts. In this
respect, particular attention should be drawn to the human rights standards in relation to trials
and detention. Among the conventions applicable in Kosovo, the ECHR and the ICCPR
contain the most comprehensive list of guarantees for fair criminal procedures. The relevant
international standards are spelled out in Articles 9, 10, 14 of the ICCPR and Articles 5,6 of
the ECHR. The right to challenge the lawfulness of detention, the right to defense counsel,
and the right to fair trial are the core guarantees for fairness and non-arbitrariness of the
criminal proceedings. Let us briefly review these guarantees and their enforcement.
As I pointed out before, I do not seek to analyze the applicable law in great detail.
Rather, I use the content of the regulation and instances of their misapplication to highlight
the areas of concern in the development of a legal framework for Kosovo and the treatment
of minorities.

a. Right to challenge lawfulness o f detention
The ICCPR, the ECHR and the Yugoslav domestic law contain special guarantees
against arbitrary detention. According to Article 9(1) of the ICCPR and Article 5(1) of the
ECHR everyone has a right to liberty and security. No one can be deprived of his liberty
except on the grounds and according to procedures established by law.483 Further, both
Conventions provide for the right of detained persons to challenge the lawfulness of their
detention.484 The right to review the ordered detention is a limitation on state authorities to
ensure that detention is absolutely necessary for effective exercise of the criminal

483 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.171, Can.
T.S. 1976 No.47, 6 I.L.M. 368, art. 9(1) (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19
May 1976) [hereinafter I.C.C.P.R.].
484Ibid., art. 9(3).
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proceedings, that trial takes place within a reasonable time and the investigation is conducted
with expedition.485
The FRY Code of Criminal Procedure provides that within 24 hours of detention, a
judge must deliver a decision to a detainee whether he is to be held in custody. In
extraordinary circumstances a detainee may be kept for 72 hours before a judicial review.
According to Article 182 (1) of the FRY Law on Criminal Procedure (LCP), pre-trial custody
may be ordered as a special measure to guarantee the presence of a defendant and the
successful exercise of the proceedings. In particular, under Article 197 of the FRY Code of
Criminal Procedure (CCP), a judge can order a one-month pre-trial detention. Further, a
panel of judges may extend detention to a maximum of 2 months.486 In proceedings where a
defendant is charged with a crime carrying a sentence of more than five years of
imprisonment, the Supreme Court of Kosovo may extend pre-trial custody for up to three
months. Thus, according to Article 197, the maximum period of pre-trial detention will be 6
months.487
UNMIK Regulation 1999/26 allows further extension of pre-trial detention. On
recommendation of an investigating judge or prosecutor, the Ad Hoc Court of Final Appeal
can extend pretrial custody by three months, with a subsequent extension of no more than
three months.488 Thus, if extensions under both Article 197 of the FRY CCP and under
Regulation 1999/26 are applied, a person may spend in total one year in pre-trial detention.
According to the findings of the OSCE Legal Monitoring Section, orders to release
suspects or to hold them in custody are often motivated by ethnic considerations.489 The
biased application of law is most frequently targeted at Kosovo Serbs. On many occasions
Kosovo Serbs were treated in a stricter way than Kosovo Albanians. For example, several
Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs were suspected of involvement in the murder of a
Kosovo Albanian. Pending investigation, Kosovo Serbs were detained, while all Albanians
485 Neumeister v. Austria (1979-80), online: European Court of Human Rights Homepage <
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=0&Action=Html&X=1014221939&Notice=0&
Noticemode=&RelatedMode=Q > (date accessed: 3 May 2001).
486 Criminal Justice System, supra note 430.
487 Ibid.
488 Ibid.
489 The Treatment o f Minorities by the Judicial System, OSCE Report, August 1999 - March 2000,
online: OSCE Homepage < http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/ > (date accessed:
23 June 2001).
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were released.490 Given the fact that at that time no fact-finding had been carried out and all
participants were equally under suspicion, there was no justifiable reason to release Kosovo
Albanians and detain only Kosovo Serbs. This gives rise to the conclusion that the detention
was ethnically motivated.
Other cases demonstrate that Kosovo Serbs were detained even when there was
insufficient evidence of their involvement491 while no detention of Kosovo Albanians was
ordered notwithstanding compelling evidence of their involvement in crime.492
Because pre-trial detention may often become a tool of ethnic persecution, it is
particularly important that detainees have a right to challenge the lawfulness of detention.
While Article 197 spells out the right of a detained for review at each instance of the custody
extension, Regulation 1999/26 does not stipulate such a right. It can, thus, be asserted that
habeas corpus procedures will not be available to detainees whose custody was extended
under the Regulation. The question is whether Regulation 1999/26, which fails to provide a
right to challenge the lawfulness of detention, should be regarded as unlawful or whether the
standards of the ICCPR and the ECHR apply regardless of the wording of the Regulation.
The O M K Legal Monitoring Section has dedicated two reports to the analysis of Regulation
1999/26 and its application. The Section declared this Regulation to be unlawful and
recommended its amendment.493 Some Kosovo courts adopted another approach. For
example, the Gnjilane District Court established that the ECHR gives courts authority to hear
the challenges of pre-trial detention.494
Adoption of Regulation 1999/26 is an interesting example of the international
administration trying to balance the demands of an emergency situation and legality of court
proceedings. On the one hand, pre-trial detentions may be necessary for quicker restoration
of law and order. The few courts of the Emergency Judicial System would have not been able
to cope with hearing numerous challenges on detention. Thus, from a practical point of view,
490 Criminal Justice System, supra note 430.
491 In one of the cases neither of the witnesses was able to identify the suspect (Kosovo Serb) as a
man who they saw committing a crime. Nevertheless, he was put in custody. The Treatment o f
Minorities by the Judicial System, supra note 489.
492 According to the OSCE Report, compelling evidence was presented to a judge concerning a
Kosovo Albanian suspected in kidnapping two Kosovo Serb teachers, but the judge found no reason
to hold the suspect in custody. Ibid.
493 Criminal Justice System, supra note 430.
"'ib id .
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the reason for introducing pre-trial detention without habeas corpus procedures is understood.
At the same time, these practical considerations cannot justify derogation from human rights
standards.
The indirect impact of the insufficient enforcement of the right to challenge the
lawfulness of detention, first of all, will result in disbelief of the population in the fairness of
the judicial system. For many minorities, this will be one of the many instances of
discrimination that contributes to the general sense of instability and lack of protection and
will defeat the objective of inclusive government.

b.

The right to defense counsel

Among the minimum standards for treatment of suspects and detainees, the ICCPR
and the ECHR stipulate for a right to legal assistance.495 According to the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights, states are under a positive obligation to provide effective
legal assistance.496 This assistance has to be qualified and experienced.497 Adequate time and
facilities have to be provided for the preparation of a defense.498
The OMIK legal monitors have revealed that in practice these guarantees are not
observed properly. Having interviewed 198 detainees in five Kosovo regions, the monitors
found out that none of them had access to defense counsel while in detention before the first
detention hearing.499 For Kosovo Serb detainees the problem is exacerbated by several
factors. There are few Serb lawyers available to take court appointments.500 Courts also often
fail to appoint Serb lawyers even if they are available. In some Kosovo regions, the security
situation does not allow Serb lawyers to travel to detention facilities to meet their clients.501

495 1.C.C.P.R., supra note 483, art. 14(3).
496 Artico v. Italy (1974), online: European Court of Human Rights Homepage <
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=0&Action=Html&X=1014222249&Notice=0&
Noticemode=&RelatedMode=Q > (date accessed: 3 August 2001).
497 Biondo v. Italy (1983), online: European Court of Human Rights Homepage (date accessed: 3
August 2001).
498 Can v. Austria (1981), online: European Court of Human Rights Homepage <
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=0&Action=Html&X=1014222642&Notice=0&
Noticemode=&RelatedMode=0 > (date accessed: 3 August 2001).
499 Access to Effective Counsel, LSMS Report No.7, May 2000, at 6, online: OSCE Homepage <
httD://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/iustice/ > (date accessed: 23 June 2001).
m Ibid.
501 The Treatment o f Minorities by the Judicial System, supra note 489.
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In respect to available Albanian lawyers, there is significant criticism about their ability to do
their best as defense counsels for Kosovo Serbs.
Many detainees complained about the ineffectiveness of defense counsels. In
particular, detainees reported that they were rarely visited by counsel during the investigation
stage; that counsel’s visits were 10-15 minutes long, which does not allow detailed
discussion of their case; and that they were not kept informed about the course of the
investigative proceedings, etc.502 The confidentiality of the communications between
detainee and a defense counsel was often violated. 23 out of 35 detainees in Gnjilane
reported that their meetings with defense counsel took place in the presence of a detention
facility representative.503
There can be many more examples of poor observation of a right to legal assistance.
The main point here is that necessary guarantees are incorporated into the applicable law, but
courts and the international administration are not doing enough to provide their appropriate
enforcement.

c. The right to fa ir trial
Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR guarantee a right to a fair trial.
According to Article 6 of the ECHR, “everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”504 The right
to a fair trial comprises two sides - fairness of procedure and impartiality and independence
of a tribunal.
In a post-conflict society, concerns about the impartiality of courts are raised by a
number of factors. First, being subject to threats and intimidation,505 judges and prosecutors
may often ignore the interests of justice in order to protect their own well-being. Second,
many current judges and prosecutors have directly or indirectly suffered from the brutality of
the Serb regime and, thus, may seek “redress” through applying more severe measures to
Serbs. Under these circumstances the impartiality standards may arguably be violated, for
302Ibid., at 4-5.
503 Ibid., at 4.
504Conventionfo r the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 October 1950,
online: Council of Europe Homepage < http://conventions.coe.int/Treatv/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm >
(date accessed: 27 July 2001).
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example, in cases where a mono-ethnic tribunal tries a member of minority community.506
Let us look at the case of Bozur Bisevac and Miroslav Vuckovic, which involved an issue of
impartiality.507 Bisevac and Vuckovic are two Kosovo Serbs indicted for genocide. The
defense counsel applied for the exclusion of the judging panel, inter alia, on the grounds of
failure to guarantee panel’s impartiality. The defense argued that the judges could not be
impartial in the case because they all were Kosovo Albanians - members of the same ethnic
group, which the defendants have allegedly tried to destroy. The defense also stated that the
presiding judge could have been regarded as an “injured party” because his office and home
had been burned during the conflict. This case demonstrates that the composition of a court
shapes the people’s perception about that court as either likely to be biased or likely to be
more impartial.
The international administration established a special mechanism - assignment of
international judge or prosecutor and change of venue - to ensure fairness and impartiality of
proceedings.
Regulation 2000/64 allows for a change of venue of the criminal proceedings and for
an assignment of an international judge or prosecutor in a case.508 To ensure independence
and impartiality of the court, a prosecutor, an accused or a defense counsel can petition the
Department of the Judicial Affairs about the assignment of a judge or prosecutor or for a
change of venue.509 Petitions can be submitted at any time during the proceedings. On the
basis of the petition or on its own motion, the Department of Judicial Affairs submits a
recommendation to the SRSG for the assignment of international judges/prosecutors or/and
change of venue. The Regulations does not establish a time frame for the Department of the
Judicial Affairs to proceed with the petition. This creates a danger that issues will not be
resolved in timely manner.

505 See, Criminal Justice System, supra note 429 at 47.
506 Ibid.
507 Criminal Justice System, supra note 429.
508 Regulation on Assignment o f International Judges/prosecutors and/or Change o f Venue,
UNMIK/REG/2000/64,
s.1.1,
online:
UN
Homepage
<
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/repulations/reg064.html > (date accessed: 28 July 2001).
509 It is not clear what criteria should be used to decide when the fair administration of justice needs
the assignment of an international judge or prosecutor. Trial records are not a reliable source of
information about the fairness of procedure because trial records reportedly lack accuracy and
precision. - Criminal Justice System, supra note 429.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

165
The SRSG has authority to approve or reject the recommendation. The SRSG assigns
an international investigating judge and/or a panel composed of at least two international
judges, one of which should be presiding judge.510 This way a trial is conducted by a majority
international panel that provides a sufficient guarantee for the proper administration of
justice. The greater involvement of international judges and prosecutors in adjudication is a
significant development to prevent actual or perceived bias against Kosovo ethnic minorities,
especially Serbs. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that using international judges
and prosecutors is not a consociational technique and it even to certain extent increases the
dependence of the Kosovo judiciary on the outside interference. Nevertheless, I think that
such a measure is justifiable at least during the first years of the Kosovo reconstruction.

Interim conclusion
The re-establishment of the judiciary and its supportive structures falls within the
necessary task of institution-building. As an integral element of peace-building, the re
establishment of the judiciary and the delimitation of the applicable law are directly subject
to the constraints and requirements of the peace-building concept. The concept, however,
does not provide any specific guidelines for the establishment of the judiciary. In this respect,
the central test of the “correctness” of the international activities for the administration of the
judiciary is whether the judicial reforms advance the two main goals of peace-building transformation and sustainability. If courts come to be viewed as legitimate fora for the
resolution of disputes, more people may prefer to resort to adjudication instead of nursing an
ethnic grievance or resolving a matter through violence.511
The analysis of the Kosovo judiciary can be conducted in two dimensions: 1) the
vertical dimension of the administration of justice - a test of compliance with the
characteristics of peace-building; 2) the horizontal dimension of the structure and operation
of the judiciary itself - a test to what extent the principles of consociationalism are
incorporated in the judicial structure.

510 Regulation on Assignment o f International Judges/prosecutors and/or Change o f Venue, supra
note 508, s. 2.1.
511 Jennifer Widener, “Courts and Democracy in Post-conflict Transitions: A Social Scientist’s
Perspective on the African Case” (2001) 98 AJIL 64 at 70.
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1) All key appointments and decisions in regard to the administration of justice
continue to emanate from the SRSG. He appoints judges and prosecutors, decides on the
change of venue and assignment of international judges or prosecutors, and exercises
authority over law enforcement and correctional services. Moreover, the authority to “ensure
full implementation of the UNSCR 1244”5*2 gives him almost unlimited power over any
branch of the local government. The SRSG cannot interfere with the very exercise of justice,
but he can influence the work of the courts through defining applicable law and making
appointments. Generally speaking, this influence of the SRSG is unavoidable because all the
power of the UNMIK is concentrated in his hands. Theoretically, the SRSG does not
prejudice the work of the courts through his indirect influence and does not break the limits
of the peace-building concept unless he sets up standards of treatment that promote ethnic
discrimination.
From the practical perspective, the approach of the UNMIK to the administration of
judicial affairs reveals a somewhat contradictory trend. On the one hand, the international
administration tends to retain control over the administration of the judicial system. On the
other hand, the international administration does not use its power effectively enough. For
example, the UNMIK Regulations about applicable law and procedure often lack clarity. The
UNMIK is not able to ensure that law enforcement organs fully comply with human rights
standards.
2) The horizontal level - the structure and functioning of the judiciary itself. The
functioning of the courts has far reaching direct and indirect impact on the state of affairs in
the Province. First, through the protection that the courts provide to individuals. Second,
through their institutional structure (first of all, multi-ethnic composition) and equal
treatment of defendants of different ethnicity, courts can indirectly contribute to the
inclusiveness of minorities in social and political life. This, in turn, could facilitate the
meaningful participation of minorities in government and social life and lead to the
mitigation of ethnic tension and majority rule.
Three major factors shape the contribution of the courts to minority inclusiveness: I)
the institutional structure —whether minorities are included in the system, whether reasonable
effort is made to facilitate their inclusion; and how minorities are treated within the system;
512 Security Council Regulation 1244, supra note 106.
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2) the applicable law - whether there are special mechanisms that protect defendants from
judicial bias based on ethnicity; 3) and how courts apply the law — whether courts are
actually biased in the application of general standards of treatment to defendants of various
ethnic affiliation.
These three factors influenced the protection of minorities in Kosovo in the
following way:
1)

The institutional structure. From the very start of its activities in Kosovo, the

UNMIK emphasized its commitment to establishing multi-ethnic judiciary. Both during the
Emergency Judicial System and Regular Judicial System, the UNMIK bodies made
reasonable efforts to facilitate inclusion of minorities in the system and were conscious of
ethnic factor during selection and appointment of judges and prosecutors. The Commissions
on Judicial Appointments invited applications from minorities and encouraged their
participation in the re-established judiciary. However, the UNMIK was not able to hold
minority judges and prosecutors in the system. Many newly appointed minority judges and
prosecutors resigned because of discrimination within the judiciary, intimidation and other
security concerns. As a result, currently the absolute majority of judges and prosecutors are
Kosovo Albanian. We have already demonstrated that this composition of the judiciary may
partially account for the perception of the judiciary as biased and ineffective. Thus, from the
point of view of the institutional structure, there are certain concerns about the ability of the
Kosovo judiciary to provide impartial trial and equal protection to representatives of all
ethnic communities.
2)

The applicable law. From a theoretical perspective, the law applicable in Kosovo

contains all the minimum guarantees for fair and equal treatment of detainees and suspects.
Special mechanisms are introduced to combat ethnic bias (e.g., the UNMIK Regulation on
assignment of international judges and prosecutors and/or change of venue). At the same
time, some regulations are not sufficiently clear and are even contradictory to human rights
standards. Their ambiguous and arbitrary nature results in additional problems in their
application.
3)

The application of the law. The OMIK Monitoring Section reported instances

when application of the law was inconsistent with human rights standards. Both the general
misapplication of law and biased treatment of minority victims and defendants took place.
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The most widely spread discrimination is observed in relation to Kosovo Serbs. The
discrimination takes place in several forms. For example, officials are reluctant to punish
Albanians for crimes committed against Serbs; Serbs receive more severe punishment that
Albanians for the same offences.513
Currently, neither the composition of the courts nor the treatment of defendants by
courts can be regarded as contributing to the protection and inclusiveness of minorities. The
techniques applied to the re-establishment of the judiciary were consociational in character,
but their implementation fell short providing a consociational result. Rather, the practice of
the courts contributes to the general picture of discrimination of minorities. The judicial bias
and lack of protection facilitate dissatisfaction of minorities with their position and are likely
to intensify their political struggle for inclusion or even raise claims for separation.

D. Police
The restoration and maintenance of order is one of the necessary tasks of international
missions in post-conflict zones. Immediately after the deployment, control over the security
situation is usually carried out by the military as well as the police. As a rule, the
normalization of the security situation takes several stages (See picture 3). At the very
beginning, military troops intervene to stop hostilities and separate the warring parties. Once
violence is brought under control, the involvement of the military decreases and security
responsibilities are gradually transferred to the police force. The transfer from the military
monitoring to civil policing can take several years, especially if an international mission has
to re-establish the police structure.

st3 Assessment o f the Situation on Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, OSCE Report, October 2000, at 12,
online: OSCE Homepage < http://www.osce.org/kosovoAdocuments/ieports/minorities/ > (date
accessed: 12 May 2001).
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Picture 4. Stages of security building in post-conflict societies. Source: Tom
Woodhouse & Oliver Ramsbotham, Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution (Portland, OR :
Frank Cass Publishers, 2000) at 83.

Providing law enforcement in post-conflict societies is a relatively new task for
international administrations. Traditionally, peacekeepers relied on existing police structures.
However, in Kosovo, the Yugoslav and Serb police forces were withdrawn and no law
enforcement structure existed at the time of the UNMIK and KFOR deployment. The
international administration had to assume responsibility, not only for a short-term task of
providing public security, but also for the establishing local police structures.

1. Police structure
The police and security function in Kosovo is exercised by several institutions.
According to SCR 1244, both the international security presence (KFOR) and the
international civil presence (UNMIK) have responsibilities regarding public safety, law and
order. Following the cessation of the NATO bombing the KFOR, as a military force, took the
lead in the security area. According to SCR 1244, it was responsible for ensuring withdrawal
of the FRY military and police; for the demilitarization of the KLA; for the establishment of
a secure environment for returning refugees; for ensuring public safety until the civil
presence would be able to take responsibility for this task; for conducting border monitoring,
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etc.514 After minimal order was established, the UNMIK could take over the responsibility
for the policing of the Province.
The UNMIK responsibilities include maintaining civil law and order and establishing
local police forces.515 In particular, the UNMIK Police carries out investigations, undertakes
street patrols, maintains public order, and polices borders. In addition to that, it provides
security escorts for money transfers, public transport, courts, judicial personnel, members of
minority communities. It is primarily responsible for criminal investigations.516
The KFOR and the UNMIK Police are composed from the international contingent,
which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the Province.
However, as an integral part of the process of institution-building, the UNMIK also initiated
the formation of locally composed security structures. In addition to the UNMIK Police, the
international administration established two Kosovar structures - the Kosovo Police Service
(KPS) and the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) - that assist the maintenance of security and
order in the province.
The KPS is a special sub-section of the UNMIK Police. According to the
Constitutional Framework, the KPS functions under the authority of the SRSG.517 The main
objectives of the Service is crime prevention, public protection and safety maintenance. With
time, the KPS is supposed to assume additional responsibilities in the area of law and order.
The recruitment to the KPS is exercised with consideration of demographic criterion.
The policy is to include 15% representation by minorities in Kosovo Police Service. Women
constitute about 25% of the recruites.518 The Kosovo Police Service also provides
employment for qualified members of the KLA who constitute about 50-55% of the
recruites.

519

Another structure that provides employment for the former KLA members is the
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). According to the terms of the KLA demilitarization, the
KLA was transformed into a civilian agency charged with providing emergency response and
suSecurity Council Resolution 1244, supra note 106, para 9
515Ibid., para 11(1).
516 UNMIK Police, online: UN Homepage http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/inmikl2.html (date
accessed: 15 June 2001).
517 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, ch.6.
518 Ibid.
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assistance in reconstruction services in Kosovo.520 The KPC operate under the authority of
the SRSG. Its day-to-day operation is directed by KFOR according to the guidelines of the
SRSG.521 The SRSG has final authority over the selection (10% of the members have to be
from minority communities), appointment and dismissal of the members of Kosovo Corps.
The KPC does not have any role in law enforcement or maintenance of law and
order.522 It provides disaster response, performs search and rescue, demining and assists the
reconstruction of public utilities and other social projects.523 Only a limited number (200) of
the KPC is authorized to carry weapons.
According to the OSCE Report of June-July 2000, almost every Kosovo municipality
hosted brigades of the KFOR, the UNMIK Police, the KPC and the KPS. (see, Table 7).

Table 7. International police and military presence in Kosovo
Municipalities
Municipality

Kosovo Police
Service (KPS)

UN

Civi Kosovo

Police

KFOR

Protection
Corps (KPC)

Degan/De• ani

Ferizaj/UroSevac

8

Kosovo 21 international

Kosovo

1350 Italian

Albanians

Albanians

169

128

Kosovo 90 international

Albanian

Kosovo 5600

Albanian,

USA/Greek

Askali
Fushe

12

Kosove/Kosovo

Albanians

Polje

Serbs

Gjakove/• akovica

8

Kosovo 60 international
&

Kosovo 21 international

Albanians

200 Norwegian

Kosovo

1350 Italians

Albanians

520 Regulation on the Establishment o f Kosovo Corps, UNMIK/REG/1999/8, s. 1.2, online: UN
Homepage http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg8.html (date accessed: 30 June
2001).
521 Ibid., s.3.
322 Ibid.
523 Ibid., s.l.
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Gjilan/Gnjilane

167

Kosovo 75 international

Serbs

&

416

Kosovo 3500 USA

Albanian

Albanians
Gllogovc/Glogova

54

c

Albanians

Albanian

Istog/lstok

60

52 Kosovo Alb.

Kosovo

31 international

Kosovo 35 International

112

Kosovo 40 Norwegian

600 Spanish

Albanians
Kline/Klina

Kaqanik/Ka• anik

9

Kosovo

12 international

Kosovo 300 Portuguese

Albanian

Albanian

52

47

Kosovo 34 international

Albanian
Leposavi• / Leposa

52

Kosovo

Albanian

1 Kosovo Serb

17 international

200
intemaitonal
740 Belgian

viq
Lipjan/Lipljan

47

Kosovo 45 international

Serbs(9)

&

183

Kosovo

Albanian

Albanians (38)
Malisheve/MaliSev

45

o

Albanian

Mitrovice/Mitrovic

121

a
Novoberde/Novo

830
Finnish/Canadi
an

Kosovo

25 mixed

54

Kosovo

500 Russian

Albanian

Kosovo

164

Kosovo

Albanian

international

Albanian

1 Kosovo Serb

4 international

2638

40 US

Brdo
Obiliq/Obili•

5

Kosovo 40 international

Serbs,

5

52

Kosovo Norwegian

Albanian

Kosovo
Albanians
Peje/Pe•

255 Kosovar

66 international

574

Kosovo 5

Albanian,
Bosniac,
Egyptian
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Podujeve/Podujevo

Prishtine/PriStina

83

Kosovo 45 international

120

Kosovo

Albanian

Albanian

578

800

Kosovo 661

Albanian

international

600 UK

mostly 600 British

Kosovo
Albanian

Prizren/Prizren

62 mixed

106

51

international

Albanian

Kosovo 2

500

German/Turkis
h

Rahovec/Orahovac

2

Kosovo 42 international

Albanian
Shtime/Stimlje

26

52

Kosovo German/Dutch

Albanian

Kosovo 6 international

134 Finnish

Albanian
Strpce/Shterpce

11

Kosovo

11 international

international

Serbs
Suhareke/Suva

90

59 international

200

450 Austrian

Reka
Viti/Vitina

2

Kosovo

25 international

USA

Albanian
Vushtrri/Vu* itm

137

Kosovo

37

Albanian
Zubin Potok/Zubin 3 Kosovo Serbs

170

Kosovo

800 French

Albanian
46 international

Danish

13 international

250 Danish

Potok
Zve* an/Zveqan

Source: Municipality Profiles, online: OSCE Homepage

The authority over the organs providing order and security in the Province continues
to be concentrated in the hands of the international presence: from the Table above we can
see that each municipality has a heavy military presence (KFOR) and a considerable number
of the UNMIK Police. The two Kosovar structures - the KPS and the KPC - are also placed
under the authority of the international administration. Moreover, all the security duties are
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entrusted primarily with the international contingent of the UNMIK Police or of the KFOR.
The locally composed KPS and KPC are viewed only as assisting the international forces.
The UNMIK seem to be reluctant to give more responsibilities to the local structures because
of a fear that they will either fail to provide effective protection to the population or use their
authority as a means of repression against minority members. In this respect, the security area
differs from the judicial and representative branches of government, where the UNMIK
initiated gradual transfer of responsibility to local organs.

2. Police powers
The KFOR and the UNMIK Police were entrusted with a wide range of complex
security tasks. To achieve these objectives, the police and military in Kosovo are granted
necessary coercive authority. Among their main powers are the authority to arrest and to
detain and to exclude a person from a certain territory.

a.

Arrest and detention

Even after the two years of international presence in Kosovo, the KFOR remains
active in exercising detentions and arrests. The KFOR broadly interprets its powers under
paragraph 9(d) of SCR 1244.524 In conversations with the representatives of the Amnesty
International, the KFOR officials argued that they have authority to hold persons in detention
indefinitely.325 They also claimed power to continue detention notwithstanding court order to
release a person.526 The OSCE Legal Monitoring Section reported that the KFOR, in fact,
often exercised those extraordinary powers. In many instances the KFOR continues to detain
individuals subject to criminal investigation, notwithstanding court orders to release them.527
For example, the suspects Shaban Beqiri and Xhemal Sejdiu were ordered to be released by a
judge. However, they were held in detention by an order of the KFOR Commander.528

524The paragraph reads that the international security presence is responsible, inter alia, for “ensuring
public safety and order undl the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task.”
25 Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Amnesty International Report, March 2000, online:
Amnesty International Homepage http://www.web.amnestv.org/ai.nsf/index/EUR70013200Q (date
accessed: 28 April 2001).
326 Ibid.
527 Criminal Justice System in Kosovo, supra note 429.
528 Ibid.
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The instances of such detentions raise two concerns. The detention contrary to a court
order for release is a violation of the prohibition on arbitrary detention. A person can be
deprived of his liberty only on grounds and according to procedure established by law.529
Although the KFOR was granted authority under SCR 1244 to provide security in the
Province, it was not given power to violate human rights standards. When the KFOR
continues to detain a person notwithstanding the court order to release, the KFOR not only
violates the law, but also undermines the authority of the judiciary. Although the SRSG
enjoys ample powers in the Province, he cannot exercise its authority over the military
presence, KFOR, and consequently cannot control the action of the KFOR. The remedy
against the KFOR actions, which contradict human rights standards would be to allow
challenging their actions in Kosovo courts.530
The KFOR as a military force continues to utilize techniques more appropriate for
cases of civil insurrection rather than for the exercise of policing. For example, in regard to
the KFOR detection of 49 people in Mitrovica in February 2000, a representative from the
UNMIK police told the Amnesty International that “[f]rom a military point of view there
may have been a good reason to detain these persons, however, from a police point of view
there was no probable cause.”531 This means that the KFOR still heavily relies on rigid
means of controlling public order, which may be considered excessive and disproportionate.
b. Exclusion o f a person
Another recent development of the powers of the KFOR and the UNMIK Police is the
authority to issue exclusion orders.532 In the interests of security, the law enforcement
authorities can issue an order requiring a person to leave or to stay away from a particular
area if there are grounds to suspect that he has participated in preparation of acts that threaten

529 1.C.C.P.R., supra note 483.
330 Currently, the KFOR personnel is immune any civil or criminal suit in the courts of Kosovo. See,
Regulation on the Status. Privileges and Immunities o f KFPR and (JNMIK and Their Personnel in
Kosovo,
UNMDC/REG/2000/057,
online:
UN
Homepage
<
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg047.html > (date accessed: 25 August 2001).
531 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Amnesty International, supra note 525.
332 Authorized by Regulation On the Exclusion o f Persons fo r a Limited Duration to Secure Public
Peace, Safety and Order, UNMIK Regulation 2000/62, online: UN Homepage <
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg062.html > (date accessed: 17 July 2001).
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peace within or outside the Province.533 The exclusion is authorized for up to 30 days. A
violation of an order is punished by 2 month of imprisonment.534
On the one hand, the Regulation constitutes an extension of the powers of the police
and military. On the other, it introduces exclusion as a “softer” alternative to arrest or
detention. Most importantly, the Regulation expressly provides for the right to challenge the
lawfulness of an exclusion order before an international judge. A person to whom an
exclusion order was issued can lodge a petition for a review. A petition is Hied with the
district court of a region from which a person was excluded.535
The petition is examined by an international judge. An international judge has to
provide an opportunity of an adversarial debate between a person who is subject to the order
or his representative and a prosecutor or representative of the authority that issued the
order.536 In deciding the issue, a judge has to consider three factors: whether there are
grounds to suspect that a person was involved in the commission or preparation of acts that
threaten peace within or outside the Province; the person’s link with the territory from which
he is prohibited; and whether an order may subject him to persecution within the meaning of
the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.537

Interim conclusions
The institution of the police is entrusted with an important task of providing law and
order. The role of the police in a post-conflict society can be observed in at least two ways:
1) maintenance of law and order; 2) contribution to minority inclusiveness through both a
multiethnic composition and the guarantee of equal treatment for everybody regardless of
ethnic affiliation.

533 Ibid., s.2.1.
534Regulation On the Exclusion o f Personsfor a Limited Duration to Secure Public Peace, Safety and
Order, supra note 532.
535 Ibid., s. 3.1.
536 This requirement strictly conforms with the requirements of habeas corpus proceedings set up by
the case law of the European court of Human Rights: in Toth v Austria the European Court of Human
Rights held that such hearings have to be adversarial and that authorities must ensure the detainee
equality of arms.
33 On the Exclusion o f Persons fo r a Limited Duration to Secure Public Peace, Safety and Order,
supra note 532, s.3.3
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1) The way in which law and order are exercised will to a great extent define the
stability in the country and influence both the confidence of the public in the quality of peace
in the post-conflict zone and the commitment of the government to respect it.538 In this
respect, the powers of the KFOR and the UNMIK Police may be somewhat problematic. On
the one hand, they may be recognized as necessary for providing law and order and are
generally consistent with the tasks of peace-building. On the other, some powers, like the
KFOR “holds,” may now seem excessive given the relative stabilization of the situation in
the Province. Again, the peace-building concept does not provide any guideline in this
respect. Thus, the only test of the consistency of the measures with the requirements of
peace-building would be whether the measures advance the goals of the UNMIK.
Another question about the international policing of Kosovo is why the KFOR still
continues its active role in law enforcement. In Chapter I I I concluded that the KFOR played
a role of “ground preparator” for the UMNDC. In my view, after two years of international
presence, this task may be considered complete. Moreover, according to SCR 1244 the
KFOR has already transferred the tasks of maintaining law and order to the UNMIK Police.
The continuation of the active role of the KFOR seems to be inconsistent with the pattern
prescribed in the UN documents on peace-building. The heavy KFOR presence in the
Province raises some concerns about what might be the underpinning motives for the
continuation of the KFOR deployment. Is it really necessary for the maintenance of stability
in the Province or is it a way to maintain and strengthen the Western influence over Kosovo?
2) The composition of the police force and its ability to provide equal treatment to
everybody regardless of his/her ethnic affiliation also contributes to minority inclusiveness.
The analysis of the situation in Kosovo does not confirm that the police are able to
sufficiently meet either of these two objectives. Even if the activities for the maintenance of
law and order are to be considered sufficiently effective, they are carried out primarily by the
international contingent. There is no basis for judging how effective the locally composed
structures would be and how their multiethnic composition will help them to be fair and
impartial.

338 Rama Mani, “Contextualizing Police Reform: Security, the Rule of Law and Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding” in Peacebuilding and Police Reform at 10.
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E. Conclusions to the Chapter
The courts and the police are integral elements of the institutional structure for
attainment of the rule of law. As parts of this structure and as elements of the broader system
of government, the judiciary and the police must also be built with consideration for the
principles of consociationalism. The contribution of the judiciary and the police to more
inclusive government is of a different nature from the inclusiveness provided through
representative organs. The legislative branch allows for the direct influence of minority
representatives on the formation of the general legal framework for protection of minorities.
In contrast, the courts and the police contribute to the inclusiveness in a more indirect way.
They work at a community and individual level. The police and the courts are in a certain
sense the agents of the representative branch, which put into life the directions of the
legislature regarding minority policies.
In the process of adjudication a judge relies on his expertise as a professional and as
an individual. The subjectivity of a judge should be controlled and limited by the principles
of law, professional ethics and procedural rules. Several examples from court practice in
Kosovo (see, e.g., the application of the KPC) show that the judiciary does not see itself
controlled by legal or professional principles. Neither are there sufficient outside control
mechanisms to preclude ethnic bias and other forms of unprofessional conduct. One of the
remedies for fairer trials is a possibility to change a venue and/or require assignment of an
international judge or prosecutor. This mechanism is good as a short-term measure. It allows
for prevention or correction of injustice in an individual case. However, in the long run it
does not help to make the judiciary more tolerant or professionally correct. This mechanism
does not change the perception of a biased judge about defendants of other ethnicities. Thus,
such a judge is likely to continue the exercise of partial adjudication in the future cases. One
of the factors required to change perceptions and the inner characteristics of the judicial
process is to have multi-ethnic courts, which will help to develop the interaction among
perspectives of professionals with different ethnic and educational backgrounds. Currently,
the Kosovo judiciary is not ethnically diverse. The most disturbing fact is that the highest
courts, those which have the most active policy-making role, are purely Albanian. Taking
into consideration the described instances of ethnic bias and subjectivity in adjudication, I am
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inclined to think that the recommendations of such courts will also be targeted primarily for
protection of the ethnic majority group.
Because the composition of the judiciary is important, a vital practical question is
how diverse should the judiciary be to be considered multi-ethnic? I cannot advocate
proportionality because a requirement of certain assigned quota may: first, lead to lower
quality appointments - on account of the lack of sufficient numbers of a minority qualified as
legal professionals, the requirement of proficiency may be compromised to satisfy numbers.
Second, given the small population of some minorities and the absence of a protective
mechanism like mutual veto for the legislature, proportional representation in the judiciary
will provide no more than symbolic inclusiveness.539 For the minority participation in the
judiciary to be meaningful, there should be some protective mechanism similar to the mutual
veto applied to the representative branch. Alternatively, the composition of the highest courts
should be based on proportionate representation if possible and include more than a half of
legal professionals from non-ethnic majority communities.
As can be seen, the implementation of consociationalism in the judiciary is
significantly different and perhaps more complicated than in relation to the legislature. While
the approach of the UNMIK to tailor the structure of the legislature was sufficiently creative,
the development of a consociational judiciary needs further attention.
There is a concern that the failure of the judiciary and the police to provide
inclusiveness and protection to the communities and individuals will intensify the
dissatisfaction of minorities with their position in a society and lead to their more active
struggle on the political arena and attempts to “revenge” ethnic majority members by
discriminating against them in the area where they are in minority.

539 Devlin, MacKay & Kim, supra note 407 at 835.
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Chapter V
Making Ends Meet
The discussion of the Kosovo reconstruction began with two implicit assumptions
about the relevance of theoretical models and past experience to the resolution of
contemporary conflicts. The first assumption is that each type of conflict has particular
features and trends; the knowledge of these trends assists in developing a concept of
“treatments” for conflict situations. Second, knowing the theoretically available treatments
and the result of their application in the past we can predict the effect of similar measures in a
current situation. This line of reasoning led to the idea of applying the peace-building and
the consociational model in Kosovo and was the basis for the analysis of the institutional
arrangements adopted there.
The principles for general peace-building are provided through the concept of peace
building developed in several UN documents. The peace-building concept is already serving
a practical guideline for international activities. However, there are no specific
recommendations for approaching reconstruction in an ethnically divided society. The
guidelines for the new missions in divided societies are primarily derived from the expertise
gained in past operations. In particular, the practice of some missions (e.g., in Bosnia)
demonstrates that the international community includes ethnically sensitive mechanisms in
the range of “treatments” for post-conflict societies. The consociational model that was used
for the analysis in this thesis reflects many aspects of the mechanisms actually adopted in
Kosovo and Bosnia. Thus, the chosen theoretical framework - combination of peace-building
and consociationalism - largely follows the current practice of peace opserations, but, at the
same time, introduces a broader and more comprehensive vision of international activities.
The relationship between the peace-building and the consociational concepts is
complex. The successful implementation of one concept is dependent on the implementation
of the other. Peace-building in an ethnically divided society is not likely to provide long-term
stability unless special attention is drawn to the meaningful participation of minorities in
government. Consociationalism is not likely to be adopted by the local parties unless backed
by the coercive power of an international administration. The two concepts promote and
strengthen each other’s implementation, but, at the same time, they impose restrictions on
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each other. For example, because consociationalism develops within the framework of peace
building, each activity intended to develop consociationalism has to comply not only with the
principles of consociationalism, but also with the limits of peace-building. In turn, the
political rationality of peace-building may sometimes require deviation from the
requirements of consociationalism. For instance, the idea of consociationalism requires
broader inclusion of all segments of the society in decision-making. However, the necessity
to achieve conciliatory results quickly may motivate an international administration to
negotiate only with the most influential local leaders. For example, the UNMIK negotiated
the most important decisions with the IAC, which included only the Kosovar key leaders,
rather than with the pluralistically composed KTC.
In certain respects, the relationship between peace-building and consociationalism is
somewhat unequal. Peace-building is the principal activity. It defines the aims of the
international reconstruction and serves as a general framework within which consociational
democracy is developed. Consociational democracy is, basically, one of the means for the
advancement of the goals of peace-building.
Peace-building is a hybrid of political and development activities.540 The political
aspect reveals itself at every stage and level of social reconstruction: in the motives and the
ways of establishing an international administration, its interaction with the local parties and
its operating through international organization. In Kosovo, for example, UNMIK’s political
activities took the form of negotiating political settlements among the warring parties,
creating incentives for inter-ethnic dialogue between various ethnic segments of the Kosovo
society, preparing a constitutional framework for the Province, etc.
At the initial stages of state reconstruction the peace-building concept and its first
goal - transformation - dominate. For instance, in the first months of post-conflict
rehabilitation in Kosovo all the power was concentrated in the UNMIK. The international
administration was determined to use pressure and primarily rely on its own judgement about
appropriate means (as opposed to consultation with the multiple local parties as required by
consociational approach) in order to start the stabilization and transformation of a post
conflict society. With time, the second goal of peace-building - development and
sustainability - acquires a status of priority and this is when consociationalism comes into
540Brahimi Report, supra note 6, para. 4.
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play. For example, in Kosovo consociationalism was applied in a limited way to the
temporary UNMIK-created organs and in a more sophisticated and complete manner to selfgovernment. For instance, if we admit the primary role of peace-building at the initial stages
of state reconstruction, the leading role of the SRSG at the first stages of reconstruction can
be viewed as acceptable.
Both consociationalism and peace-building seek to achieve stability and democracy in
a post-conflict society. Consociationalism seeks stability through the development of
inclusive government in which all segments of a society have an opportunity to participate in
the formation of state policies. National political institutions are designed according to four
principles - grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy - which
ensure minority participation in governing the society.
Peace-building addresses another level of political activism - interaction between an
international administration and local de jure or de facto authorities. Peace-building includes
the following elements: 1) partially based on host state’s consent; 2) seeks transformation of
a society and promotion of its sustainability; 3) requires close cooperation between peacebuilders and local parties; 4) is comprehensive in nature; 5) includes institution-building as
one of its major objectives; 6) closely connected with peacekeeping; and 7) permits
participation of international organizations in peace-building by regional arrangements
without restriction to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The first three requirements have a
direct impact on the legitimacy of a peace-building mission. The last three primarily
influence the effectiveness of a mission.
The implementation of the peace-building and the consociaitonal concept means that
institutional structures, the constitutional framework and the behaviour of political actors are
shaped and exercised according to particular mandatory principles. At the same time, it is
important that conceptual standards do not preclude the development of more efficient means
for the treatment of a conflict situation. Certain deviations from theoretical standards that
contribute to the positive effect of the reconstruction should be permitted. The threshold for
permissible deviations from the standards of the peace-building and of the consociational
concepts is different. Because peace-building is a general framework, within which other
activities, including consociationalism, are developed, the compliance with its requirements
should be stricter. For example, derogation from the first three requirements of peace
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building should not be permitted because it has serious impact on the long-term objectives of
a concrete mission as well as on the future of peace-building in general. At the same time, an
international mission should be given some discretion in deciding on the necessity of
absolute or partial compliance with the rest of the requirements. In relation to these
requirements the decision should be based on what combination of means will be the most
efficient and, at the same time, the least questionable from the point of view of the peace
building concept.
At least two significant deviations from the requirements of the peace-building
concept took place in Kosovo. The first is the leading role assumed by the Secretary-General
in the interpretation of the UNMIK’s mandate. His interpretation of Security Council
Resolution 1244 served the basis for the UNMIK structure and mandate. Basically, the
legitimacy of his interpretation has a direct impact on the legitimacy of the UNMIK. There is
no explicit basis in the peace-building concept for the authority of the SRSG to interpret the
competence of a mission beyond what is expressly provided in the resolution. Because of
arguable legitimacy of the interpretation by the SRSG, another mechanism might be needed
for the future peace-building missions.
The second instance represents a deviation from requirements that affect the efficacy
of the mission rather than its legitimacy. It is the utilization of the KFOR instead of a
peacekeeping mission as required by the peace-building concept. The utilization of a
peacekeeping mission instead of the KFOR would not likely advance the goals of peace
building and, thus, the deployment of the KFOR seems to be a necessary and beneficial
change to the UN scenario.
The peace-building concept is vague on many aspects of the international activities in
administered territories. The ambiguity of the standards creates certain problems in
determining which forms of international interference in internal decision-making are
necessary and which are excessive. For example, the peace-building concept requires the
international administration to cooperate with the local parties in the process of finding a
solution for a reconstruction of the state and society. Cooperation does not always mean
equality of parties in negotiation. The international administration has enough power and
resources to push for certain solutions and the local actors often do not have a choice but to
accept the proposed solutions. Pressure by the international administration may be a
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necessary and acceptable tool to draw local parties to negotiation and to introduce the
ethnically sensitive mechanisms. At the same time, an open-ended formulation of a peace
building concept gives room for certain usurpation of power by the international
administration, even after the local self-government is put in operation. For example, the
Kosovo Constitutional Framework gives the UNMIK wide supervisory powers over
provincial and municipal self-government. These powers are dormant and can be exercised
only for the purpose of providing full implementation of SC Resolution 1244 and ensuring
sufficient protection of minority interests. Such a formulation, basically, imposes little
restrictions on the powers of the SRSG because almost any step in self-government may be in
one or another way interpreted as insufficient fulfillment of SC Resolution 1244
requirements.

The only possible restriction against retaining too much power by an

international administration are the goals of peace-building -

transformation and

sustainability. If the concentration of power within the international administration precludes
the development of independent self-government, such power should be restricted. This
seems to be the only available test to set up limits on the SRSG powers. However, such a test
has several problems. The first is its rather general and imprecise character. A second
problem is the issue into who makes a decision which instance of the exercise of the SRSG’s
power may be regarded as necessary and which one as excessive. Obviously, such decisions
have to be made by a body or an official other than the SRSG; perhaps a UN commission or
panel of international experts. The decisions that the SRSG activities impede the
development of independent government can be made only if a clear pattern of excessive use
of powers by the SRSG has been observed for a period of time.
In practice, it is always difficult to draw a line between the supervision that is
necessary and that which is excessive. James Madison noted that “[i]n framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself.”541 Although this statement was made in a different context, it is particularly relevant
for Kosovo. On the one hand, the “leash” for self-government must be not be too tight and
short in order not to stifle its development and to allow it to exercise control over the

341 The Federalist No. 51 at 3S6 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed. 1974).
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governed. On the other hand, while self-government is still not able to control itself
effectively, certain international supervision is necessary.
Thus, it is possible to conclude that the observation of the requirements of the peace
building concept is essential not only for the legitimacy of a peace-building mission, but also
for its generally more effective work. While derogation from certain peace-building
characteristics can be acceptable and even beneficial, no exceptions to the first three
principles should be allowed.
In contrast to some requirements of peace-building, the consociational techniques
should be tailored creatively and with sensitive consideration given to local peculiarities.
Because of heavy reliance on inclusiveness, quotas and proportions the original concept of
consociationalism contains a number of contradictions and under certain circumstances may
impede the development of one of the central features of democracy - competitiveness and
opposition. Then, the advantage of consociationalism lies in elaborating a flexible solution,
which reduces the adverse effects of consociational techniques. While the principles of grand
coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy should be the main
guidelines for peace-builders, the institutional arrangement for their achievement must be
tailored individually. In many respects the practice of the Kosovo mission represents an
instance of individually tailored consociationalism.
Peace-building and consociationalism complement each other in the ways they
approach democracy-building. Peace-building concentrates on the democracy-building at the
level of the international administration and local leaders. Consociationalism works at the
level of population. Even a successful political settlement between the segmental leaders will
not guarantee long-term stability, unless the population is involved, understands and supports
the changes.542
Generally, there are three levels of successful democratization. First is the very
formation of institutional structures according to universally accepted (or deemed to be
universally accepted) democratic principles. Another level involves an attempt to create

542 The involvement of the population in reconstruction and its acceptance of the solutions proposed
by an international administration is one of the necessary features of peace-building. See, Brahimi
Report, supra note 6.
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social and intellectual conditions that can serve as an anchor for democracy.543 The tie
between these two levels is provided through democratic political culture.544 Political culture
allows a two-way connection between the institutional structures and “anchors” of
democracy. It provides a possibility for democratically oriented personalities to make their
way to the institutional structures and facilitates the contribution of the institutional structures
to the formation of democratic personalities. Interestingly enough, neither the peace-building
nor the consociational concept expressly discuss the issues of developing political culture
consistent with the new democratic institutions.
Political culture affects the performance of democracy.545 It defines what kind of
leaders the population is likely to elect and what kind of tactics would have the most effect
upon these elections - speculation over ethnic sentiment or elaboration of sound political
programs. In tum, the functioning of the re-established self-government, judicial and police
systems creates certain perceptions within ethnic communities and individuals about their
place in the political system and in society as a whole. It shapes the orientation of groups and
individuals towards political system and, thus, the political culture.546 In my view, the
orientation of the population towards political entities and towards its own participation in
the political process can be developed, inter alia, through the consociational techniques
because those techniques seek and provide inclusiveness. Meaningful inclusiveness creates a
feeling among minority groups that they are not mere subjects of the majority governed
political process, but that they can influence the formation of governmental policy. The belief
that their participation matters may facilitate the more activist orientation of minorities
towards the re-established political and governmental system. This, in tum, may help to
resolve one of the difficulties faced by the UNMIK in the first years of the reconstruction the reluctance of certain minorities to cooperate with the UNMIK and other segments of the
society and boycott of democratic procedures, like elections.
Political culture, unlike institutional structures, takes much longer to develop. In my
opinion, the institutional structures in a post-conflict society play the primary role in the

543 Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? Harry Eckstein (ed.) (Lanham, Md. : Rowman
& Littlefield, 1998) at 279.
544Ibid.
545Ibid., at 358
546Here, I understand political culture as defined by Almond and Verba. See, supra note 183.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

187
formation of political culture. This is one of the reasons why special attention should be paid
to the design of governmental structures and ways of their operation. Let us briefly sum up
the arrangements in Kosovo.
Although the UN did not adopt any specific concept for the reconstruction of
ethnically divided societies and Kosovo, in particular, we can And many consociational type
arrangements implemented in the Province. The consociational principles of proportionality,
mutual veto and grand coalition can be clearly traced in the organization of self-government
and to lesser extent in the judiciary and the police. Generally, the elements of
consociationalism were adopted extensively enough and in certain respects grew beyond the
original consociational framework.
One has to recognize all the difficulties of establishing state institutions from scratch
in a ruined post-conflict society. Nevertheless, there are several inconsistencies in the
UNMIK approach to the utilization of ethnically sensitive mechanisms that could have been
avoided.
First, the implementation of the consociational techniques differed, depending on the
level of government: the provincial organs are operating on the basis of proportionality,
mutual veto and grand coalition, while there is no mutual veto and less preconditions for
grand coalition at the municipal level. This difference, on the one hand, may exemplify a lack
of a balanced approach to institution-building. On the other hand, I also see it as an
illustration of the dilemma between the necessity to address the ethnic factor and the danger
of overemphasizing it. All organs and decision-making procedures cannot and should not be
based on the consideration of the ethnic factor. Rather, it should be taken into account in the
design of the central policy-making institutions and in relation to the most important
questions of communal concern.
Second, in relation to some institutions consociationalism was used somewhat
excessively, while in another insufficiently. For example, proportionate distribution of the
committees’ chairmenship in the Kosovo Assembly seems to be too inclusive of minorities
and threatens to undermine the principle of meritocracy in the election process. Moreover,
because chairmen are not likely to play particularly influential roles, proportionate
distribution does not contribute much to the stronger position of communities in the
Assembly. At the same time, the election of such an important official as the President of
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Kosovo does not provide any mechanisms to increase the chances of him or her being a
panethnic figure.

This inconsistency may ultimately reduce the overall effect of

consociationalism in Kosovo.
Third, while sufficient preconditions are created for the inclusiveness of the segments
of society at the level of representative organs, little inclusiveness is provided through the
judiciary and the police. For inclusiveness to be achieved, the consociational approach should
be adopted in a coherent manner in relation to all branches of government. In particular, the
multi-ethnic composition of the judiciary and the police essentially contributes to general
inclusiveness of minorities. The representation of minorities in the courts and the police is a
form of achieving “full membership in a larger society.”547
The very idea of a multi-ethnic judiciary is not new, but finding an effective way to
implement it is difficult. Even in stable democracies, serious questions arise about which
criteria should be used for the selection of judges, and what level of inclusiveness is
sufficient.548 The current police and judicial structures in Kosovo cannot be regarded as
contributing to minority inclusiveness either through their composition or through the way
they exercise their functions.

Thus, there is an apparent misbalance between the

implementation of consociationalism in relation to different branches of government. The
insufficient judicial and police protection may lead to a situation in which minorities shift the
struggle for their rights from adjudication to personal resolution of matters through the use of
force or other inappropriate techniques.
On the basis of the analysis of the Kosovo mission, several recommendations can be
made in regard to the general UN policy in peace-building. First, the practice of Kosovo and
Bosnia demonstrates a clear trend that ethnic factor is taken into consideration in design of
the new democratic institutions. Nevertheless, there is no unifying approach to the issue what
weight ethnicity should have in an institutional design of a state. For example, the Bosnian
mission was criticized as overemphasizing ethnicity and, thus, deepening the gap between
monoethnic communities.549 Kosovo might be different in this respect. Although each post

547 Devlin, MacKay & Kim, supra note 407 at 808.
548 See, ibid.
549 See, e.g., Bosnia's November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, ICG Report, 18 December 2000, online:
ICG Homepage < http://www.intl-crisis-group.orp/proiects/showreport.cfm?reportid= 116 > (date
accessed: IS March 2001).
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conflict situation is peculiar in its modalities, there should be a theoretical model that
provides guidelines for consistent and integrated planning and assessment of international
peace-building activities in divided societies. The UN should adopt a set of principles that
will guide future international activities in the reconstruction of ethnically divided societies.
Second, a more clear determination of the limits of peace-building is necessary. In
particular, it is important to decide whether the role of the Secretary-General in defining the
structure and mandate of peace-building missions is an acceptable pattern for the future
missions.
Third, because of the concerns that international administrations in post-conflict
territories may preclude the development of independent self-government, some international
body should be given power to monitor activities of international administrations and their
officials. This body may also be instance to challenge the actions or decisions of international
administrations by the local population. A possibility of such a challenge is important to
promote the accountability of missions to the population, which they intend to assist. For
example, currently the UNMIK and the KFOR enjoy immunity in Kosovo.550
It has been observed that the “successful democracy syndrome" requires, among other
characteristics, that societies are generally not “plural.”551 Hopefully, this observation is not
true, but it once more demonstrates the controversy surrounding the very possibility of
building a democracy in a divided society. The analysis of the institutional solutions adopted
by the UNMIK suggests that the self-government arrangements have a good potential to be
successful in providing certain level of minority inclusiveness. However, the success of
promoting inclusiveness through the judiciary and the police is quite doubtful. At this point,
there are enough reasons for both skepticism and optimism in regard to the UNMIK activities
and there is no choice but to wait for the empirical evidence to confirm or dismiss these
conclusions.

530 See, Regulation on the Status, Immunities and Privileges o f KFOR and UNMIK and Their
Personnel in Kosovo, supra note 530.
sst Eckstein, supra note 543 at 367.
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Appendix 1
Kosovo: Chronology of Events (1974-1999)
1974

Kosovo obtains a status of an autonomous region within Serbia

1975-81

“Albanization” of political and social life in Kosovo, discrimination
against province’s minorities, growing demands of Kosovo Albanians
for the republican status of Kosovo

1989
March

Kosovo autonomy is abolished

May

Milosevic becomes president of Serbia
The LDK is formed

1990

The Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia dissolves the
Assembly of Kosovo.
A secret referendum held in Kosovo, where the independence of
Kosovo is established. Albania recognizes the self-declared republic.

1991

Election to the Kosovo “parallel” structures are held. Rugova is elected
president of the Kosovo republic.

1992

The KLA is created.

1994

The KLA starts massive reprisals against the Serb police and security
forces.

1995

The KLA intensifies its attacks on police stations, patrols and
residences. The Serb police responds by series of raids in Drenica
region, where houses are burnt and dozens of Albanians are murdered.
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1998

The ethnic tension grows.

March

The Security Council adopts Resolution 1160 where condemns the
excessive use of force by the Serb police and imposes an arms embargo
on the FRY.

September

The Security Council adopts Resolution 1199, which demands the
cessation of hostilities in Kosovo and withdrawal of the Serb forces
from the province; NATO prepares to military intervention.

October

Milosevic agrees to withdrawal of the FRY forces from Kosovo.
The Security Council adopts Resolution 1203, which endorses the
deployment of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)

1999
Feb. - March

Rambouillet talks (failed because of the Serb refusal to accept the
agreement)

March 24

The 78-day NATO air strikes campaign starts.

June 3

The FRY accepts terms brought to Belgrade by EU envoy Ahtisaari and
Russian envoy Chernomyrdin and demands the cessation of bombing.

June 9

The Military Technical Agreement is signed between the FRY and
NATO

June 10

Solana calls a suspension of NATO air strikes. UN Security Council
adopts resolution 1244 authorizing the deployment of the international
security and civil presence in Kosovo.

June 12

The deployment of the international security presence - Kosovo Force
(KFOR) - starts.

June 13

Special Representative ad interim Sergio Vieira de Mello arrives in
Kosovo.
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June 20

The withdrawal of the FRY forces from Kosovo is completed.

June 21

NATO and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) officials sign a
disarmament agreement

July 15

Special Representative for the UN Secretary-General, head of the
UNMIK, Bernard Kouchner arrives in Kosovo
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Appendix 2
Kosovo Parties
N
o.

Name

Acronym Party Leader Muni Votes
cipali won,
ties
%
Conte
sted

Seats

S s S sh S fStS ciJSs*

1.
~2.

_4.
5.

7.
8.

Democratic League of
Kosovo
Democratic Party of
Kosovo
Liberal Centre Party of
Kosovo
Liberal Party of Kosova
Social Democratic Party of
Kosova
Albanian Christian
Democratic Party of
Kosova
Republican Party of
Kosova
Albanian National
Democratic Party
Social Democratic Union

LDK

29

58.0

504

PDK

Ibrahim
Rugova
Hashim Thaci

27

27.3

267

PQLK

Naim Maloku

16

0.8

PLK
PSDK

Gjrgj Dedaj
Kaqusha
Jashari
Mark
Krasniqi

19
17

0.6
0.4

13

1.2

PRK

Feti Grapci

12

0.3

PNDSH

0.3

PSHDK

0

10 Albanian national
Democratic Movement
11 Party of Democratic Action
of Kosova
12 Green Party of Kosova

LNDSH

Rexhep
Abdullahu
Luljeta PulaBeqiri_____
Kajtaz Fazlia

SDA

Numan Balic

0.5

PGJK

Daut Maloku

0.2

13

PRSH

Skender Hoti

0.1

14 Liberal Democratic Party
of Kosova

PLDK

Agim
Gjakova

0.1

0

15 Ashkali Albanian
Democratic Party of
Kosova
17 National Democratic Front
of Kosova

PDASHK

Sabit
Rrahmani

PBKD

Durmish
Rizvanolli

0.1

0

9.

Albanian Republican Party

USD
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0.1

0

0.1

0

0
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Bosniacs Party of
Democratic Action of
Kosova

Turkish People’s Party of
Kosova
Democratic Reform Party
of Muslims

HilmoKandic

KTHP

Sezair Saipi

0.1

DRSM

Dezair Murati

0.3

Alliance for the Future of
Kosova
Coalition for Independence

AAK

Ramush
Haradinaj
Rexhep Qosja

Mitrovica Turk
Community
Citizens’ Initiative of Gora
Citizens’ Initiative the
Independents of Mitrovica

MTTT

KP

GIG
IQPM

0

29

7.7

71

18

0.4

0

Ergin
Koroglu
'Ibisi Rustem
Qemajl
Sokoli
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Appendix 5 - Progress Report on the Formation of Municipal Assemblies

Updated 2

February 2001
.

Fust* Kosov*

Elected Party
Representatives K/Albanian

19LDK; 10 AAK; 2 PDK
10 LDK; 6 POK
3QIO;2SDA
29LDK, 11 PDK; 1AAK
"■ 13 LDK; 4 PDK; 3 AAK 1 PDAShK;

QWptthakovtea
QfrnfQflHtr* '

G«90WP/G|OflWBO
' Mo&Mok......
T^tTt“•J^yrTri
^KfftwntofKamenioa

hWWM«wiv,.v . -

26 LDK; 7 AAK; 4
PShOK; 3 PDK; 1 PLK
27 LDK; 11 PDK; 2 AAK;
1 POLK
27 PDK; 4 LDK
22 LDK; 5 PDK; 3 AAK 1SOA
16 PDK; 12 LDK; 2 AAK;
1 PRK
19 LDK; 0 PDK; 3 AAK
17 LDK; 10 PDK; 2 AAK;
2 PShDK

Uposayh/Lspbaavi

i'’Uolii/lJDiin11'r'■;" • 16 LDK; 13 PDK; 2 AAK
IT" - ■
16 LDK; 13 PDK; 1 AAK;
M*QyjQAyttrovfca

1Indep.
26 LDK; 11 PDK; 1 AAK
6 PDK; 7 LDK; 1AAK

1'OWHfl^OWW**'*
12 LDK; 5 POK; 4 AAK
•• "ir 28 LDK; 8 AAK; 4 PDK
- w i n y n r i r ^ ’ii

1 SDA

Ppth4evfl/Podu|evo

28 LDK; 10 PDK; 3 AAK
36 LDK; 11 PDK; 4 AAK

Prtwen

24 LDK; 10 PDK; 2 AAK; 2BSOAK; 1
1 PShDK; 1 PNDSH
DRSM
20 LDK; 6 PDK; 5 AAK

Rahovec/Orahovac

Appointed MAMambara
Sworn In

Elec. Party;
Br* -

flw oU o ■>
n
iiip v n

Deputy Praaldant

N/A
1 Ashkali (PDAShK); Pending: 1 Rom/Ashkali
Pending: 4 KS;1 Ashkali?

m

LDK; Mehmet Bojcaj
LDK; HalimShpmshedini
LDK; AdemSMihej
LDK; SkenderZOgaJ

AAK; Nazmi Setmonaj
LDK; Aslian ZejnuHahu
LDK; Falk Grainca
LDK; Sabit HykoHi

2 Egyptians

LDK;Aq»Shehu

LDK; Haxhi Kambeari

1 Turk (TDP); 1 Rom; Pending: 6 KS

LDK; Lutii Hazki

LDK; Xhemajl Hyseni

m

1 Egyptian; 1 Bosniac (SDA?); Pending: 1 KS
N/A

PDK; Izet ttxahimi
LDK; Fad* Ferati
PDK; Tahir Qaka

PDK; Xheladin Gashi
LDK; Ferat Hajzeraj
PDK; Gjabir Zharku

1 Rom; Pending: 11 KS
1 Rom; Pending: 1 KS

LDK; Shaip SurduHi
LDKjtsmetRrad

LDK; Nexhat Rexha
LDK; Prank Ojetaj

14 KS; 1 Bosniac (JUL); Pending: 2 KA

Nenad Radoeavt(evio

Dragisa Krstovic

1 Ashkali (PDAShK); 1 Rom; 1 Croat; Pending: 5KS
N/A

LDK;BasriDemiri
LDK;JakupKastrati

LDK; Mevlide ShamoNi
LDK; Mrs.RemzijeThaqi

1 Bosniac; Pending: 11 KS
1 Rom; Pending: 12 KS (6 sworn in?)

LDK; Fan* Spahiu
PDK; Emin Gerbeshi

LDK; Mustaj Pllana
PDKGafur Mustafa

1 Ashkali (PDAShK); Pending: 5 KS, 1 Rom/Ashkali
1 Rom; 1 Egyptian; 1 KS/SPS; 1 Bosniac? Pending: 1
KS/SNC
1 Ashkali
1 Ashkali (PDAShK); 1 Bosniac (BSDAK)?; Pending:
5 KS, 1 Turk; 1 Rom
1 Turk (TDP); 1 Rom; 1 Bosniac (indep.); Pending: 1
Turk (KTHP)
1 KS; 1 Rom; (1 additional appointed KS has
declined)

LDK; RexhapKeiani
LDK; AfiLaJqi

LDK; HajrizBekteshi
LDK; Smajl Shala

LDK; AgimVeiki
LDK; SeUhGashi

LDK; AgtmKikaj
LDK; Nabih Zariqi

LOK; Eqrem Kryeziu

LDK; Mre. Samahata
Mashkulli
LDK; Nahid Elshanl
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LDK; EsatHaxhltya

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11 PDK; 9 LDK; 1AAK
27 PDK: 4 LDK
9 PDK; 8 LDK
30 LDK; 7 POK; 2 AAK;
2 POLK
19 LDK; 8 PDK; 2 AAK;
1 PShOK; 1 PLK
20 LDK: 9 PDK; 2 AAK

:
Zvran/Zveean

1 Ashkali (PDAShK)
Pending: 2 KS
Pending: 17 KS
N/A

PDK;F*hmiNMota
PDK: Ramadan Gacht
LDK;Uke8ytyqi

LDK; Ahmeti Ahmedi
PDK: Ahmed UW
PDK; Bahri Hyseini
LDK; Vitor Markaj

2 KS; Pending: 2 KS

LDK;SametOalipi

PDK; NexhmedinArifi

Pending: 3 KS
15 KS; 2 KA

LDK: HaizerKrasniai

LDK: Ibush Januzi

appoints by UNMIK]

by UNMIK]

12 Seibs (+ 3 accepted but not yet sworn in); (2
appointed KAwithdrewbefore taking the oath)

This is an unofficial working document - for internal OSCE use only - comprising informationfrom OMIK Democratisation Officers in FOs and RCs, the HQ DD Advisor on
Minorities as well as from the Municipal Helpdesk (TTF).
Please send any corrections or amendments to
Stia.Kieldsen@omik.ore (Democratisation Department).
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Appendix 6 - Progress Report on the Formation o f Municipal Structures

Updated 20 March 2001

Municipality

lilii
jS jii

fill

I1?

Defan/De* ani

LDK

Dragash/DragaS

LDK

3 LDK; 2 PDK; 1 GIG; 1 SDA

1 SDA(chair); 1 GIG; 1 LDK

Ferizaj/UroSevac

LDK

7 LDK; 3 PDK; 1 AAK

Fush£ Kosova/
Kosovo
Polje
GJakovfi/* akovic
a
Gjilan/GnjKane

1 LOK; 1 POK; 3 Vacant
seats

LDK

4 LDK; 1 PDK; 1AAK; Vacant
seat: 1Appointed

V

V

V

1 Rom; 1 Egyptian; 1
Bomiao; 1 LDK; 1 PShDK
2 LDK; 1 PDK; 3 Vacant seat

4 LDK; 1AAK; 1 PShDK; 1
Egyptian
2 LDK; 1 PDK; 1(to be checked]
Vacant seat
2 PDK; 1 LDK

LDK

Gllogovc/Glogov
ac
Istog/lstok

" 4 LDK; 2 AAK; 1 PDK

" 6 LDK; 2 AAK; 1 PShDK; 1
PDK; 1 PLK
6 LDK; 3 PDK; 1 AAK/PQLK
LDK
LDK

PDK

5 PDK; 1 LDK

LOK

5 LDK; 1 PDK; 1 AAK

T "

i*' , . ‘

2 LDK; 2 Bosniac; 1 AAK; 1
Egyptian: 1 KS

Kaganik/Ka* anik PDK ' V
Kamenic6/Kame
nica

LOK

KlinS/Klina

LDK

Leposavi* /Lepos V
aviq
Llpjan/Upljan
LDK
Malishevfl/MallSe LDK

5 LDK; 1AAK; 1 PDK; 1 Rom. 2 LDK; 1 PDK; 1 Rom.
Vacant seat: 1 KS
Vacant sept: 3 KS
2 LDK; 2 PDK; 1 AAK; 1
PShDK
V

LDK
aft.
LDK

' V

'

2 PDK(chair); 1 GIG; 1 SDA; 1
LDK; 1Gorani (indep.)
5 LDK; 2 PDK

2 LDK; 2 Bosniac; 1 PDK; 1
Egyptian
3 PDK; 2 LDK; 1 PRK; 1
AAK/AQK
2 LDK; 1 PDK; 1 Rom. Vacant
seats: 2 KS

1 Ashkali; 1 Rom; 1 LDK

2 Roma; 2 LDK

V (KA vacant)

V (KAvacant)

4LDK;2 AAK; 1POK; 1 indsp. ,
indep.fKA?!: 2 [affiliation?]

V

V

LDK

i LDK

™WpSW>K

7 LOK;2 P8M>^1AAK
2 UJK; 1A^K; 1 PShpj&l,,
indeo.: Vacant seat I KS

PDK

V

LDK
aft.
PDK

6Diiacto»;'p«fKlinflr3' ::‘v'r" "

LDK

5i,R K ;i!PPK j't-|a-c/ ^

LDK

7 LOtty! AAK: . / r-".';

(Maoebonian); lw-*dvertised :■>
(KS naaatuad)
4 U * ]4 PDKv
■- J ; / : ; -

V-

4 LDK; 3 PDK; 3 community
representatives

>/
5 LDK; 3 PDK; 1 AAK

VO

MitrovicA/Mitrovic

lDk

7 LDK; 3 PDK; 1 AAK

Novobdrdfi/
NovoBrdo

PDK

2 PDK; 1AAK; 1 KS; 1
Vacant (lor LDK)

V
1 PDK: 1 LDK; 1 AAK; 1

Rom; 1 KS

209

2 LDK; 2 PDK; 1 KS

.

V

PDK

3 K/SaftMK2 LDK; 2 POK

"
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ObiHqfObiU*
PejS/Pe*

LDK
LDK

v

7 LDK; 2 AAK; 1 PDK; 1 SDA

Podujevfi/Poduje LDK

7 LDK; 3 PDK; 1AAK

PrishtlnA/PriStina

LDK

Prizren

LDK

5 LDK; 2 PDK; 1AAK; 1
Bosniac
6 LDK; 2 PDK; 1 PSHDK; 1
BSDAK; t AAK

vo

3 LDK; 2 PDK; 1AAK; 1 Ashkali
1 Bosniac; 1Ashkali; 1 Turk; 2 LDK; 1 AAK; 1 Ashkali; 1
1 LDK: 1 PDK: vacant KS
Bosniac; 1 Turk; vacant: KS
1DRSM(ctyMr); 1BSOAK; 2 3 LDK(chair); t PDK; t AAK; 1
LDK; 2 PDK; Pending; 2Turic indep. Bosniac; 1 TDB (Turk)
1Bosniac; IRom
2KS; 1Rom; Pend?;2LDK;
Pending: 2 LDK; 1 PDK; 1AAK;
1PDK:1AAK: vacant: 2KS
4 community representatives
1 Ashkali (Chair); 1 LDK; 1
1 LDK(Chair); t PDK; 2
PDK; 1 KS; 1 Rom
community repre. (1 PDASHK)

Rahovec/Orahov LDK
ao
Shtime/Stimlje "POK"

4 LDK; 2 PDK;
1 AAK
4 PDK; 2 LDK; 1 AAK

SkenderaJ/Srbica PDK
Strpce/ShtArpcd
SuharekA/Suva
LDK
Raka
Vitina/Vtti
W

10 PDK; 1 LDK
3+2temporaryKA; Vacant:5KS
7 LDK; 1 PDK; 1AAK
1Roman-Cathq|ic; IRom;
1PPK:1LDK:1unknown
8 LDK; 4 PDK; 1 AAK; 1
PShDK
5 LDK; 2 PDK
Yea

Vushtrri/Vu* ttm
Zubin Potok

LDK

1PDK(Chair); 2 LDK; IKS; t
PSHDK/ Roman-Catholic

LDK
LDK
aft.
LDK
LDK
aff.
LDK
LDK
aft.
PDK

S Directors; 1 re-advertisad
8LDK+ 2LDK a#.; IPShDK; •'

Undsp. ■;

10 Directors ■.
3LDK+6LDK support; 2POK;
lPSbD K ;2lndep ■
, 1
8LpK +LD K aff.;lPSO K ;l
unknown afflHatkm
'
:

V(recruited

PDK
LDK

7LOK*2LDKatf.; 2Msp.;
lAAKaff.
\

LDK

'pKSirii^vet^;:^.'-'"^

Yes
LDK
2 LDKaff.it POK; 31ndso.
V
V
7
Vacant seat: 1 KA
Vacant seat 1 KA
Vacant seat: t KA
Zve* an/Zvsgan
V
V
V
This is an unofficial working document comprising information from OMIK Democratisation Officers in FOs and RCs, the HQ DD Advisor on Minorities as
well as from the Municipal Helpdesk (TTF).
Please send any corrections or amendments to Stie.Kieldsen@omik.ore
(Democratisation Department).
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